{"id":8552,"date":"2015-12-18T15:03:36","date_gmt":"2015-12-18T07:03:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.quezon.ph\/?p=8552"},"modified":"2022-04-20T12:58:43","modified_gmt":"2022-04-20T04:58:43","slug":"the-presidency-and-the-crisis-of-modernity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.quezon.ph\/2015\/12\/18\/the-presidency-and-the-crisis-of-modernity\/","title":{"rendered":"The Presidency and the Crisis of Modernity"},"content":{"rendered":"
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\"SOURCE:<\/a>
SOURCE: Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Spain<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

I. “Today began yesterday”<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

–As Leon Ma. Guerrero once put it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From Nick Joaquin’s reportage on the 1963 midterms, \u201cAyos na ang Buto-Buto,\u201d<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The following night, at the NP miting de avance, there was again no doubt that the crowd responded most fraternally to another Southerner, Senator Roseller Lim of Zamboanga\u2014and this on the testimony of a Pampango-Manile\u00f1o, Senator Puyat. A forecaster could indeed have read in the size and temper of that multitude on Plaza Miranda the great swing of the South to the Opposition that the next day\u2019s polls would reveal. If the politicos want a new rule on Manila, here\u2019s a possible one: As Manila goes, the South goes. Because Manila is now the biggest Southern city in the Philippines.<\/p>

Puyat says he felt rather scared when the atmosphere became so charged with passion the miting turned into a mighty dialogue between speaker on stage and the crowd below.<\/p>

SPEAKER: Ano ang gagawin kay Macapagal?
CROWD: Palakolin!
SPEAKER: Ano ang gagawin kay Macapagal?
CROWD: Martilyuhin!<\/p>

\u201cI felt,\u201d says Puyat, \u201cthat if the speaker had shouted On to Malaca\u00f1ang! that mob would have followed\u2014and I fear to think what would have happened there. We politicians carry a big responsibility.\u201d<\/p>

As one listened to Puyat\u2019s account, one had the creepy feeling, too, that our political campaigns have gotten out of hand and are becoming sick.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The unease of 1963 (in the context above last felt, perhaps, during Edsa Tres) has come back in our Republic of Amnesia, though now seen as new, precisely because of that amnesia (among other things, caused by the lost generation in our national life<\/a>, just at the point when a handover from one generation to the next was supposed to take place).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So I do think Patricio Abinales has a point in saying it ain’t new –it’s just Imperial Manila that’s shocked, shocked!– at what everyone else knows. See his essay, Digong’s Mouth<\/a> in Rappler. And so his (Duterte’s) blunt talk is not so much blunt, or the kind of Id<\/a>-speak that put Miriam Defensor Santiago on the politicial map, as it is the tone and style of the provincial barons. And here it’s important to consider that Duterte is, indeed, a provincial baron: as he himself has pointed out, he was always immersed in politics because his own father was governor. The last time we saw this in a candidate for national office was when Joseph Estrada ran for the presidency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Duterte’s advantage is novelty —particularly compared to the candidates who kicked off their campaigns for 2016 back in 2010<\/a>— and for being the lone non-Manila-centric candidate (their Visayan, Ibanag-Batangue\u00f1o, etc. origins and constituencies notwithstanding, the other candidates are all firmly part of the Manila establishment); and so he can –and is– tweaking the noses of the Metro Manilans. This is no small matter and carries with it many long-standing issues on representation and recognition. See my Notes for a prospective article on the emerging politics of a national identity<\/a> from 2009.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An interesting article by Richard Javad Heyderian is Philippines’ Black Swan Elections: The New Normal in Democratic Politics<\/a>: proposing that Trump, Le Pen, and Duterte represent a brewing revolt against the democratic system. Buddy Gomez<\/a> says as much in more trenchant terms. An online commentary by Nik @ iwriteasiwrite<\/a> suggests unease, even revulsion, with the tenor of some of his supporters. Though if one recalls the 2010 campaign, the tenor is much the same as the supporters of Dick Gordon (supporters of Miriam Defensor Santiago on the other hand, are closer to the style of the supporters Gibo Teodoro). So, these things should be par for the course.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To be sure, going back to Heyderian, he qualifies the survey numbers he uses with the usual caveats –some question the surveys concerned, etc.– but on the whole he puts forward Duterte as a Black Swan, a political phenomenon no one saw coming, as demonstrated by the upsurge in Duterte’s numbers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A few things, though, that can explain that uptick. First, there’s being the Flavor of the Month due to–<\/p>\n\n\n\n

a) The “teleserye”<\/a> nature of the will he or won’t he chatter;<\/p>\n\n\n\n

b) His coming in, at long last, when he was predicted to enter the fray: by December<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, more importantly, to my mind, is that Duterte’s numbers can be explained by a question repeatedly polled: martial law. At the heart of this constituency is something I pointed out when Adrian Cristobal passed away<\/a>: the idea that you can have a Year Zero, a New Society, a Restored Eden –if only drastic action is undertaken:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Everything that Marcos claimed was the problem: a conceited yet essentially incompetent ruling class, a slavish society devoid of a sense of intrinsic self-worth, a society that required a firm hand to rule it –all continue to be said of ourselves, by ourselves, all the time. Whatever the infinite variation, the central theme continues to be that of the need for a New Society: it was precisely that, but without the Great Dictator, that even Edsa tried to accomplish, and which has been used as an indictment of People Power since.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

If one views politics as a contest to gather and expand constituencies, then the martial law constituency is not only actually rather large, but consistent –and except for some senatorial candidates, one only tangentially cultivated by presidential candidates –until now.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Just as in 1992 –where few noticed that the alarming subtext of the election was that the Marcos Loyalist bloc would have won if it hadn’t been fatally divided between Imelda Marcos and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.– the showdown in 2010<\/a> –between the Reformists and Populists (who themselves were heirs and veterans of the Marcos Machine)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Up to the entry of Duterte, the division between Populism and Reformism essentially had a reshuffling of the deck between the Reform Constituency: Liberal Wing (Roxas) and Populist Wing (Poe); the Populist Constituency: Traditionalist Wing (Binay) and Loyalist Wing (Santiago). What Duterte did was give the Marcos-Populist-Leftist side of things a shot in the arm by daring to break the post-EDSA consensus on Martial Law (of all establishment groups, the one left in the most awkward situation is the Left, which, already having dumped Binay and hitched its star to Poe, will be hard-put to justify yet another tactical move to Duterte even though he actually has the “best” record of dealing with them –the modus vivendi he’s reached with armed partisans in the past representing an inconvenient dilemma for some Leftists in the Metro Manila  chattering class upset over his perceived scorn for human rights, for example.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What he has done is awakened a constituency that has always been there (see The Praetorian Temptation<\/a>) but in past probes of public opinion, it was considered so small as to be a harmless minority: because the pro-martial law segments of the population added up to a slall minority compared to those against martial law. But in a crowded field which has divided the large constituences, cultivating a smaller but cohesive constituency no one else has tapped into, is significant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here’s the constituency over time (see Felipe Miranda’s Anyone for having martial law?<\/a> from 2001 and Mahar Mangahas’ Filipinos rarely approve of martial law<\/a> from 2009):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"SWS<\/a><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n
\"PULSE<\/a><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n


<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The surveys above also slice and dice the public on the basis of class –the ABC, D, and E familiar to us in the surveys. But an interesting point to consider is that there can be other ways to view –and explain– the public and the opinions people hold. Consider the following, which is basically a distillation of the thoughts of some marketing people:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"(1)<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

\"(2)<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

How would the above come into play in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of a campaign? To the extent that it offers up a different approach from the usual class-based one, it can go far in explaining how a candidate can break down barriers between economic classes, or put another way, have cross-class appeal: because there are ways of thinking or approaches that are shared by Filipinos regardless of socioeconomic class. An easy way to understand this would be the cross-class appeal of particular shows and personalities in entertainment, for example.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

II. Traditional expectations of the Presidency<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

I do not think that the public’s expectations of the presidency have changed in three generations. Two comments, a decade apart, summarizes these expectations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

  1. Teodoro M. Kalaw, a follower of Osme\u00f1a, quoted Manuel L. Quezon as having said to Osme\u00f1a in 1922 that “The problem with you is that you take the game of politics too seriously. You look to far behind you and too far ahead of you. Our people do not understand that. They do not want it. All they want is to have the present problem solved, and solved with the least pain. That is all.”<\/strong><\/li>
  2. Writing in his diary on December 23, 1938, former Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison caught his friend Manuel L. Quezon in a moment of reflection. \u201cThe people care more for good government than they do for self-government,\u201d adding that, \u201cthe fear is that the Head of State may either exceed his powers, or abuse them by improprieties. To keep order is his main purpose.\u201d<\/strong><\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    In a review he wrote, Arturo Rotor (who, besides being a well-known writer and botanist, served as Executive Secretary in the Commonwealth government-in-exile), pointed out how politicians use off-the-cuff statements to gauge public opinion:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Quezon had his own way of gauging public opinion, of taking a poll survey. He would say something preposterous or do the completely unexpected to find out what the people thought of a political leader, or to measure their opposition to religious instruction in schools. If the act aroused a bigger rumpus than he had calculated, he would institute an appropriate measure.<\/p>

    Thus to the uninformed, Quezon often appeared inconsistent, mercurial, unreliable, a man whose word could not be trusted. No greater mistake can be made. When Quezon had studied a problem and made up his mind, no earthly force could stop him.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

    So there can be method in what might superficially appear as madness –just as there can be a line easily crossed between being hot copy and becoming a caricature not to be taken seriously.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    III. The Crisis of Modernity<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    So let us see how Randy David defined the Crisis of Modernity<\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    But, in general, the problems we have gone through and are going through \u2013 the multiple crises, the almost unending instability, the cycle of confusion, despair, hope, disenchantment, and cynicism \u2013 that have accompanied our evolution as a society are part and parcel of the often wrenching transition to a modern society. A transition is a particularly confusing stage \u2013 marked by what Gramsci once called the dying of the old and the inability of the new to be born. The old habits of our culture are quickly vanishing, yet the ways of modern society have not fully taken root. In the interim, our people suffer from a surplus of dependence. They are subservient even when they no longer need to be. They slide into the easy habits of the powerless even when the tools of emancipation may already be at hand. They seek patronage even where it is not necessary.<\/p>

    Our leaders and rulers, on the other hand, suffer from a nobility deficit. A sense of honor, drawn from tradition, no longer deters or restrains them. The poverty and ignorance of the masses brings out the predator rather than the hero in them. They take advantage of the weaknesses of the legal system and the persistence of the old habits of an unequal society, even as the old values like delicadeza<\/i> no longer compel them.<\/p>

    But all this will pass as our society slowly moves from a hierarchical order to a more democratic one. There are many drivers of modernity in our midst, not the least of which is the migration of millions of our countrymen to various parts of the world. Working abroad, they are no longer just improving their material lives; they are also discovering new values, developing a work ethic appropriate to modern settings, and building a strong sense of self that had been denied them in a traditional society.<\/p>

    In the near future, inherited status will no longer be an asset. Occupations and public office will become more accessible to those born without privilege. Politics will be more accountable to the general public, to the citizens, rather than to a few dominant centers of influence. Kinship will decline in importance as a passport to economic or political mobility. With universal education, which has so far eluded us, citizens should be in a better position to distinguish between roles like entertainment and governance, between public service and profit-seeking, and between the quest for spirituality and the quest for justice.<\/p>

    What I am describing here is the trajectory of the transition to modernity. Our political institutions, modern as they are, came as a legacy of American colonialism. They were grafted onto a feudal social order and culture defined by the values of a patron-client system. The disconnect became apparent to us only after the generation that had been schooled in colonial America\u2019s modern ways had left the stage. We are just starting to grasp the logic of these institutions. Our hope is that the next generation can make them a reality.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

    Creeping modernity manifests itself in many ways (just as it creates a paradox<\/a>: “can the aspiration to be modern, remain modern, if it’s built on what is, after all, a very traditional assumption? That political involvement and its goal of control of the government, are not only good, but necessary, and capable of achieving beneficial change?”). One sign is the extinction of the honorific “Don” and “Do\u00f1a.” It’s gone out of style only in the last decade or so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The decline of “church, club, and school” –the institutions that defined what I have called the Old Middle Class, in contrast to the New Middle Class– I’ve written about several times in the past, whether concerning fraternities<\/a> (still strongest in the legal profession, and a core constituency of some candidates such as the Vice President), or the two periods of social transformation, i.e. World War II and Martial Law<\/a>, or even the gerrymandering of the national territory<\/a>; the relationship between politics and business<\/a>; leading, however, to fears over the loss of social mobility<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Here is a bullet point version of the above<\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n