Introduction

Recently, I came across the Heneral Luna Study Guide, which is an interesting effort to engage teachers.

I am sharing a timeline I have compiled of key events and accompanying literature on the life of Antonio Luna. Some of the items in the timeline came from The World of 1898: The Spanish-American War. The purpose of the timeline is to add additional readings, from the perspective of friends, critics (and enemies) and historians, on Luna and his times.

Events and trends placing events in Luna’s life in context are in italics.

See also Part I, Part II, and Part III of a Graphic Timeline of the Philippine-American War, from the Presidential Museum and Library. See also The Philippine-American War.

1866

October 29

Antonio Luna is born.

Edwin Francisco, UP Science and Society Program:

Antonio Luna de San Pedro y Novicio-Ancheta was born on October 29, 1866 in Urbiztondo, Binondo, Manila. He was the youngest of seven children of Joaquín Luna de San Pedro, from Badoc, Ilocos Norte, and Spanish mestiza Laureana Novicio-Ancheta, from Luna, La Union (formerly Namacpacan).[3] His father was a traveling salesman of the products of government monopolies. His older brother, Juan, was an accomplished painter who studied in the Madrid Escuela de Bellas Artes de San Fernando. Another brother, José, became a doctor.

1872

January 20

Cavite Mutiny.

1881

Bachelor of Arts, Ateneo Municipal de Manila. Studied two years at the University of Santo Tomas, earning first prize for the paper, Two Fundamental Bodies of Chemistry.

1884

May

In The Roots of the Filipino Nation, O.D. Corpuz writes:

The reports during the period also refer to an incident that occurred in Pangasinan in May 1884. The official story was that the pueblo officials of Santa Maria, Binalonan, and Urdaneta conspired to lead a group of bandits to sack one of the towns, and that the disturbance was speedily quelled.
If Buencamino’s testimony is correct, the investigation and trial were “rigged.” He claims that the alleged insurrection was simulated by the Dominican friars. They sent out incriminating letters to Filipinos in places as far apart as northern Luzon to Tarlac, Bulacan, and Nueva Ecija, the letters bearing Novicio’s name. For good measure they “warned” the civil government of the supposed insurrection. In other words, it was a frame-up.[1]

1885

Maternal uncle of Antonio Luna implicated in revolt. As Raquel A. G. Reyes wrote in Love, Passion and Patriotism: Sexuality and the Philippine Propaganda,

The family of Juan and Antonio Luna fell under suspicion after their maternal uncle had led a short-lived uprising against Spanish rule in the provinces of Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija, and the 19-year-old Antonio had been briefly incarcerated in Manila’s Bilibid prison.[21]

1888

Luna goes to Spain. The exceptional abilities of the two brothers was recognized even by their enemies. Here is an extract from a truly scurrilous book, written from the perspective of the Spanish religious orders.

In The Katipunan, Francis St. Claire wrote:

NOTE 10. Antonio and Juan Luna were two of four brothers. The former was a bacteriologist, the latter an artist who at one time, whilst he followed the instruction and remained under the guidance of his master, showed no little talent. Antonio went to Spain in ‘88, and later on passed to Paris where he lived with his brother Juan who supported him. There he devoted himself to the study which made him famous; this he did in the laboratory of Dr. Roux. He became an assistant editor of the Solidaridad, the official organ of filipino freemasonry, and wrote many vicious articles in its columns over the pseudonym of Taga-Ilog. As a member of the freemason fraternity, he was known as Gay Lussac.
On his return to Manila he established for a livelihood a school of fencing, and like the vain, insensate “magpie in borrowed plumes” that he was, he once sent his seconds to a Spanish officer, inviting him to a duel![6]

October 16

Antonio Luna writes to Mariano Ponce. This letter would be used as an exhibit in Rizal’s trial in December, 1896:

Madrid, October 16, 1888, to D. Mariano Ponce.
My dear friend Mariano:
–Rizal has very well said of Lete that he does not serve for big enterprises. Consult with him concerning the designation of Llorente as director of the paper. Rizal knows them both; he also knows Llorente’s capacity and is very intimate with him, because both are young men of sterling value and Rizal has a very good opinion of Llorente. Ask him for advice and heed well what he tells you. Tell him that I have induced Llorente to accept the position of director.
–An embrace, and take the matter to Rizal for his advice.
Thine, Antonio.
–P. S. Tear this letter up after noting its contents. Send me immediately Rizal’s London address.[23]

1889

From the memoirs of Luna’s good friend, Jose Alejandrino:

In that year (1889) there appeared in the newspaper “El Pueblo Soberano” of Barcelona certain articles signed by its editor and owner, Mir Deas, lambasting “Taga-Ilog” for his criticisms of the Spanish customs expounded in his book “Impressions”, which articles Antonio Luna was answering from Madrid. The controversy reached a point, if I remember well, where the editor of “El Pueblo Soberano” included all the Filipino people in his attacks.
This Mr. Mir Deas, whose name Luna changed to Mier Das (Spanish for excreta), was one who had resided for a long time in the Philippines, writing in the local papers. Protected by the immunity afforded them by the state of things at that time, he and Barrantes, Quioquiap, Retana and others took pleasure in reviling continuously the entire Filipino people in their writings.
—
Luna needed very little to arouse his anger and this time he had more than enough reason to get really mad; consequently, he wanted at all cost to avenge the offense done to him and all those of his race. He therefore insulted even us for refusing to point out Mir Deas to him.
—
Upon Mir’s refusal to accept a duel, Luna became more furious, and we resolved not to leave him alone when walking in the city. I slept in the same room with him, and I was careful to keep him company at all times. One morning, however, I woke up greatly startled upon seeing the bed of Luna vacated so early. I looked for him in all parts of the house and, not finding him, I dressed up in a hurry and proceeded to the Rambla de las Flores (a promenade in the city) where I was almost sure I would find him. There indeed he was, walking alone up and down the Rambla de las Flores and the Rambla de los Pajaros brandishing a rattan cane with that ferocious face which he used to wear when in bad humor and which face earned for himself among his intimates the nickname “cafre”. Upon seeing him I asked him, ”What are you doing here, Antonio?”
And he answered, “ I am looking for Mir Deas.” I asked him again, “How do you expect to find him when you do not know him?”
To this he replied, “Well, I am looking for anyone who to me looks like Mir Deas to mangle down.”
I tried to calm him down, advising him to have a little more patience because soon we would indicate Mir to him, and he would have occasion to punish him properly.
Mir Deas refused absolutely either to make the demanded retraction or to fight, and, finally, the seconds, despairing that Mir would not give satisfaction for the offense which he had caused us, decided to tell Luna who he was, taking him to the Cafe de los Cristales on Plaza Cataluña where he was found writing on one of the tables. From the door of the Cafe they indicated to Luna where Mir was and Luna, without committing himself to the protection of either God or the devil, went toward the offender, spitting on his face. But not even this insult which was done publicly made Mir fight; instead, he wrote another insulting article in the newspaper “El Diluvio” (The Deluge). Luna and ex-Secretary Apacible sent their seconds to the editor of the paper and the author of the article, but both refused to accept the challenge on the pretext that they were not agreeable to the principles of the duel. One of the seconds sent was Mariano Ponce.
Later on, for the satisfaction of the Spaniards who sympathized with our aspirations, the Filipino colony in Barcelona submitted the writings of Luna to a jury composed entirely of Spaniards, among whom was Señor Junoy — editor of “La Publicidad” of Barcelona who later on occupied a prominent place in Spanish politics. This jury decided that the writings of Luna were not insulting to the Spaniards as a people but were solely a criticism of some customs which many Spanish writers themselves had also criticized.[2]

Context for the above can be found in The Roots of the Filipino Nation, in which O.D. Corpuz writes:

Antonio Luna was involved in an “affair of honor” in 1889. It started with his article “Impresiones Madrileñas de un Filipino” (La Solidaridad 31 October). The piece began with him fantasizing about Spain the mother country, Madrid its capital, and then the Puerta del Sol, the latter’s magnificent hub and main plaza, when he was on board ship in the China Sea on the voyage to Europe. In Madrid Luna’s Malay features were conspicuous; the people called him “Chino” or “Igorot” – there had been some Igorots brought for exhibition in the 1887 exposition. In the main his impressions of the city expressed disappointment; but if the piece was critical, it was not much different nor more severe than criticisms of the city by Spanish writers. Luna warned Filipinos against being disenchanted. In his closing paragraph he advised readers that “his pictures were realistic” and that he did not use “shadings and medium tints.” He signed as Taga-ilog.
[…]
This supplement ended with an Epilogue: how Mariano Ponce was secretly denounced to the authorities as allegedly publishing clandestine books. Rumors and talk of sedition spread in the city and were published in the press, but an official investigation established that the denunciations were groundless.[1]

1889-1890

The editorial ins and outs, and relationship between the writers of La Solidaridad is summarized by O.D. Corpuz as follows:

He had sent a letter with this suggestion to Del Pilar in June 1889. He informed the latter that Antonio Luna was ready with a series of articles for the SOL; Luna would not use any pseudonyms.
Let us abandon pseudonyms and adopt a new policy, the policy of valor and true solidarity. The paper is becoming important; imagine if the articles are signed by Blumentritt, M. del Pilar, Jaena, Luna, etc. Our countrymen, upon seeing our courage, upon seeing not the courage of one but of many, on seeing that Rizal is not an exception but the general rule, will take courage and lose their fear.
[…]
The exiles generally wrote to each other in Spanish; Rizal had to use German with Blumentritt and sometimes Tagalog with Ponce and Del Pilar. In 1890 Antonio Luna, Alejandrino, and Edilberto Evangelista were studying at the University of Ghent; they occasionally corresponded with Rizal in French. The two Lunas were fencing aficionados. Antonio became a staff writer of La Solidaridad. He wrote under the pen name “Tagailog.” His pieces tended to be fiction, nostalgic themes characteristic of the love-struck Filipino swain such as kissing in Filipinas, affairs of love, his lady teacher in the pueblo, and so on. For a time in 1891 he was producing the paper almost single-handedly. He was back in Filipinas by 1892 but did not join the Katipunan because he thought that it was premature; he was tricked later on by the friars into betraying some of his old colleagues. He was arrested and sent to prison in Spain. He returned in July 1898 to join the Revolution and became the most admired but controversial general during the second phase of the Revolution and Filipino-American War.
[…]
A. Luna was rather more cosmopolitan than the other Filipinos in Madrid. His brother Juan lived in Paris, so that he spent some time in the French capital, and he was the principal staff writer on the 1889 universal exposition in Paris as well as on the political status of colonies in the French system. He also wrote lead articles and political pieces every now and then. He contributed many pieces for the “Arts and Letters” section.
[…]
By September the SOL was in shambles. Antonio Luna wrote Rizal about the plight of the staff: “the recompense for our labors is the ruin of our future; we are easily made to serve as a facade so that others plunder behind the screen – in short, the exploitation of man by man.” He hints darkly at financial irregularities. Where does the money that is said to have come from Manila go? “There are grand mismanagement, unnecessary trips, total unconcern; initiative is gone; the campaign is dead. This is total suicide.” The work is passed on to him: “Today I have had to write four articles because neither Del Pilar nor Naning does absolutely anything.” The management of the SOL is absolutist; “it is worse than that of the State.” Luna is bitter and tells Rizal that he is about to leave the SOL.
Luna’s hints on financial irregularities in the SOL appear to have been confirmed in November. Moises Salvador wrote that some 700 pesos in the custody of the editor were to be turned over to Rizal. The turn over of the money was agreed to by the old Manila committee upon petition of the fund donors. But the turnover could not be effected; Salvador was disgusted; he cited obstructions raised; he decried these as unspeakable, referring to them as “events that have no name.” [1]

Rizal challenges Luna to a duel.

1892

See my North Borneo (Sabah): An annotated timeline 1640s-present. In Under Three Flags, Benedict Anderson writes:

Rizal’s first plan for resolving, or evading, these contradictory pressures was to form a settlement for his family and like-minded friends on the bay of Sandakan in what is today the east Malaysian federal state of Sabah. Geographically, it was as close to the Philippines as one could get—250 miles from Jolo, seat of the once-powerful Muslim sultanate of Sulu, still restive under loose Spanish overlordship, and a little over 600 miles from Manila. The same distances separated Havana from Miami, and from Tampa, where Marti was recruiting revolutionaries among the Cuban tobacco-worker communities. Politically, too, it could seem promising. The northern littoral of Borneo was, in the 1890s, a very peculiar Conradian place. On the western portion lay the kingdom of the so-called White Rajahs, founded by the English adventurer James Brooke in the 1840s, and under London’s hands-off protection from the 1880s. The residues of the once-powerful sultanate of Brunei occupied a small niche in the middle, while the eastern portion, including Sandakan, was governed after 1882 by a private business, the British North Borneo Chartered Company. Better still, in 1885 the Spanish had been induced to abandon any quasi-legal claims to the territory deriving from the shifting suzerainty of Jolo. Hence, while Hong Kong was under the suspicious eyes of the Spanish consul and the Catholic Orders’ local branches, Sandakan was free of both. It is not surprising, therefore, that some of Rizal’s more fiery comrades in Europe, such as Evangelista and Antonio Luna, dreaming of Marti’s Florida, were enthusiastic about the planned settlement. Some time in January 1892, Luna wrote to Rizal in Hong Kong that “Borneo sera un Cayo Hueso para nosotros, y muy probable sea yo tambien uno de sus habitantes, si las circunstancias me obligan” [Borneo will be for us a Cayo Hueso (Bone Reef, phonetically garbled by the Americans into Key West), and it is very probable that I will become one of its denizens, if circumstances make it necessary].[1] On the other hand, Sandakan also promised an unbadgered life for Rizal’s family, and for the novelist himself, his library and his writing.[2] He also hoped that many of the dispossessed people in his hometown Calamba would also join him in this Bornean sanctuary.[3]
At the end of March, Rizal made the first of several visits to North Borneo after preliminary negotiations with the British North Borneo Charter Company’s representative in Hong Kong. Initially, the prospects seemed quite rosy. Rizal was offered 5,000 acres of uncultivated land rent-free for three years, with the possibility of eventual purchase at a low price. The British North Borneo Charter Company, eager for settlement in a very sparsely populated region, further accepted that the Filipino community would be run by its own members according to their own customs, and be subject neither to corvee nor to unreasonable taxes. But within a few months the whole project started to collapse. Rizal began to realize that he could not raise anything close to the money needed to get the little colony going. Furthermore, populating it would require the agreement of the Spanish to a substantial migration. Rizal wrote to the new Captain-General explaining that he wished to settle down quietly with family and townspeople, but Despujol was not persuaded. An emigration on this scale would put his government in a bad light; besides, the conservative press in Spain would be likely to view it as the start of a Bornean Tampa just out of Manila’s political and military reach.[4]
Rizal’s alternative, more alarming for his family, was to create the first legal political organization for Filipinos in the Philippines itself. What this plan amounted to is difficult to determine. No document in Rizal’s own hand survives. Virtually all the written evidence, often contradictory, comes from testimony given to, or extracted by, police interrogators and torturers…

The same book contains this interesting exchange of letters:

[1]Cartas entre Rizal y sus colegas, pp. 771-2. The whole letter is of great interest, since Luna was highly intelligent. He told Rizal he was heading back to Manila to work for independence. “Para todo eso sera preciso mucho studio, mucho tacto, prudencia y nada de alardes de ser fuertes… Con constancia y silencio seremos unos jesuitas para plantar una casa donde pongamos un clavo. Ofrezco, pues, en este sentido mi concurso, pero con la sola condicion de que podre desligarme de la campan?a active si viera que sera solo un motin… Creo que me comprendes bien, si nos vencen que cueste mucha sangre. Ire, pues, a Manila y en todos mis actos tendre siempre presente mi deber de separatist. Nada de desconfianzas, si las circunstancias me colocan al lado de los espan?oles en Manila, peor para ellos: me ganare la vida e ire minando el suelo a costa de ellos hasta que la fruta este madura, Teneis ya, pues (si non vuestras ideas estas), un satellite por aqui que trabajara con constancia.” [But this will require much study, much tact, prudence, and no empty boasting about our strength… With constancy and silence we will be like Jesuits, etting up a house for which we have a key. So, in this sense, I am offering you my assistance, but with the single condition that I can disengage from the active campaign if I see that it will be nothing more than a mutiny… I believe you understand me well, that if they win, it will cost much bloodshed. In any case, I am leaving for Manila, and in all my actions my duty as a separatist will always be before my eyes. No suspicions: if circumstances place me at the side of the Spaniards in Manila, so much the worse for them. I will earn my living and continue mining the land to their cost, until the fruit is ripe. You will have, then (if these ideas are also yours), a satellite on the spot who will work with constancy.]
[2] Touchingly, Rizal wrote thus to Blumentritt on January 31, 1892: “Wahrend ich aus meine Amtspflichten ausruhe, schreibe ich den driten Theil meines Buches auch in Tagalisch. Es wird sich nur um Heimlich tagalischen Sitten die Rede sein, nur um tagalischen Ubungen, Tubungen, und Fehler. Leider dass ich es nicht auf Spanisch schreiben darf, den ich habe einen sehr schonen Gegenstand im kopfe gefunden; ich will einen Roman nach den modernen Sinne des Wortes erdichten, kunstlich und litterarisch. Diesmal will ich die Politik und alles den Kunst aufopfern; schriebe ich es auf Spanisch, so warden die armen Tagalen, denen es gewidmet, nichts davon wissen und doch die haben es am moisten nothing… Doch est kostet mir viele Muhe den viele von meinen Gedenken konnen sich nicht frei ausdrucken, sonst muss ich neologismes einfuhren; ausserdem mir fe[h]t die Ubung in Tagalisch zu schreiben.” [While resting from my professional labors (as a doctor), I am writing the third part of my book in Tagalog. It will deal solely with Tagalog customs, [i.e.] exclusively with the habits, virtues and defects of the Tagalogs. I feel I cannot write the book in Spanish now that I have found a beautiful theme; I want to write a novel in the modern sense of the word, an artistic and literary novel. This time I would like to sacrifice politics and the rest for the sake of art; if I write in Spanish, then the poor Tagalogs, to whom the work is dedicated, will not understand it, even though it is they who most need to do so… The book is giving me a lot of trouble, as many of my thoughts cannot be freely expressed without the need to introduce neologisms. Besides, I lack practice in writing Tagalog.] The Rizal-Blumentritt Correspondence, 1890-1896, unnumbered pages from p. 431. This third novel was never finished. What little there is of it has been carefully reconstructed by Ambeth Ocampo in his The Search for Rizal’s Third Novel, Makamisa (Manila: Anvil, 1993). Rizal gave up writing it in Tagalog after twenty manuscript pages, and reverted to Spanish. Makamisa means “After Mass,” and the text, focused on the townspeople of Pili and their Peninsular parish priest, returns to the satirical costumbrista style of Noli me tangere. Perhaps this is why he gave up on it, or maybe he concluded that he could not go beyond El Filibusterismo. In any event, after mid-1892 he seems to have abandoned any idea of further novel-writing.
[3] It will be recalled that it was Rizal who had strongly urged the tenants and townspeople of Calamba to take the Dominicans to court, and pushed the case right up to the Supreme Court in Madrid. As already noted, when the vengeful Order won the case, and Weyler, in addition to burning houses, forbade the recalcitrants to reside anywhere near Calamba, Rizal was devastated and felt enormously guilty for the suffering he had brought on his hometown.
[4] The comparison between Sandakan and Tampa is, in one sense, unwarranted. The British had no designs on the Philippines, whereas powerful groups in the United States had had their avaricious eyes on Cuba for some time. But the contrast may have seemed less obvious in the 1890s than it does today. It is hard to imagine Antonio Luna and Edilberto Evangelista promising from Europe to join Rizal in: Sandakan if they expected no more from it than a chance to grow vegetables and read some books.[3]

From Vivencio Jose’s The Rise and Fall of Antonio Luna, this declaration by Luna:

“The propaganda for assimilation is necessary but more active should the separatist propaganda be, because we shall not obtain the first (i.e. assimilation) and even if we did (which is almost impossible) we would be worse off than ever; the practical thing is to seek adherents in order to shake off the yoke of Spain. I want to make clear therefore, what is in my mind: that we must work for independence, organizing ourselves, converting ourselves into apostles in order to gain men and money. For all this much study is necessary, a great deal of tact, prudence and no boasting of our strength… I offer therefore my services, in this sense, but with the sole condition that I shall be allowed to disengage myself from the active campaign if I see it will only be an armed riot. It is not that I dream of success, rather I dream of a resistance for which you understand me well enough; if they triumph over us let it be at the cost of much blood. I shall go then to Manila and in all my acts always keep in mind my duty as a separatist.”[4]

Rizal, in his essay, “The Philippines a Century Hence”:

All the petty insurrections that have occurred in the Philippines were the work of a few fanatics or discontented soldiers, who had to deceive and humbug the people or avail themselves of their powers over their subordinates to gain their ends. So they all failed. No insurrection had a popular character, or was based on a need of the whole race, or was fought for human rights or justice; so it left no ineffaceable impressions … when they saw that they had been duped, the people bound up their wounds and applauded the overthrow of the disturbers of their peace! But what if the movement springs from the people themselves and based its causes upon their woes?[5]

In The Rise and Fall of Antonio Luna, Vivencio Jose writes the view of the Spanish religious orders:

NOTE 70. The idea that the Liga was but an introduction to the Katipunan is not borne out by the facts of the case. The Liga Filipina was a foundation of Rizal, whilst the Katipunan was a conception of Pilar who, finding Rizal was carrying all before him, determined not to be outdone by his former companion. The very fact of the enmity existing between the two leaders is proof enough that the two societies were not one and the same thing, although after their foundation they walked arm in arm. The Liga, as an association, was eventually dissolved, and from it was formed the Compromisarios (see Note 63) and this body continued its functions till the outbreak of the revolt. The vicissitudes of the Liga did not lessen Rizal’s influence. Ever ready to tell a lie or act one if it were to his own advantage, Rizal permitted the free use of his name in connection with the Katipunan also. To the vast majority of the oath- bound, the Katipunan was but the Liga under another form; and in order that the people should not know of the rivalry existing between himself and Pilar, Rizal gave no signs of disfavor towards the foundation of the new society; in fact he rather favored it, seeing that under the circumstances it would make him figure as its “hero” and he would thus be enabled to take the wind out of Pilar’s sails. The only objection raised by Rizal to the work of the Katipunan was that which he made to Valenzuela: that the time had not yet come for armed rebellion.[6]

In The Roots of the Filipino Nation, O.D. Corpuz writes,

Rizal regarded the Revolution in its wholeness. A revolution would entail a contest of arms that, if successful, wins national liberty. But fighting is only part of the revolution; the other part is the building of civic structures to establish the justice that the people had fought for. To Rizal the Filipino Revolution was a struggle to win both liberty for the nation and, after victory, to ensure that the masses who fought in battle are governed by civil institutions that promise a just and lawful society.
There is an old Filipino saying: “Someone does the cooking, but somebody else does the eating.” Rizal’s view of the Filipino Revolution was that it was to be a struggle of national regeneration and not merely a transfer of political power from one dominant class to another dominant class. If his manifesto were to be taken at face value it must be read as saying that the Revolution was premature because it was at best uncertain whether the common people, who would do the fighting, would be the beneficiaries of the liberty that victory would yield. But it would be against the evidence of Rizal’s life and writings, and of the admiration and respect in which he was held by the Filipinos of his time, to say that he was against the Revolution, because he was a defender of “upper class interests.”
[…]
We have suggested that the exodus of the young Filipinos and their waging of the Propaganda abroad indirectly delayed the outbreak of the Revolution at home. Had Lopez Jaena, Arejola, Ponce, Alejandrino, Evangelista, Serrano, the Lunas, Salvador, Ventura, Llorente, Bautista, Apacible, Canon, Sandico, Del Pilar, Rizal, and others among the exiles stayed home during the 1880s, or come home earlier, say by 1890, the inevitable fight with the friars would have ruptured the fragile peace long before 1896.
In addition to the evidence already shown, that some of the important men of the Propaganda abandoned reformism, note must be taken of those who came home and became prominent in the Hongkong Junta, the Revolution, and the FilipinoAmerican War. Sandico and Apacible were “hawks” when Aguinaldo and the Junta were exploring the probable relations with the United States in early May 1898. Mariano Ponce served as Aguinaldo’s secretary in Hongkong. Canon, Evangelista, Sandico, Alejandrino, Llorente, and of course Luna, became generals in the Revolution. Numerous others served in the Malolos Congress and Republic. [7]

1893

Doctorate in Pharmacy from the Universidad Central of Madrid. See: El hematozoario del paludismo su estudio experimental por Antonio Luna y Novicio.

Per Benjamin Vallejo Jr., Antonio Luna’s research on malaria:

He did his doctoral research on the forms of the malaria parasite in human blood. Now we call these as merozoites but in Luna’s day doctors called these as hematozoites. Luna’s thesis “El Hematozoario del Paludismo” focused on describing the differentiation of these merozoites into different morphological forms (Luna’s own drawings of these are shown above) and related these to malaria’s trademark symptoms, the chills, enlargement of the spleen and liver and periodic high fevers. Luna tried to find out what forms of the parasites caused these symptoms and to know when to best administer the only known drug at the time, quinine from the Chinchona tree.
Luna had to test, improve and develop diagnostic techniques some of which medical technologists and pathologists still use to diagnose malaria today. However he was also interested to culture the parasite in vitro and tried to develop a technique to observe the merozoite cellular differentiation outside the host. However in 1892-1893 the technology did not exist. Luna failed in the attempt. It was only in 1976 was it possible to have in vitro culture of the malaria parasite. And so it became possible to test effective drugs such as Dr Tu’s Artemisin.
The reason why Luna wanted to culture the parasite is to test Robert Koch’s postulate that by inoculation of the parasite to an uninfected host, the disease will be observed and doctors would know how a drug can disrupt the parasite’s biochemistry, thus leading to an effective cure. At this time, doctors just suspected that mosquitoes were the vectors for malaria transmission. But based on the parasite studies of Luna and other scientists, it became possible to test this hypothesis. In 1898, Dr Grassi one of the scientists Luna cited in his thesis, was able to experimentally demonstrate that it was the Anopheles mosquito that was responsible for infecting humans. Humankind thus had the first effective strategies for eradicating malaria.

1894

In The Rise and Fall of Antonio Luna, Vivencio Jose writes:

At the time of the organization of the popular Supreme Councils, Bonifacio was chosen president of the Council of Trozo; but in consequence of internal troubles occasioned by his rebelliousness, the Supreme Council decided to dissolve the local Council. Bonifacio, true to his colors, disregarded this order and continued working on his own account, taking upon himself the faculties of the Supreme Council.
He preserved in a case which was found in the warehouse of Messrs. Fressel and Co. the organization of the “Filipino Republic” which was to be, as well as a number of regulations, codes, decrees of nominations, etc., all drawn up in Tagalog.[6]

1895

Jose Alejandrino recalled:

On my return in 1895, we renewed our intimate friendly relations, which relations Mamerto Natividad and Moises Salvador took advantage of by requesting me to transmit to him Rizal’s advice that Luna be asked to join the K.K.K. as an intermediary between the rich and educated class and the proletariat which constituted the great majority of the members of the Katipunan. Luna refused to join the movement, alleging that it was yet premature.[8]

March 20

LETTER TO DEL PILAR[9]
Manila, March 20, 1895
MARCELO H. DEL PILAR
My very dear Friend:
Enclosed is the letter in answer to your proposition to help “El Globo” so that you can show it to Don Miguel;[1] also enclosed is a bill of exchange in the amount of $100.
The reasons stated in the letter are only too true, and not invented. And they are so true that neither Ariston[2] nor anyone of us dares talk to Don Pedro Roxas, and much less to Limjap.
With respect to the bill of exchange, we haven’t yet been able to increase our remittance, despite all our efforts, as we are well aware that the $100 monthly is not enough to cover the pressing needs of the delegation.
We deeply regret our inability to give neither a long and detailed description of the Regional Exposition nor only a light sketch of it because nobody is in charge of this work. In the first place, none of our friends is used to this kind of work and, secondly, more or less each has his own tasks. You can cite me as an example. Even if I make a great effort, the work may still turn out badly, and my health may become the worse for it, because I shall have to study hard to be able to give a story of the Exposition.
Luna (Antonio) does not like to take charge of the work unless we give him a monthly remuneration of thirty pesos, something which we cannot promise him lest we cannot keep the promise. In truth, there are four kittens of us moving around here, which cannot do anything without help from others.
Despite the pessimism reflected in the previous lines, we still retain, the hope we had of the first days, firmly believing that without struggling it is not possible to mould real men. Besides, we try our best to show how we manage the funds in the hope that, sooner or later, our friends will understand that honesty still exists.
And, please do not think that the obstacles I have stated reflect on you, no. On the day we come to understand it that way, we shall be the first to let you know without beating around the bush, because then, our campaign would have become indefensible. I am just saying this to you because on similar occasions you seemed to have read in my words a meaning that was far from what I intended to give them.
Receive the embrace of all and, in particular, of your affectionate
MABINI
[1] Don Miguel Morayta.
[2] Ariston Bautista.

1896:

July

In A New History Of Southeast Asia, M.C. Ricklefs,Bruce Lockhart, Bruce, and Albert Lau wrote:

The Katipunan ballooned from 15,000 to 30,000. In July 1896, however, the organization was betrayed to a priest in confession. The authorities thereupon raided a printing shop where they found printing blocks for the Kalayaan, other paraphernalia, and a list of members. The Guardia Civil then arrested suspects, who were forced to identify other members.[11]

In The Emergence Of Modern Southeast Asia- A New History, Norman Owen writes:

Bonifacio sought unsuccessfully to attract ilustrados, including Apolinario Mabini, Antonio Luna, and, most important, Rizal himself, to his Katipunan. He then decided to implicate them through forgery, hoping that Spanish repression would achieve his goals. He succeeded. A friar, discovering the revolutionary plot — supposedly during confessional, though this seems unlikely — reported it to Spanish authorities, who moved to arrest the conspirators. As the police swept across the city searching for Katipunan members. Bonifacio and his supporters fled to a Manila suburb where he issued a call to open rebellion, known today as the “cry of Balintawak,” and they tore up their hated cedulas (identity papers).
Spanish heavy-handedness accomplished Bonifacio’s goal. Rizal was brought back to Manila and tried for treason, because the Spanish believed he was “the principal organizer and the very soul of the Philippine insurrection.” Rizal, who considered the Katipunan plan “disastrous,” was convicted after a sham trial and publicly executed. Many years earlier, Rizal had written, “The day on which the Spanish inflict martyrdom on our innocent families for our fault, farewell, pro-friar government, and perhaps, farewell. Spanish Government.” Rizal’s execution forged an alliance, albeit fragile, between the ilustrados and Bonifacio’s rebels. Hatred of the Spanish unified many Filipinos of every social class. Some years before Rizal had noted: “A numerous, educated class, both in the archipelago and outside it, must now be reckoned with… It is in continuous contact with the rest of the population. And if it is no more today than the brains of the nation, it will become in a few years its whole nervous system. Then we shall see what it will do.”
In his prison cell Rizal wrote a “Manifesto to Certain Filipinos,” reiterating that the education of the people was a prerequisite to liberty. Noting that without education and “civic virtues,” Filipinos would not find “redemption,” he stressed that reforms, if they were to bear fruit, would have to “come from above,” because reforms from below would be “violent and transitory.” In spite of this cautionary’ note and his professions of loyalty to a Spain that he still hoped might govern justly, he was shot on 30 December 1896, ensuring the very revolution he had hoped to avoid.”[12]

In John Schumacher’s, review of Vivencio Jose’s The Rise and Fall of Antonio Luna, he writes:

Though this book was apparently written before the publication of my Propaganda Movement, its failure to situate Luna within the organized nationalist activity of the Filipino activists in Europe makes Luna’s activities during this period seem rather unconnected and gives little idea of the progressive evolution of his thought. Nonetheless, Jose does make clear that, contrary to the efforts of some historians to portray the Propaganda Movement as merely a reformist, assimilationist movement, there was a radical separatist group, including Luna, Rizal, Edilberto Evangelista, Jose Alejandrino, and others not alluded to here. Whatever they may have been forced to say publicly, some of the Propagandists had already resolved, at least by the early 1890s, on definitive separation from Spain. What is not explored here, however, is how early Luna set himself on such a course, and how he related his ideas to the differing strategies of Rizal and Del Pilar, both of them likewise aiming at ultimate separation from Spain. This failure to explore the nuances of the Luna-Rizal separatist approach vitiates to a great extent the discussion on Luna’s relation to Bonifacio’s Katipunan and the Revolution of 1896. To attribute Luna’s refusal to support the premature revolt by Bonifacio to his ‘middle class thoughts’ or to the typical attitude of ‘the wealthy Filipinos’ is to ignore how correct Luna was when he rejected, not the Revolution, but an unprepared and insufficiently armed revolution, which could only eventuate in military disaster, as Bonifacio’s total military failure rapidly showed. The criticism of Luna for refusing to support the ill-prepared revolt of Bonifacio seems inconsistent with Jose’s later (and to this reviewer, more correct) praise of Luna for his strenuous and often-frustrated efforts to organize a disciplined army, operating according to careful plans and making use of military science and discipline, instead of Aguinaldo’s haphazard collection of ‘clan armies’ based on personal local and provincial loyalties and wishing to fight “with bared breasts” rather than prepare trenches and breastworks…”[13]

In The Roots of the Filipino Nation, O.D. Corpuz writes,

There is additional material about the Katipunan having been exposed or discovered before August 1896. Jose Alejandrino, back home from Europe in 1895, says that Moises Salvador and Mamerto Natividad asked him to get Antonio Luna to join the society. This was in accordance with a suggestion of Rizal to Valenzuela. But Luna believed that the revolutionary movement was premature. Even so, he was among those arrested and interrogated in the round-up after the uprising. Luna made a statement dated 12 November 1896 wherein he said that on 18 or 20 July he had told his supervisor in the government laboratory (Luna was a pharmacist-chemist) that there were secret societies organized to rise against the regime, “so that he could report it to the Governor-General.” The latter summoned him “on the 2nd or 3rd August” and he repeated what he had told his supervisor, adding that the rich and prominent classes did not join the societies, which were plebeian. Luna’s testimony confirmed what the governor-general had known for months.
[…]
Blanco’s secret measures, already semi-public since the printing house episode of July, were no longer secret. The Revolution was forced to begin.[14]

August

In A New History Of Southeast Asia, M.C. Ricklefs,Bruce Lockhart, Bruce, and Albert Lau wrote:

In August 1896, under Bonifacio’s leadership, the Katipuneros decided to start the Revolution by seizing Manila. To break their ties with Spain they tore up their identification papers and shouted Mabuhay ang mga anak ng Bayan! (‘Long live the children of the nation!’). The assault failed, and expected reinforcements from Cavite never arrived. Bonifacio and other survivors retreated to the southern mountains, but news of the assault mobilized Katipuneros in Nueva Ecija and Bulacan to take up arms. Katipuneros of the two bickering councils of Cavite – Magdalo and Magdiwang – easily captured Cavite province. Landowner Emilio Aguinaldo, the Magdalo head, earned renown as a general, but Magdalo towns fell to the Spaniards, endangering the Magdiwang-heId towns to the rear.
The outbreak of the Philippine Revolution made life more difficult for the Filipino elite. To force them to join the revolutionaries, Katipuneros implicated some of them. Among the 4000 whom the Spanish arrested and imprisoned were many Ilustrados; some were executed and a number were deported. To escape persecution, others demonstrated their loyalty to the colonial government by donating money to the Spaniards and enrolling their sons as officers in local Spanish militias. But many members of the elite, especially in the provinces, concluded that – as in 1872 – wealth, status, and education were ineffective weapons against the declining Spanish empire. Quietly they joined and assumed leadership of various councils of the Katipunan. Their mestizo culture and Ilustrado worldview thereby pervaded and changed the orientation of the organization.[16]

In “Socioeconomic Class in the Revolution,” John Schumacher writes:

III. The Katipunan and the Revolution[17]
Surely the key role of the Katipunan in initiating the Revolution cannot be denied. However, the Katipunan had not arisen solely from the ideas of Bonifacio. It was, in fact, the heir of the Propaganda Movement, too easily dismissed as an ineffective “reform movement.” There were to be sure, propagandists who sought nothing more than the assimilationist reforms their public program called for. But for its key figures — Rizal, Marcelo del Pilar, Antonio Luna, and others — there is no question that independence was the ultimate goal. The principal difference between Bonifacio and the major ilustrados of the Propaganda Movement was not even on the method of obtaining independence, but on the timing. The writings of Bonifacio and Jacinto mirror those of Rizal and Marcelo del Pilar, and the Katipunan’s official teachings are quite in continuity with the major works of the Propaganda Movement.
It is for this reason that though the initiative for the Revolution certainly came from Bonifacio and his Katipunan, once the Revolution began, it immediately attracted to itself a far larger number who had never been Katipuneros, but had imbibed similar ideas through the writings and activity of the Propagandists. In his memoirs Aguinaldo cites his cousin Baldomero Aguinaldo, speaking to the revolutionaries in Cavite of how there had been only 300 Katipuneros in that province on the eve of the Revolution, but the following day more than a thousand revolutionaries assembled. It was part of Bonifacio’s tragedy that he did not, or was unwilling to, realize that the Revolution was already a much wider movement than the Katipunan, and that there were others besides the Katipuneros who were legitimate heirs of the Propaganda Movement.
As the analysis of the Katipunan has shown, the actual initiative for the Revolution of 1896 came from a lower middle class urban membership allied with local and provincial elite, almost completely in the Tagalog provinces and Pampanga. It is not true, however, that the wealthy and educated took no part in it.
The national elite, not themselves part of the Katipunan, varied in their support for the Revolution once it was underway. Some of them, like Rizal and Antonio Luna, had been approached beforehand by the Katipuneros, but, though not rejecting revolution in principle, had argued that the means for a successful revolution were not yet at hand. Numerous figures of the old Liga Filipina or Cuerpo de Compromisarios, like Mabini and Moises Salvador, were arrested on suspicion by the Spaniards, and most were executed, however little or much had been their complicity in the actual revolt.[1] Others of the national elite, about to be arrested, escaped abroad and assisted the revolutionaries from Hong Kong, like Jose Alejandrino, Felipe Agoncillo, and Galicano Apacible.[2] Still others who were in Europe when the Revolution broke out, returned to take part in it, like Mariano Ponce in Hong Kong and Edilberto Evangelista, who was killed in the battle of Zapote Bridge in 1897.[3]
Many of the very wealthy national elite, however, neither believed in the revolutionary cause nor were they willing to contribute to it. In consequence of Bonifacio’s having left to the authorities forged documents compromising them, some of them, like millionaire Francisco Roxas, who had refused to listen to the Katipunan’s demands for financial support, nonetheless paid with their lives.[4]
To summarize, elite attitudes to the Revolution of 1896 were varied. Though wealth was certainly a factor which was negatively correlated with willingness to join the Revolution, age was a more important factor than wealth by itself. The young ilustrados, wealthy or not, who had taken part in the Propaganda Movement, were generally found joining the Revolution; the older men who had held aloof from that movement, likewise held back when the Revolution came.”
[1] Mabini, who escaped execution only because of his paralysis, had been a regular source of advice for the Katipuneros, but opposed their plans for revolt and became suspect to Bonifacio as a result. See Agoncillo, Revolt, pp. 105, 107. Salvador is said to have actually been a member of the Katipunan, but was arrested before he could join the revolt (Jose Alejandrino, La senda del sacrificio [Manila: Nueva Era Press, 1951], p. 29).
[2] *Ibid., pp. 51-64; Esteban de Ocampo and Alfredo B. Saulo, First Filipino Diplomat: Felipe Agoncillo (1859-1941) (Manila: National Historical Institute. 1978), pp. 67-69; Encarnacion Alzona, Galicano Apacible: Profile of a Filipino Patriot (n.p., 1971)

16 September:

Luna brothers arrested

Antonio Luna tortured, and in the process “cried hysterically,” (this is the description of Quibuyen):

No soy rebelde, ni mason, ni filibustero; al contrario, soy delator y creo haber cumplido como hijo leal de España. … El Kutipunan es la Liga Filipina. … Su autor es D. Jose Rizal …. Vuelvo a repitir: No soy rebelde, ni fiibustero, ni mason. –(Arch. Fil., IV, 199 [19]; cited in Guerrero 1963, 522, note 24)

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino wrote how Luna implicates Masons:

“It appears in official documents that in this period Luna committed the greatest error of his life in denouncing the existence of the Katipunan and in revealing, during his imprisonment after the first outbreak of the rebellion, the names of some of his friends affiliated with the Society. Later, he explained however to me his aforesaid acts by saying that with the physical and moral tortures which he suffered during his imprisonment, and upon being assured by the Spaniards that he had been squealed upon by his own friends, denouncing him as an accomplice in the rebellion, his violent character made him lose his better judgment. And having fallen for the scheme woven by the Spaniards, he declared that those who had denounced him were more guilty than he.
The events of 1896 separated us from each other, he having been prosecuted and later on sentenced to suffer imprisonment in Spain, while I left the country for China and Japan.[18]

In The Katipunan, Francis St. Claire writes:

What Spain did for the Filipino brought forth fruit in only a few of the people who fell under her beneficent Christian influence. The Lunas were among the few. They like so many other ungrateful children, repaid their benefactors by becoming leaders of the insensate and inexcusable revolt against them; a revolt, the first act of which was to be the brutal murder of all Spaniards irrespective of parentage or other claims of consideration. Both the brothers suffered arrest by the Spanish authorities for rebellion and sedition, but in spite of the degree to which they were complicated, they remained practically free from punishment, and ever at the right hand of the imbecile General Blanco, himself a freemason, and friend of the enemies of his country. Eventually the two brothers left the ante-chamber of the Governor to enter the security of the military prison.
Both brothers eventually retracted their errors only to fall into them again as soon as the lying protests of repentance had fallen from their lips.
Juan died in Hong-Kong; Antonio, after a career of militarism, succumbed to the same unprincipled ambition which carried Andres Bonifacio to an untimely grave.[19]

1897

January 11, 1897

Numeriano Adriano, lawyer (under whom Mabini had served as assistant attorney); Domingo Franco, merchant; Moises Salvador, propagandist; Antonio Salazar, owner of bazaar El Cisne; Faustino Villarael, Pandacan merchant, executed –allegedly after being implicated by Luna. Alfredo Saulo suggests that the fate of Adriano left ill-feelings on the part of Mabini towards Antonio Luna.

February 1897

Luna incarcerated in Model Prison, Madrid.

May 1897

Luna obtains clemency from King Alfonso XIII of Spain.

Upon release, Luna begins study of military science.

1898

April 21, 1898

Spanish-American War begins.

Early May 1898

In The Roots of the Filipino Nation, O.D. Corpuz writes,

In addition to the evidence already shown, that some of the important men of the Propaganda abandoned reformism, note must be taken of those who came home and became prominent in the Hongkong Junta, the Revolution, and the Filipino-American War. Sandico and Apacible were “hawks” when Aguinaldo and the Junta were exploring the probable relations with the United States in early May 1898. Mariano Ponce served as Aguinaldo’s secretary in Hongkong. Canon, Evangelista, Sandico, Alejandrino, Llorente, and of course Luna, became generals in the Revolution. Numerous others served in the Malolos Congress and Republic.[20]

May 1, 1898

Dewey defeats Spanish fleet in Manila.

Some years after this, in his “Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands”, Felipe Buencamino said:

“Mr. JONES. At that time had not Admiral Dewey placed in the hands of Aguinaldo arms with which to fight the Spaniards?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. No, sir. The occurrences I have already related at the last meeting. The Spanish commander at Cavite capitulated to Admiral Dewey. Immediately thereafter, after the destruction of the Spanish squadron, and on May 1, 1898, the Filipinos entered the city. Admiral Dewey informed the Filipinos he had not come to fight the Filipinos, but they could enter and go out of the city of Cavite as they pleased, and the Filipinos who entered the city found there some rifles abandoned by the Spaniards and took those arms away with them. But there was no formal delivery of arms by Admiral Dewey, because on that date Aguinaldo was not there yet. Aguinaldo arrived there on the 19th of May and those arms were gathered on the 1st day of May.”[22]

May 2, 1898

In the “Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands”, Felipe Buencamino said:

“Mr. JONES. Did you not upon the return of Aguinaldo to Cavite go to him for the purpose of inducing him to take up arms for Spain as against the United States, and did not Aguinaldo indignantly repudiate the proposition?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir; that was my mission.
Mr. JONES. Did not Aguinaldo convince you on that occasion that the Filipinos, with the aid of the American forces, were going to win, and did you not then become an ardent advocate of Filipino liberty and independence?
Mr. JONES. Did not Aguinaldo convince you on that occasion that the Filipinos, with the aid of the American forces, were going to win, and did you not then become an ardent advocate of Filipino liberty and independence?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. When I men Aguinaldo on the 2nd of May, 1898, I was not permitted to speak of my mission by Aguinaldo. I was informed only that he, Aguinaldo, came to establish the independence of the country with the assistance of Admiral Dewey. I then asked him to present to me the documentary evidence, promising if he would do so I would join them, first writing to the Spanish general, but Aguinaldo did not produce this documentary evidence, and then I told him I did not agree to the proposition because, as I told Aguinaldo, of the Spanish motto or saying, “Between a nation unknown and a nation known the nation known is preferable.” I did not know the Americans; I did not know what they might be. I was acquainted with the Spaniards; consequently it was my duty to be on the Spanish side.
Mr. JONES. And you did then go to Aguinaldo at Cavite for the purpose of inducing him to abandon the Americans and to side with the Spaniards against the American forces; that was your mission?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. There were no American forces as yet at that time, nor had Aguinaldo any troops yet, but he was going to organize troops, and before he organized them I was trying to get him to join the Spaniards, and I repeat the saying to which I have just called attention.”[22]

To add context to the above, Victor Buencamino, in his memoirs, writes this about his father:

AND YET, FROM ALL accounts, Father should have had no regrets. I’d be mighty proud and consider myself fortunate if I had had a chance to play, as he did, such a billing among stars in the epic drama of his generation.
A lawyer from Sto. Tomas, he was counted among the so-called ilustrados (elite) of the period who, by reason of their education, were engulfed in the upheaval that demanded the active participation of the intellectuals of the day.
Historians note that he was among the elite whom the last Spanish governor general enticed into joining a so-called Consultative Assembly that would run an autonomous regime but still under the Spanish crown. It was a desperate ploy to try to save a sinking ship. Anyway, it is recorded that Father was chosen by Captain General Augustin as emissary to General Aguinaldo with an offer of autonomy plus top military rank for Aguinaldo at some fancy salary.
Not only was the offer rejected; Aguinaldo detained the emissary and later persuaded him to serve as one of the braintrusters of the revolution. So, when Aguinaldo formed his first cabinet following the declaration of Independence in 1898, Father was named Director of Public Works.
It is also recorded that Father was among the key figures at the Malolos Congress; that, in fact, he was credited with having composed the flamboyant prose that Aguinaldo read as the first inaugural address of a Philippine president.
In the turbulent episode which saw Apolinario Mabini relieved as premier by Pedro A. Paterno, my father was given the portfolio of the secretary of foreign affairs. [68]

May 10, 1898

Secretary of the Navy John D. Long issued orders to Captain Henry Glass, commander of the cruiser U.S.S. Charleston to capture Guam on the way to Manila.

May 11, 1898

President William McKinley and his cabinet approve a State Department memorandum calling for Spanish cession of a suitable “coaling station”, presumably Manila. The Philippines were to remain Spanish possessions.

May 11, 1898

Prime Minister Sagasta formed the new Spanish cabinet. U.S. President McKinley ordered a military expedition, headed by Major General Wesley Merritt, to complete the elimination of Spanish forces in the Philippines, to occupy the islands, and to provide security and order to the inhabitants.

May 19, 1898

Emilio Aguinaldo returned to the Philippines, from exile in Hong Kong. The United States had invited him back from exile, hoping that Aguinaldo would rally the Filipinos against the Spanish colonial government.

In the “Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands”, Felipe Buencamino said:

Mr. JONES. At that time had not Admiral Dewey placed in the hands of Aguinaldo arms with which to fight the Spaniards?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. No, sir. The occurrences I have already related at the last meeting. The Spanish commander at Cavite capitulated to Admiral Dewey. Immediately thereafter, after the destruction of the Spanish squadron, and on May 1, 1898, the Filipinos entered the city. Admiral Dewey informed the Filipinos he had not come to fight the Filipinos, but they could enter and go out of the city of Cavite as they pleased, and the Filipinos who entered the city found there some rifles abandoned by the Spaniards and took those arms away with them. But there was no formal delivery of arms by Admiral Dewey, because on that date Aguinaldo was not there yet. Aguinaldo arrived there on the 19th of May and those arms were gathered on the 1st day of May.[22]

May 22-24, 1898

Buencamino goes to Aguinaldo:

Mr. JONES. What time in May was it that you went to Aguinaldo on this mission?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. I went there on the 22nd of May, but was received on the 24th, in the evening.
Mr. JONES. Then you went to see Aguinaldo on the 22d day of May for the purpose of inducing him to side with the Spaniards against the Americans and in June of that same year you abandoned the Spaniards and went over to Aguinaldo?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. I did not abandon the Spaniards; the Spaniards abandoned me, because the Spanish general in Cavite, who had 1,600 men under him and munitions of war and provisions for six months, surrendered to Aguinaldo without firing a shot, saying that they did not defend the cause of Spain in the Philippines, but the cause of the friars. I could not be more Spanish than the Spaniards; as for example, if the Americans should abandon the Filipinos now I could not defend the Americans there.
Mr. JONES. Then you did not abandon the Spaniards until they had surrendered to the Filipinos, and, as you say, they had abandoned you?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir. I was kept seventeen days a prisoner of Aguinaldo,
from the 22nd of May to the 12th of June, and only when I saw I was abandoned by the Spaniards I passed over to Aguinaldo.
Mr. JONES. Then you became an ardent advocate of liberty and independence for the Filipino people, did you not?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir; in view of Admiral Dewey’s promise.[22]

May 24, 1898

With himself as the dictator, Emilio Aguinaldo established a dictatorial government.

May 25, 1898

First U.S. troops were sent from San Francisco to the Philippines. Thomas McArthur Anderson (1836-1917) commanded the vanguard of the Philippine Expeditionary Force (Eighth Army Corps), which arrived at Cavite, Philippines on June 1.

May 28, 1898

The war commenced:

Mr. JONES. After the war commenced on the 28th of May, four days after you had gone there for the purpose of inducing Aguinaldo to side with the Spaniards, which side did you take?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. I was on the Spanish side. On the side of my people, because Aguinaldo did not then represent my people, unless you understand that there are no Filipino people except Aguinaldo.[24]

June-October 1898

U.S. business and government circles united around a policy of retaining all or part of the Philippines.

June 2, 1898

Felipe Agoncillo, President of the Hong Kong Junta, recommending Luna for appointment in the army.

June 12, 1898

German squadron under Admiral Diederichs arrives at Manila. Philippines proclaim independence. Mabini arrives. As Buencamino later testified, he, too, joins the cause:

Mr. JONES. How long after that was it before you cast your fortunes in with Aguinaldo?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. On the 12th day of June of the same year.[26]

June 14, 1898

McKinley administration decided not to return the Philippine Islands to Spain.

June 15, 1898

Admiral Cámara’s squadron received orders to relieve Spanish garrison in Philippines.

American Anti-Imperialist League was organized in opposition to the annexation of the Philippine Islands. Among its members were Andrew Carnegie, Mark Twain, William James, David Starr Jordan, and Samuel Gompers. George S. Boutwell, former secretary of the treasury and Massachussetts senator, served as president of the League.

Admiral Dewey’s defeat of the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay on May 1, 1898 ignited impassioned nationalistic feelings in Spain. Spanish Admiral Manuel de la Cámara y Libermoore’s squadron received orders to relieve the Spanish garrison in the Philippines. His fleet consisted of the battleship Pelayo, the armored cruiser Carlos V, the cruisers Rápido and Patriota, the torpedo boats Audaz, Osado, and Proserpina, and the transports Isla de Panay, San Francisco, Cristóbal Colón, Covadonga, and Buenos Aires. (Library of Congress, The World of 1898: the Spanish-American war)

June 23, 1898

Revolutionary Government Established.

Alejandrino stated:

We played a secondary and very humble role in the Dictatorial Government and, seeing the state of inaction to which we were being doomed, we requested as a special favor that we be permitted to study the terrain over which we believed the war would be staged with more vigor. This was the territory along the Manila-Dagupan railway. The Government acceded gladly to our petition. Armed with recommendations to the chiefs who commanded the lines, we proceeded to Malabon and Kalookan. After making a study of the terrain, we decided that the line from Kalookan to Novaliches was a good line of defense along which should be dug strong trenches.[27]

July 1898

Luna arrives in the Philippines. Alejandrino meets Luna:

We were able to see each [other] again in Kabite toward the month of July, 1898. He was returning home after having served his sentence in the Model Prison of Madrid, and he brought with him in his baggage books on military strategy and tactics and treatises on field fortifications. Above all, he brought with him a desire to atone for his past mistakes.[27]

July 18, 1898

The Spanish government, through the French Ambassador to the United States, Jules Cambon, initiated a message to President McKinley to suspend the hostilities and to start the negotiations to end the war. Duque de Almodóvar del Río (Juan Manuel Sánchez y Gutiérrez de Castro), Spanish Minister of State, directed a telegram to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris charging him to solicit the good offices of the French Government to negotiate a suspension of hostilities as a preliminary to final negotiations. (Library of Congress, The World of 1898: the Spanish-American war)

July 23, 1898

In The Roots of the Filipino Nation, O.D. Corpuz writes:

An important development in the army was the appearance on the scene of Antonio Luna. He was in Hongkong in. July 1898 on the way home after his release from prison in Madrid. Felipe Agoncillo, Aguinaldo’s representative there, thought well of him, entrusting him with twenty revolvers and thirty-five boxes of bullets plus a letter dated 23 July, all for Aguinaldo. The letter reported that Luna “earnestly desires to serve our country…” [28]

July 25, 1898

General Wesley Merritt, commander of Eighth Corps, U.S. Expeditionary Force, arrived in the Philippines.

July 30, 1898

U.S. President McKinley and his Cabinet submitted to Ambassador Cambon a counter-proposal to the Spanish request for ceasefire.

In The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, Brian McAllister Linn writes:

On 30 July 1898, he [Aguinaldo] authorized each Tagalog province to create a battalion of provincial forces which would join three new “Aguinaldo” regiments of federal troops and form the Republican Army. At the same time, he continued to encourage the continued formation of revolutionary Sandahatan, town companies, independent battalions, and other units which drew their strength from local or personal loyalties.[29]

August 2, 1898

Spain accepted the U.S. proposals for peace, with certain reservations regarding the Philippines. McKinley called for a preliminary protocol from Spain before suspension of hostilities. That document was used as the basis for discussion between Spain and the United States at the Treaty of Peace in Paris.

August 11, 1898

U.S. Secretary of State Day and French Ambassador Cambon, representing Spain, negotiated the Protocol of Peace.

August 12, 1898

Peace protocol that ended all hostilities between Spain and the United States in the war fronts of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines was signed in Washington, D.C.

August 13, 1898

Manila falls to U.S. troops.

August 14, 1898

Capitulation was signed at Manila and U.S. General Wesley Merritt established a military government in the city, with himself serving as first military governor.

August 15, 1898

U.S. General Arthur MacArthur appointed military commandant of Manila and its suburbs.

September 3, 1898

First issue of Luna’s newspaper, La Independencia, comes out.

In The Katipunan, again, writing from the point of view of the friars, Francis St. Claire wrote:

[1] La Independencia was a revolutionary daily of four pages, published in the Orphan Asylum of Malabon, property of the Augustinian Corporation and stolen and eventually destroyed by the “ever destructive” Tagalog rebels during the revolution. The first number was published on Saturday, 3rd Sept. 1898. Its leading article is an exposition of the purpose of the publication

September 13, 1898

The Spanish Cortes (legislature) ratified the Protocol of Peace.

September 15, 1898

The inaugural session of the Congress of the First Philippine Republic, also known as the Malolos Congress, was held at Barasoain Church in Malolos, province of Bulacan, for the purpose of drafting the constitution of the new republic.

September 26, 1898

Luna appointed Director of War with the rank of Brigadier General.

In The Katipunan, again, writing from the point of view of the friars, Francis St. Claire wrote:

During the second half of the rebellion of ’96, Aguinaldo offered Antonio the position of director of the War Department with the grade of General of Brigade. This honor, however, he declined. The Independencia, speaking on this incident, says: “The military knowledge of Sr. Luna, acquired during his captivity (sic) in the prisons of the peninsular (Spain), is to be found condensed in two small works, one concerning the organization of the army, having as its base the idea of obligatory service in which he demonstrates that Luzon might put on a war footing 250,000 to 400,000 men, and the whole Archipelago as many as from 800,000 to 900,000. The other work is a practical course in field fortifications as adopted by the French and German armies.”[1][15]

45 days later Luna will be promoted to General of Division with assimilated rank of Major General, third highest in military hierarchy.

In The development of Philippine politics, Maximo Kalaw writes:

General Luna was, in the opinion of many observers, the ablest general of the revolution. He represented the well-to-do Filipinos who were indifferent to the revolutionary cause in 1896, but who in 1898 joined Aguinaldo with enthusiasm. Aguinaldo had at this time, as we have noticed, the almost unanimous support of the people. Yet complaints were sometimes heard among military officials as to the partiality shown by Aguinaldo for people who came from his province of Cavite and also for those who had been with him during the first revolution. These people were not necessarily the most intelligent of the revolutionary officials. In fact it may be said without fear of contradiction that, as a general rule, the later additions, like Generals Luna and Concepcion, showed greater military ability than the “deans and fathers” of the Philippine Revolution, as they were often called. It was rather mortifying for the new and more intelligent officers to be under the orders of officers less versed in military matters than they were. At the same time it was but human on the part of Aguinaldo to recognize the worth of men who had shown greater loyalty to the cause by joining it at the time when there were fewer chances of success. That Aguinaldo, however, was not entirely blind to great merit when real merit was in evidence, was shown by the rapid advance of General Luna.[30]

October 1, 1898

The Spanish and United States Commissioners convened their first meeting in Paris to reach a final Treaty of Peace.

October 25, 1898

McKinley instructed the U.S. peace delegation to insist on the annexation of the Philippines in the peace talks.

In the “Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands”, Felipe Buencamino said:

Buencamino: “General Luna was appointed lieutenant general of the army in October, 1898. He organized the entire army, but he was a very cruel, inhuman man in his command, because from that date, October, 1898, to June 5, 1900, when he died, he had ordered the execution of 160 persons, under the pretext of their being spies and traitors. His cruelty went to such extremes that when I was visited from Manila by my mother-in-law, my sister-in-law, and my two sons, who are minors, and who are at present in San Francisco, he ordered them arrested and said that they were spies; and he also ordered the execution of Baron Dumarais, the French agent of the General Tobacco Company, of Manila, who entered our camp requesting an interview with Aguinaldo to treat on tobacco questions in the province of Cagayan, where many millions of dollars are invested in tobacco. By reason of these cruelties the public almost demanded his removal; but he was a very active and intelligent military man, a great patriot, and was very brave, and he had a large number of admirers among the military men. Aguinaldo objected to many of his orders, and that was the reason for the differences between them. Two bands were then formed within the Philippine army, one for General Luna and the other for General Aguinaldo.” [31]

Reviewing the outbreak of the Philippine-American War in February, 1899, Felipe Buencamino testified before the US Congress that preparations had begun in October, 1898, based on intelligence from Felipe Agoncillo:

Mr. BUENCAMINO. This is my conviction, and I maintain it up to the present time, for the following reasons: In the first place, because on that day, the 4th of February, as I was with Aguinaldo constantly, I knew that he had not issued any order for the beginning of hostilities. As 1 said before in my first statement, we received a telegram from Agoncillo in October, 1898, stating that we would be deceived by President McKinley and the American Congress, and consequently that we should make preparations for war. As I have already said, Aguinaldo and Luna began making preparations. Secret preparations were made in Manila to catch the American Army between two fires.
The CHAIRMAN. When did those preparations begin?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. In October.
The CHAIRMAN. What year?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. 1898. General Otis discovered the secret preparations in Manila and he ordered all houses searched and found more than 500 rifles; but we had more than 1,600 rifles hidden. Our engineer battalions and four cavalry troops were still to be organized before the orders to attack were to be given, and it is very possible that General Otis, before permitting himself to be caught between two fires, and knowing the decisive intention of General Aguinaldo to attack the American forces, took precautions in order not to see himself caught again, because the American forces were very small at the time and it was Luna’s intention to collect our 40,000 rifles and enter Manila, and for that reason I sustained the opinion; but I have not the evidence that the order to attack came from the American forces. Not as a political question, perhaps, but as a question of vital necessity.
Mr. JONES. You now speak of Aguinaldo and Luna commencing to make preparations with a view to organizing a force to oppose the Americans. On yesterday, when I asked you about these alleged preparations on the part of Aguinaldo, you said that you had never said that Aguinaldo made any preparations, and I asked you then whom you had said had made preparations, and you said that General Luna made them. Why is it now that you undertake to connect Aguinaldo with what you said yesterday he had nothing to do?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. You asked me yesterday if I said to anyone before I appeared before the committee that Aguinaldo had made secret preparations in Manila to attack the American forces. That is what I deny. I never, before I appeared here, made such a statement. I have never told any of Aguinaldo’s secrets, and if General Otis discovered them, he discovered them for himself. That is what I said yesterday. So there is no contradiction at all in what I have said.[31]

November 12, 1898

By a vote of 26 to 25, Malolos Congress approves article in draft Constitution providing for the separation of Church and State.

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

“Antonio [Luna] became also a member of [the Malolos] Congress …. Eloquent speeches from each group were pronounced but there never was a voting because both groups were afraid of the result of the balloting. Luna broke the situation with one of those tricks peculiar to his character and which made him famous later. He assembled all those delegates of the radical faction who had confidence in him advising them to keep away from the sessions of the Congress but requesting them to remain within call at a moment’s notice. With the radicals absent, the Conservatives constituted a majority during the sessions. Having made a careful counting and thinking themselves sure of victory, the Conservatives asked for a vote while the few radicals present registered a token opposition. The motion to call a vote was carried. Then at the precise moment of balloting, Luna immediately called all his advisers to enter the session hall en masse to the surprise of the confident Conservatives. The voting was taken and we won, if I remember right, by one or two votes. [In fact, they won by one vote.] In this manner [the] provision in our Constitution for the separation of the Church and State was secured.”[32]

November 25, 1898

In The Roots of the Filipino Nation, O.D. Corpuz writes:

On 25 November Antonio Luna y Novicio was formally appointed Director of War in the War Department by decree of Aguinaldo. The decree stated:
As Director of War, he is the Supreme Chief of the Army, after the General-in-Chief and the Secretary. The honors and military grade corresponding to him by reason of this office are those inhering in a General of Division…
A portion of this decree states that Luna preferred to remain a civilian although his rank in the War Department corresponded to that of a General of Division. Luna’s military career was colorful, ending in tragedy during the Filipino-American War. [35]

November 28, 1898

The Spanish Commission for Peace accepted the United States’ demands in the Peace Treaty.

November 29, 1898

The Philippine revolutionary congress approved a constitution for the new Philippine Republic.

Aguinaldo tenders his resignation as President.

In The Revolutionists: Aguinaldo, Bonifacio, Jacinto, Epifanio De los Santos writes:

VIII.–THE BREAKING OF HOSTILITIES AND AGUINALDO’S ODYSSEY
In order to fully devote himself to military exploits, Aguinaldo decided to resign from the position of President. In 1896, he also wanted to revoke his responsibility as Commander-in-Chief of the Revolution and relinquish the post the to Engineer Evangelista, the hero of Zapote. On Christmas Day of 1899, he secretly issued a manifesto wherein he appealed to the people to relieve him of the presidency as a token of gift that day. The resounding news created agitation and consternation among the prominent military and civil officials. However, without Aguinaldo’s knowledge, the packages containing the manifestoes, long prepared for circulation, disappeared like magic. One could therefore foresee the impending tragedy; notwithstanding, the instinct of self-preservation and devotion to one’s ideal demanded retention of the unique and real prestige of the people. They could have their mutual complaints and dissensions but they would never argue with Aguinaldo. They believed that a complete revamp of the Cabinet, not the relief of Aguinaldo, was necessary. When the dictatorial government was established in 1898, the organizers of the Katipunan in 1896 expected some untoward events for the positions of greater responsibilities were not entrusted to them. Nevertheless, an advice of Aguinaldo was enough to pacify them. According to Mabini, the withdrawal of the revolutionary forces from the suburbs of Manila would not have suffered the humiliations of a retreat if it were of Aguinaldo’s prestige and not at the behest of the American Military Government. When General Luna apprehended Paterno and Buencamino as pacifists in Cabanatuan, Aguinaldo’s intervention was enough to make Luna return and report at Bayambang to facilitate Buencamino’s capture in that place (May 25, 1899).
The national tragedy began on February 4, 1899, the day when the Filipino-American hostilities broke out.[33]

December 10, 1898

Representatives of Spain and the United States signed the Treaty of Peace in Paris. Spain renounced all rights to Cuba and allowed an independent Cuba, ceded Puerto Rico and the island of Guam to the United States, gave up its possessions in the West Indies, and sold the Philippine Islands, receiving in exchange $20,000,000.

In“Lo que decimos,” in La Independencia, Luna said:

Oh people! Die defending your independence and the sanctity of your homes. Shed your blood and do not give less now that the Motherland demands from you the invaluable offering of your life. Forward! God and men applaud your conduct and consecrate your right: they shall be the impartial judges in this titanic struggle brought about by foreign arms and avarice… Forward! Conquer or die! “
21 December: President McKinley issued his “Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation, “ ceding the Philippines to the United States, and instructing the American occupying army to use force, as necessary, to impose American sovereignity over the Philippines even before he obtained Senate ratification of the peace treaty with Spain. [34]

December 27, 1898

In The Roots of the Filipino Nation, O.D. Corpuz writes:

By 27 December 1898 General Antonio Luna reported that all the provinces of Luzon; the islands of Mindoro, Marinduque, Masbate, Ticao, Romblon; part of Panay island; and the Batanes as well as Babuyanes island groups were under the control of the Revolutionary Government. As we can see from the progress of the Revolution in the Visayas, even the Luna report was not complete.[35]

1899

February to November of 1899

Conventional War Operations; in November, 1899: shift to Guerrilla Operations.

January 1899

Emilio Aguinaldo was declared president of the new Philippine Republic, following the meeting of a constitutional convention. United States authorities refused to recognize the new government.

January 21, 1899

The constitution of the Philippine Republic (the Malolos Constitution), was promulgated by Emilio Aguinaldo.

In The Revolutionists: Aguinaldo, Bonifacio, Jacinto, Epifanio De los Santos writes:

On the other hand, when there was a conspiracy to oust Mabini as President of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, Aguinaldo extended full support in his favor. Mabini won.** He also upheld Mabini’s opinion to the end regarding the retention of Spanish prisoners contrary to General Luna’s contention of being “a burden against the exchequer and a very cumbersome impedimdent.”
Although the Malolos Constitution dropped Mabini’s Program, it may be said that it was not at all worthless. It was neither a mere piece of legislation like the multicolored cape of Tirabeque nor a consequence of the malicious influence of the ninth article of Mabini’s True Decalogue. It was precisely a type of revolutionary anarchy after the demobilization of forces as mentioned by Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, for the popular suffrage contained in the Malolos Constitution was already provided in the organic decree of June 18, a retrospection of the constitutional conjectures made on October 31, 1896. It showed traces of the war undertaken by Edilberto Evangelista, the hero of Zapote; Emilio Jacinto, the brains of Katipunan; the Sanguniang Hukuman; and the council of elders of the ancient Tagalogs; the woman’s suffrage, and while the English language is sufficiently taught and learned throughout the Philippine Archipelago, and will then be declared the official language, in the meantime however, Tagalog will remain. They are all anticipated in the Program we are now discussing. Article 5, Title 3, concerning the separation of the Church and the State, was not the ardent love of the framers of the Malolos Constitution, especially of Felipe C. Calderón who drafted it, although, the latter had represented the interests of the Filipino clergy inside and outside of Congress and had been the Director of El Católico Filipino.[1] Moreover, he was with Mabini and Aglipay on this question. If the provision for the separation of the Church and the State had garnered a vote, it was because of the military influence of General Luna as a leader and director of the popular La Independencia which was known as a separatist newspaper; and for this reason, two of its undisputed clergy-concerned editors did not attend the convention. Pablo Tecson resolved the tie. Besides being a separatist, he knew Aguinaldo, Luna and the La Independencia had supported his vote. After having won in the voting, the separatist group became complacent, hence, their restless opponents were able to convince Mabini to interpolate an additional article with some modifications of his famous amendment, suspending the implementation of Article 5, Title 3, until the next meeting of the constituent Assembly. The consent of the National Assembly on this insertion was off the record; nevertheless, it was indicated in the officially printed Constitution.
In spite of adverse events, the Malolos Constitution, although provisional, was commendable. Calderón, who always consulted Don Cayetano Arellano relative thereto, was very much inspired by his colleague, Dr. Joaquín Gonzales, one of the most industrious and cultured Filipinos who was subsequently appointed Director of Civil Service. Like any of other Constitution, it was unanimously approved inside and outside of Congress. Mabini after giving his approval to “the judicious opinion of our beloved country”, said:
…that this monumental work is the most glorious achievement of the noble aspirations of the Philippine Revolution and the conclusive proof before the civilized world of the cultured and capacity of the Filipino people to govern themselves.
This Constitution was decreed by the following delegates:”
** Aguinaldo nominated Mabini Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, but the influential members of Congress, led by Paterno and Rianzares Bautista, opposed Mabini’s election ot the Tribunal. Aguinaldo gave in. Mabini cannot be said to have won, as E. de los santos says. – T. A. A.
[1] E. de los Santos was an appointed member of the Malolos Congress and was, therefore, familiar with many of its members and with the “goings-on” in the Chamber – T. A. A.[33]

January 23, 1899

Luna becomes Commanding General of the Philippine Army.

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

General Luna, by virtue of the order he received, left immediately for Malolos in a special train. After a conference with the Captain General who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, he received from him an order to lead the troops guarding the Kalookan line. The order, however, was ambiguous, as was true of all orders emanating from Malolos, in such a manner that this command resulted in being almost nominal only.[36]

February 4, 1899

The Philippine-American War began as the Philippine Republic declared war on the United States forces, following the killing of three Filipino soldiers by U.S. forces in a suburb of Manila.

Luna assumes post of chief of operations in Luzon.

In The Development of Philippine Politics, Maximo Kalaw writes:

As soon ‘ as hostilities began between Americans and Filipinos, Luna was appointed commander-in-chief of the Filipino forces in Central Luzon, where most of the fighting was done. The poor preparation of Aguinaldo’s forces was manifest during the first weeks of the campaign and some military observers believe that if General Luna had been put in charge of the preparation of the army before the opening of hostilities, the Filipino army might have been able to offer better resisting qualities. [30]

In La Revolucion Filipina, Mabini writes:

Only after the outbreak of hostilities, when the telegraph line had already been cut, did he [Aguinaldo] name General Luna commander of the forces operating around Manila, but by that time the various army units had already evacuated their old emplacements, and communications among them had become slow and hazardous. Furthermore, Luna resigned his command shortly afterward because the War Minister had disapproved one of his dispositions. However, he resumed command of the defensive operations north of Manila when the Philippine government was compelled to leave Malolos for San Isidro in the province of Nueva Ecija. [37]

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

On a certain occasion, while we were sitting in front of a lunch served better than the usual ones, Luna, who was in good humor, called Garcia and asked him if he was ready to disturb the digestion of the enemy general who, according to intelligence reports, was staying in the house of Higgins and must be at that precise moment also eating. Garcia with his “Very well, my general” which still rings in my ears like the laconic and smiling sayonara of the Japanese whenever they are sent on a dangerous mission, took with him some of his men and, after the very time when he should be at the place to which he was ordered to go, we heard short but lively exchange of shots from the lines. Luna, upon hearing the shooting, could not help but exclaim: “It is a pity that there are not many Garcias!” I believe that there is a providence for the brave because Garcia returned without injury from that exploit.
Luna was of an impulsive temper, violent in his passions and with an inexorable heart when he believed it convenient to lay down his iron hand. He was a samurai by instinct, incapable of abandoning a comrade in moments of danger, and ready to do anything within his power to reward valor and to mitigate the sufferings of a soldier who complies with his duty. So long as acts of service were involved, he did not take into account either friendship or family ties. He was gifted with a fearful courage and he considered it a dishonor to run in the face of any danger whatever it might be.[38]

In the “Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands”, Felipe Buencamino said:

Mr. JONES. Before you make that further statement I would like to ask you one or two questions, and then you will be permitted to make any statement or explanation which you desire, but I would much prefer that you answer my questions as briefly as possible before you make any statement or explanation. What authority had you for your statement contained in this memorial to Congress that the American forces commenced hostilities on the 4th of February, 1899, in accordance with the orders of President William McKinley?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. The authority of the council of Aguinaldo as I wrote that memorial, not as Felipe Buencamino, but as the secretary of Aguinaldo.
Mr. JONES. The memorial is signed “Felipe Buencamino,” not as secretary of Aguinaldo, or in any other official capacity. Why did you not sign it as secretary for Aguinaldo if you wrote it at his instance?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. If your memory does not fail you you will remember that I said the document was not authentic. In the authentic document in Spanish which I wrote my title appears as secretary of Aguinaldo, and that appears in the preamble in the English itself – that I wrote this at the command of my government, at that time Filipino.
Mr. JONES. I understand you to say that when this memorial was written you entertained exactly the sentiments and opinions expressed in it?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. It is my opinion that when I acted officially as secretary I did not express but the logic of the documents which were presented to me by Mr. Aguinaldo. Those documents were denied by Admiral Dewey, as well as by Consul Pratt at Singapore and by Consul Wildman at Hongkong, afterwards, and for those reasons nobody paid any attention to this document at that time, when some attention should have been paid to it. No American paid any attention to it at that time, and now there is a great deal made of it.
Mr. JONES. You attach to that memorial a number of additional documents which you declare in the memorial would sustain the statements which you had made. Are those documents authentic?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. They were given to me as authentic documents, but they were denied to such an extent that Consul Pratt brought a suit against Bray, Aguinaldo’s agent in Singapore, and the British tribunals in Singapore sentenced this Englishman for libel and to pay a fine of $6,000, which Agoncillo asked me, as secretary of state, to authorize him to pay.
Mr. JONES. Although you admit that you prepared this memorial to Congress, and that it correctly represents the views which you entertained at that time, you now say that you repudiate, for the reasons you have given, the whole memorial and its statements?
Mr. TAWNEY. Before he answers that question, has he said that the memorial correctly represents his views? Did he not say that it was written for Aguinaldo?
Mr. JONES. He said that it did represent his individual views and sentiments, and that he wrote it at the instance of Aguinaldo, and that he did entertain those views at that time. You have not, as I understand, translated the document?’
Mr. BUENCAMINO. I have read it.
Mr. JONES. You have read it?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir.
Mr. JONES. And it correctly expresses the ideas which you entertained at that time and which you intended by it to convey to the American Congress?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir; by reason of Admiral Dewey’s alleged promises.
Mr. JONES. Do I understand you to say that the original in Spanish had been sent to Hongkong to the junta there?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir.
Mr. JONES. Is the original in Hongkong now? Do you know where it is?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. I do not know. I suppose it must be there.
Mr. JONES. Why did you say then on yesterday, that you would like to be allowed, before testifying as to this, to send to Manila and get the original?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. I have a copy in Manila. It was printed in Spanish. But the original, signed by Aguinaldo, was sent to Hongkong.
The CHAIRMAN. The original was signed by Aguinaldo?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir; and for this reason: It would not have been accepted as authentic with my signature only. After my signature Aguinaldo put the word “authentic” and affixed his signature. These are some of Aguinaldo’s secrets.
Mr. JONES. The copy of that memorial which I have in my hand, and which I have shown to the witness, contains a note in these words: Official editions of this correspondence have been forwarded through the post to the presidents of both Houses.
Mr. BUENCAMINO. That appears there, but on the original, of course, it did not appear. The members of the junta at Hongkong were the ones to do that.
Mr. JONES. This seems to have been printed in Hongkong.
Mr. BUENCAMINO. That may be, but I have not submitted any English documents to the Hongkong junta, but a document in Spanish for transmission by the junta here.[39]

Mr. JONES. The notes of the stenographer will show, and I hope they will be properly transcribed. In this memorial these words are used: It is sometimes said that we are to blame for the outbreak of hostilities during the night of the 4th of February last, but this is not an established fact.
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir. For the attack of that night they were not to blame at all.
Mr. JONES. For the attack of that night the Filipinos were not to blame at all?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. That is my opinion.
Mr. JONES. It is also stated in this memorial: It is unquestionable that we were not aggressors, for we know full well that were we to act on the offensive we could look for neither military or political gain of any kind. On the contrary, we regarded such action as bordering on suicidal folly, and well-nigh sure to bring down on us the hatred and contempt of the American people. We had, in fact, nothing to gain and very much to lose by aggression. Did you write that statement, expressing your own views and those of your associates, or did you write it as expressing the views of Aguinaldo?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. I wrote that statement as expressing the views of Aguinaldo’s private secretary; not as a private individual.[40]

Mr. JONES. You said in this memorial: The only possible way to accomplish your object is to destroy the lives of 8,000,000 Filipinos, an act which would leave on the hitherto–
Mr. BUENCAMINO. I do not understand that question very fully.
Mr. JONES. You desire me to repeat the question.
Mr. BUENCAMINO. If you please.
Mr. JONES. This memorial addressed to the American Congress made use of these words: The only possible way to accomplish your object is to destroy the lives of 8,000,000 Filipinos, an act which would leave on the hitherto spotless pages of your glorious history and traditional liberality an everlasting and indelible stain. Now, what I want to know is, Do you still adhere to that statement, that the only possible way by which the American people can extend their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands is to destroy the lives of 8,000,000 Filipinos?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. That was the idea of the Philippine government at that time, but the true facts are that, beginning with Aguinaldo, all those who said they were going to die are still living.
Mr. JONES. And one of those still living is yourself, and you are enjoying a fat office under the American Government, are you not? And your associate, Aguinaldo, is now in prison
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Buencamino is alive, and he has admitted many times that he holds an office.
Mr. JONES. We know that Aguinaldo is alive and that he is now a prisoner.
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir; but I did not express my opinion in that case. There I expressed the opinion of Aguinaldo and one of the bravest men they had at that time. Consequently if I live now it is not because I surrendered. I was captured, and if I live now it is due to the humanity of the American Army, which should have shot me twenty times over. For this reason I esteem the American sovereignty now because I have understood it to be a very humane one.[41]

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

The great majority of the rich and educated elements who had been attracted to the cause of the Revolution during its successes were in no manner capable of following up in times of adversities. Neither were they imbued with enough self-abnegation and patriotism to stake their material interests and conveniences and, much less their lives, on the hazards of an arduous and unequal struggle. Undoubtedly, upon the outbreak of the war they were sincere in manifesting that all the Filipinos should fight to the end, but subsequent events demonstrated that their convictions were not deep-rooted. For hardly have they encountered the opportunity, they formed without any honorable exception the nucleus of the pro-annexation Federal Party which worked so hard to disarm by all means imaginable the men whom they themselves had encouraged to fight the war.
[…]
The enlightened class who came to Malolos in order to fill honorific positions which could serve to shield them against the reprisals of the people for their previous misconduct, flew away like birds with great fright upon hearing the first gun report, hiding their important persons in some corner, meantime that they could not find occasion to place themselves under the protection of the American Army. Only a few followed the Government in its odessey and, certainly, less enlisted in the army.
From the rich class neither could the country expect any efficacious aid, because in a reunion held in Malolos by the most distinguished financiers for the floating of domestic bonds, despite the fact that the one who appeared at the head of these Croesuses had subscribed for P50,000, but under a fictitious arrangement with the Government — I believe — just so such a large subscription might excite the patriotism of the others, the amounts subscribed were however very insignificant. Later on, I learned that many of those who had subscribed did not comply with their commitments, and that some of those who received deposits of the payments on these subscriptions had misappropriated them. Our ideas of probity and love of country must have been distorted, as these men whom the public point out with an accusing finger still enjoy the esteem and favors not only of the popular masses who have subsequently elected them to high positions of responsibility, but also of the highest society in the country.
[…]
Nevertheless, Luna did all he could to improve our situation, putting into practice the idea of constructing trenches in two strategic zones: the first beginning from Kalookan and ending in Novaliches and the second, a little to the north beginning from Hacienda Malinta and reaching the mountainous region to the east. In the Kalookan zone the works could not be constructed for being almost all of it under fire by the enemy artillery situated in La Loma which concentrated its fire wherever we began to construct the works. In the northern zone some work was done, but the constructions were not finished for lack of means and time.[42]

February 6, 1899

U.S. Senate ratified the Treaty of Paris by a vote of 52 to 27.

February 7, 1899

In The Truth About Aguinaldo and Other Heroes, Alfredo Saulo writes:

Luna ordered ‘the extermination of all foreigners regardless of sex or age for the purpose of showing the world at large that the United States was incapable of maintaining order in the Philippines or of defending foreign interests.[43]

February 9, 1899

Battle of La Loma lost.

n The Revolutionists: Aguinaldo, Bonifacio, Jacinto, Epifanio De los Santos writes:

In this unequal battle, the victory of superior fire power and proficiency in all types of warfare was already foreseen. The bravery and even personal courage could not be deciding factors. With pugnacious ardor, José Torres Bugallon reconnoitered the enemy’s front line; unfortunately, he died at the encounter at the La Loma Cemetery in the afternoon of February 5.
To give an idea of how Torres, Luna and their men fought, we quote hereunder a portion of Luna’s account:
“The train composed of forty coaches seemed to creep like a serpent, loaded with soldiers who filled the air with their joyful shouts as if they were celebrating fiestas and days of diversion. Where were they going? We did not know… To the battle front, where the cannons roar like thunder and the noise of bullet shots were deafening. Shall we be marching to death? What of that? We will fight for our independence and that is enough… We will be going happy and exhilarated as if we are going to a fiesta…
An hour before, I told Bugallon, the charming and brave young man,
“Finally they have acceded to my request. Come with me,” and he complacently answered,
“I’ll go with you, my…”
We brought six companies and upon our arrival at the Caloocan station, they requested two companies. Then they informed me that the situation in La Loma was very critical. It was necessary to go there come what may and whichever way. That sector was opened and thereupon it was necessary to attack or wait.
We marched towards the plains, through the sun-scorched fields, thinking of our soldiers in La Loma. Where are they? What will they do? Where will they attack?
We advanced and occupied the terrain. We tried to investigate everything around with binoculars. Nothing, …there was silence!
We then moved to the field fronting the Binondo Cemetery, towards the Chinese fort and cemetery, and with our knowledge of the location, we hurriedly advanced to reach the Chinese Hospital.
Commander Torres was beside me. We ordered deploy like guerrillas while our soldiers positioned at the rice field ready for the assault.
Suddenly, the enemies emerged from the left flunk of the Chinese Cemetery. Deployed in guerilla formation and in closed ranks, they proceeded towards Caloocan without any obstacle.
It was necessary to dispatch the troops at that moment, and so, with previous verbal orders, we heavily counter-fired within three minutes.
At the outpost were Torres, Lieutenant Tamayo, Captain Hernando and I. Torres stood up, gave the command and led his soldiers. While I was looking through the binoculars, I heard a piercing noise at y side as if a bamboo was split into pieces. Bautista, commander of a militia, fell dead. His body was riddled with bullets. As the enemies were firing at us without being seen, I deemed it wise to stop our shooting and coordinated with Torres. But, it was impossible to check the fusillage of our soldiers. Instantaneously, Pepe Torres approached me and reported in a hoarse voice:
“These soldiers don’t obey me.”
Then I went down the road considerably sprayed with enemy bullets and in the midst of heavy rain I tried to order Captain V. Natividad’s Company from Nueva Ecija to advance on instruction of Torres. In kneeling position, sheltered by a parapet behind the tombs, they started shooting at the enemies then deployed in front and at the sides. With a serene voice, our hero encouraged his soldiers until he was enraged by the smell of gunpowder and the sound of violent firing.
Then I told Tamayo:
“Tell your soldiers to shoot at one on horseback. He must be a chief.”
The battle continued at random; in half an hour there were 25 casualties on our side. The rain of enemy bullets caused many deaths; but then our soldiers in the Binondo Cemetery had ceased firing, so I decided to verify what happened. I met captain Hernando on the way.
When we were about to leave the cemetery, Lieutenant Colonel Queri informed me that Commander Torres was wounded and needed a stretcher.
Since nobody wanted to cross that road of death which was riddled with bullets, I decided to reach the outpost together with Lt. Col. Queri to supervise the evacuation of the wounded soldiers.
While Lt. Col. Queri and I were advancing, we saw Torres who was very pale with his disjointed right leg severely wounded, prostrate in a ditch by the road.
“Torres, Torres,” I told him. “That is nothing. Have courage and fortitude. We will go over there until you are safe.”
Then our hero, the intrepid Filipino, uttered these words which I will never forget:
“My… don’t expose yourself too much. Don’t advance anymore. Don’t advance any farther.”
Cmdr. Torres was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel right in the battlefield. His gallantry and indomitable spirit, that exemplary courage in facing enemy bullets, placed him on the highest level with Skobeleff and Prim.
As if electrified, Lt. Col. Queri and I arrived at the outpost to lead the soldiers. At that very moment, the bold Lt. Tamayo exclaimed:
“My… that man on horseback had fallen. I saw him.”
With binoculars, I was convinced of the brave official’s assertion while four fighters from Tarlac also fell dead.
Rest in peace valiant Torres, the hero of our Motherland, the bravest among the brave. In his memory, the Guerrilleros who entered Manila together with the 5th company from Malolos and Pampanga became the famous Torres Bugallon Guerilla.
He was a brave man, as General Luna attested, but McArthur occupied Malolos on March 31. It was expected that once the army was reorganized, Luna would defeat the invaders in Calumpit bridge, but he failed because his forces in Guagua were distracted in punishing Mascardo and also due to his intellectual over-confidence.[1] LeRoy stressed that “Luna’s personal chagrin was all the greater for he had advertised his position as impregnable, yet he had not even taken precautions against the dangers of a river across and below his position, so that his men mistook a contingent of crossing Filipino reinforcement for a group of Americans…”
When the Calumpit bridge, the key and port of entry for the invasion of Central Luzon, was captured, pitched battle was no longer feasible. However, taking advantage of the slow movement of the enemy, Aguinaldo mobilized his men and constructed the famous Paruao line, in order to check as much as possible the enemy’s invasion. The bamboo palisades were the original structure along this line. Aguinaldo wrote about its utility, delineating the standard plan with some graphic explanations. The bamboo palisades antedated the famous barbed wire entanglements successfully used during the Russo-Japanese war. The cited explanations follow:
Explanations
The constructed purely bamboo barricade is to check the fast advance of the enemy; the first line is 100 meters from the trenches; from there to the second barricade is 50 meters. The chiefs stationed in the trenches will not fire until after the enemies had reached the third or rather the outpost. The said barricade was approved by the revolutionary leaders in Tenajeros: that they would not attack the enemy in three advances without first seeking another place for refuge, especially when they are formed in three ranks similar to this structure.
(Signed) E. Aguinaldo
13 October 1899
The defense line in the hills of Bamban, Tarlac, as far as Concepcion, was already penetrated. The improvements thereon by Aguinaldo was learned from experience during the revolution of 1898 in Cavite, wherein the trenches constructed by Engineer Evangelista were greatly admired by the Spanish military engineers and even by the Americans: “It is worthy of consideration and study as an evidence of some technical skill.”
[1] E. de los Santos described Luna’s defeat in Bagbag, Kalumpit, Bulakan, in his article “Como se perdio la batalla de Bagbag,” published in Revista Filipina, March 1917. – T. A. A[103]

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

Nevertheless, Luna did all he could to improve our situation, putting into practice the idea of constructing trenches in two strategic zones: the first beginning from Kalookan and ending in Novaliches and the second, a little to the north beginning from Hacienda Malinta and reaching the mountainous region to the east. In the Kalookan zone the works could not be constructed for being almost all of it under fire by the enemy artillery situated in La Loma which concentrated its fire wherever we began to construct the works. In the northern zone some work was done, but the constructions were not finished for lack of means and time.
During the days following the outbreak of hostilities, the American squadron bombarded almost without interruption our positions in Kalookan. These bombardments by heavy-calibered cannons fortunately were more noisy than effective, because there were more duds than not among the shells which landed, and the casualties which they caused us were insignificant. Our soldiers, after recovering from the first fright, became accustomed to the noise of the shells and they stood the bombardment with indifference.
Towards the middle of February, after a still heavier barrage from the batteries in La Loma together with the bombardment by the naval squadron, the enemy attacked at last our lines in Kalookan,taking them after some hours of fighting. Luna on this occasion was with the members of his general staff in the house of Higgins and, during the bombardment, he was rocking himself in the gallery. When the bullets started to rake the garden of the house, it took me a hard time to persuade him to abandon the place in order not to expose ourselves to a useless danger. Luna was one of the last to retreat and when he saw the impossibility of defending Kalookan, he took a rifle and, together with the then Colonel Natividad, stationed himself in the town church, from which position he kept up an intense exchange of fire with the American forces. However, his munitions having been exhausted and in the face of the superiority of the enemy, he retreated in the evening to Polo, passing thru the highway.[44]

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

The following anecdotes picture Luna: I have cited the case of Torres Bugallon who fell in the Battle of La Loma and whom Luna in person carried in the midst of an intense exchange of fire in order that Bugallon would not fall into the hands of the enemy. After this same battle, Luna learned that many of our wounded soldiers had remained without any aid in the swamps which extended to in front of Meypajo. Immediately he took a small escort and penetrated the enemy line without taking into account the danger to which they were exposed. He succeeded in recovering some of the wounded. Among those rescued was one who aroused our admiration for his stoicism and cold-bloodedness. He had a broken leg which swung pitifully from the chair in which he was being carried by four men and yet he smoked calmly a cigar —the first thing he asked from his rescuers — without revealing any exterior sign of the pain which he must have been enduring.[45]

February 10, 1899

In The Roots of the Filipino Nation, O.D. Corpuz writes:

The enemy’s main objective had to be Malolos. The railroad terminal in Caloocan was the first key. The enemy naval guns bombarded the pueblos of Caloocan, Navotas, and Tambobong. The first hard fought actions of the war took place here. General Luna rushed from Pampanga to take charge of the defense. His men held fast without rest, food, and relief from 10 A.M. until 4:30 P.M. They were pounded by the shelling while they stood their ground, but by 5 P.M. they had run out of ammunition. Luna withdrew north to the pueblo of Polo. Caloocan was not lost that day, but the surprise outbreak of hostilities had the Filipinos unprepared. It fell to the enemy on 10 February. The next day Baldomero Aguinaldo wired Luna that two companies from Mariveles were on their way, but it was too late.[46]

February 12, 1899

Battle of Caloocan lost.

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

The fall of Kalookan convinced Luna of the necessity of imposing a very rigid discipline in the army, punishing with great severity whoever did not comply with his duty, above all, when the ones concerned were chiefs or officers. The resistance would have been more tenacious if there had reigned solidarity among the different fighting units, and this solidarity could alone be obtained thru mutual confidence among the troops. It was necessary that the soldiers be convinced that in dangerous situations they would not be abandoned by their chiefs and that they would be supported by the other corps of the army. After each battle, Luna received complaints from the different brigades, mutually accusing each other of having failed in their duties and blaming each other for the defeat.[45]

February 14-July 31, 1899

In The Truth About Aguinaldo and Other Heroes, Alfredo Saulo writes:

A lot of intrigues revolving around Luna arose at this time. These intrigues were for the most part enemy-inspired or caused by spies on the payroll of the Americans. From February 14 to July 31, 1899, about ten percent of the trials conducted in the Philippine Army involved American-paid spies. One enemy agent from Pangasinan reported that the people in that province had been advised ‘not to run away or hide from the Americans,’ as an agreement had been made seeking to make Luna ‘President of the Republic and general-in-chief of operations’; and that the Americans and Pangasinenses would fight side by side against the Tagalogs after the proclamation of independence and the ascension of General Luna to the ‘throne as king of the Philippines.’ Another agent reported that in one place in Nueva Ecija inhabited by Ilocanos, the president, or town head, had ‘given 600 militia men for the reserve of Luna’s command’ to fight with the Americans against the Tagalogs.[47]

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

Towards the middle of February, after a still heavier barrage from the batteries in La Loma together with the bombardment by the naval squadron, the enemy attacked at last our lines in Kalookan, taking them after some hours of fighting. Luna on this occasion was with the members of his general staff in the house of Higgins and, during the bombardment, he was rocking himself in the gallery. When the bullets started to rake the garden of the house, it took me a hard time to persuade him to abandon the place in order not to expose ourselves to a useless danger. Luna was one of the last to retreat and when he saw the impossibility of defending Kalookan, he took a rifle and, together with the then Colonel Natividad, stationed himself in the town church, from which position he kept up an intense exchange of fire with the American forces. However, his munitions having been exhausted and in the face of the superiority of the enemy, he retreated in the evening to Polo, passing thru the highway.[44]

February 15

HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST MANILA
I, Antonio Luna, general in chief of operations ordain and command from this date forward:
First. The following will be executed by shooting with out court martial :
A. Spies and those who give news of us to the enemy.
B. Those who commit robberies and those who violate women.
Second. All towns which may be abandoned by our forces will be burned down. No one deplores war more than I do; I detest it; but we have an inalienable right to defend our soil from falling into the hands of the fresh rulers who desire to appropriate it, slaughtering our men, women, and children.
For this reason we are in duty bound as Filipinos to sacrifice everything for our independence, however great may be the sacrifices which the Fatherland requires of us.
General headquarters at Polo, February 15, 1899.
The general chief of operations,
A. LUNA.[48]

February 18, 1899

In The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, Brian McAllister Linn writes:

The Philippine War
…tensions in Manila defeated all attempts to defuse them. Aguinaldo’s control of his army was uncertain and, with or without his collusion, a number of plots developed calling for a popular uprising supported by an attack from the Republican Army. Ever a stickler for legal niceties, Otis repeatedly insisted that all revolutionary forces withdraw from Manila’s municipal limits. In some cases this meant that they had to abandon territory they had captured and turn over their trenches to the Americans. This infuriated the Filipinos and caused a number of armed confrontations. As a result, several of Manila’s suburbs were disputed areas claimed by both sides. On 4 February 1899, while serving picket duty in one of these areas, Pvt. William Grayson of Nebraska fired on a Filipino patrol that refused to answer his challenge. In a few hours, gunfire had spread up and down the lines, the Americans had gone on the offensive, and the Philippine War had begun
In the operations following the outbreak of war the U.S. Army quickly established its military superiority over the Filipino nationalist forces. The Americans inflicted terrible casualties on Aguinaldo’s soldiers, easily storming entrenchments that were “beautifully made and wretchedly defended.” They shattered the revolutionary forces in battle and captured the Republican capital of Malolos on 31 March, driving into the central Luzon provinces in April and May, and sweeping into the southern Tagalog provinces in June. Yet these victories, though carried out with efficiency and exacting heavy casualties on the revolutionaries, proved ineffectual. Numbering only some 26,000 troops, of which less than half could be spared for active operations in Luzon, Otis could not occupy the territory his forces moved through so easily. Time and time again, his soldiers trudged through the rice paddies and hills, fought a few skirmishes with Aguinaldo’s forces, occupied a provincial capital or key city, and then withdrew to Manila. The arrival of the monsoon in late May found the Army exhausted, suffering from a 60-percent sickness rate in some units, and with little to show for its brilliant record. Otis was forced to wait for the arrival of a new army in the fall before resuming the offensive.
The American battlefield victories in early 1899 owed a great deal to Aguinaldo’s decision to adopt conventional tactics and to rely on regulars instead of guerrillas. Upon his return to the Philippines he had issued a call for the Filipinos to raise Sandahatan and provincial levies. Such forces were enough to drive the demoralized Spanish out of insular towns, but lacked the firepower to assault Manila and the discipline to besiege it. Aguinaldo’s ilustrado advisors believed that an army, organized, trained, and uniformed along European lines, would demonstrate the high level of civilization of the Filipinos and encourage recognition of their independence. Aguinaldo was less certain. As a veteran guerrilla, he was not enamored with conventional warfare. Moreover, his own experience in 1896, in which he had used his local social and political connections to raise his first troops, made him aware that any Filipino military system must be based on the localistic and personalistic nature of rural society. At the same time, remembering the bloody factional strife of 1896, he realized that only a well-armed and well-disciplined force, completely under the command of the central government, could suppress challenges from other provincial leaders. The military establishment that he gradually developed was an attempt at compromise between a European-style conventional army and rural guerrilla forces. On 30 July 1898, he authorized each Tagalog province to create a battalion of provincial forces which would join three new “Aguinaldo” regiments of federal troops and form the Republican Army. At the same time, he continued to encourage the continued formation of revolutionary Sandahatan, town companies, independent battalions, and other units which drew their strength from local or personal loyalties.30
Aguinaldo’s plans had much merit, but they failed to create an effective military establishment. Poorly armed and badly disciplined, composed of a melange of volunteers, veterans of the Spanish colonial army, Katipuneros, and provincial forces, the Republican Army resembled a feudal levy more than a modern military organization. By adopting conventional tactics and formations, Aguinaldo canceled the key strength of the revolutionary forces, their capacity for localized guerrilla war. When taken out of their villages and provinces, merged into larger units commanded by outsiders who could not speak their dialect, and required to stand against a better armed and trained enemy, the social cohesion that tied Filipino soldiers to their comrades and officers broke down. It was impractical to expect men who had been successful as guerrillas to abandon their harassing tactics and habit of seeking the shelter of the nearest village and instead to stay in trenches and fight to the last cartridge. It was equally impractical to expect principales who formed their own companies out of tenants and clients to obey orders from ’ Aguinaldo’s appointees. As Marcelino A. Foronda, Jr., has pointed out, the Republican forces suffered from “intrigues, petty jealousies, and a narrow-minded regionalism which stressed personal loyalties rather than principles and ideas.” Every defeat brought forth new accusations of incompetence, treason, insubordination, and lack of support. Although some military leaders were models of probity, others behaved as petty tyrants, allowing their undisciplined troops to loot, rob, and rape. In one instance, the conduct of the local garrison was so bad that the exasperated inhabitants of a town rose up and disarmed them.
The Republican Army also proved politically dangerous. Lt. Gen. Antonio Luna, an erratic and unstable ilustrado much impressed with the French Army, assumed command of the national forces after the fall of Malolos. Luna tried to check regional and personal differences by imposing discipline, removing incompetent or insubordinate officers, and creating a special force of Filipino veterans who had served with the Spanish forces. For a short period he succeeded in rallying the army, but his inability to achieve victory on the battlefield soon left him open to attack by his many enemies. Prone to uncontrollable rages, he quickly alienated his subordinates through his ruthless attempts to impose discipline. They in turn defied his orders and attempted to turn their military units into private armies. Luna’s political ambitions soon brought him into conflict with Aguinaldo and contributed to his assassination by the president’s bodyguard on 5 June 1899.
The Americans were unable to capitalize on this turmoil because they were in the process of replacing one army with a new one. When it became clear that there would be war with Aguinaldo’s forces, the U.S. government had to bring back the troops from the original Manila expedition and recruit new forces designed especially for service in the Philippines. Under the provisions of the Army Bill of 2 March 1899, the regular establishment of the U.S. Army was placed at 65,000 men and its cavalry and infantry regiments were recruited to their full wartime strength. Officered and manned by veterans of the Cuban, Puerto Rican, or Philippine campaigns, these regulars were tough and capable soldiers. In addition, Congress authorized a 35,000-man volunteer force enlisted for two years and designated exclusively for service in the Philippines. Organized into twenty-five regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, the U.S. Volunteers were commanded by regular and state officers who had distinguished themselves in the Spanish-American War. Both regulars and volunteers were subjects to rigorous examination standards and thorough training. The soldiers arrived in the archipelago skilled in the skirmishing tactics, march discipline, and marksmanship necessary to fighting a guerrilla war.
With the arrival of these new forces in November 1899, the Americans went on the offensive in a three-pronged drive directed at the Republican Army in the north. While Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur pinned down the Filipinos on the central Luzon plain, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton swept to the northeast and occupied the mountain passes, preventing any retreat to the east. The Filipinos fell back to the north, only to have their retreat cut off by Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton’s amphibious landing at Lingayen Gulf. Caught between the converging American forces, with their lines of retreat blocked, the Republican Army broke up. The revolutionaries lost their supplies, artil-“[49]

February 4, 1899

Luna disarms Kawit forces for the 1^st time, in Caloocan

February 21, 1899

In The Roots of the Filipino Nation, O.D. Corpuz writes:

The order to hold was too late. Col. Francisco Roman, Luna’s chief of staff, slipped around MacArthur’s troops and penetrated inside Tondo and Binondo. Then the territorial militia/Sandatahan rose in the two pueblos, setting off fires pursuant to the orders that Luna had issued on 7 February. But the fighters inside the enemy lines did not get enough support or the diversionary action that had been planned to occupy the Americans. This diversion, which had been assigned to the regular troops, was only partly implemented. And the cause was serious: the companies from Kawit, Aguinaldo’s townmates, in whom he took special pride, disobeyed their commanding general while obeying their President.[52]

February 22-23, 1899

In The Roots of the Filipino Nation, O.D. Corpuz writes:

The territorial militia and the Sandatahan were not always distinguished from each other. Thus, in the attack on Manila on 22-23 February Gen. Luna, who planned and led the action explicitly referred to the territorial militia, while the Americans and Mabini recorded that the attackers were the Sandatahan. The best way of looking at the Sandatahan would be to view it as essentially the old Katipunan. A statement of October 1898 says that the men of the Sandatahan “corps” dug trenches and hauled supplies and had no rifles. Some Sandatahan forces would be put through some regularization, mostly in organization, on Luna’s initiative. These would be the territorial militia. But other generals would call raw Sandatahan forces in their commands, territorial militia. In practice neither one nor the other was a. regular fighting force.
[…]
Our story must now turn to the death of Antonio Luna, one of the most fateful events of the war. As director of war he was the ranking authority in the War Department after the war secretary and the President. In the field he was general-in-chief of operations of the region north of the Pasig. The assault on Manila on 22-23 February failed because of the refusal of the companies of Kawit to obey his orders to attack the American rear at Caloocan. These units belonged to Aguinaldo’s personal command but had been temporarily assigned to Luna. The latter naturally asked that the captains of the companies be punished. But Aguinaldo had not only disapproved the attack; he had a special pride in his Caviteños, “whose fame has reached even to Europe,” in his own words. [52]

February 23-26 1899

In Mabini’s letters[10], he writes:

February 23:
In these past few days, I sent, through different channels, two copies of the previous letter, one addressed to your place and the other to Remedios Terrace, foreseeing the possibility of loss through any cause. I sent said copies to Manila through two persons who smuggled themselves into the city, as the vigilance of the Americans is very strict. Until now, I do not know whether the copies were delivered or not.
We have just received flattering news from the frontlines. It is said that our forces in the North are besieging the Americans in Caloocan and La Loma, and that the more advanced regiments have taken possession of the Meisic Barracks. Our forces of the East and South, after recovering Marikina, Santolan, San Francisco del Monte, San Pedro Makati, Mandaluyong and Santa Ana, are now fighting for Sampaloc and San Sebastian. Brigadier-Generals Pantaleon Garcia, Llanera, Glicerio Geronimo (alias Serio) and Pio del Pilar, are directing the operations under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, General Antonio Luna. The President went this afternoon near the front lines. From the belfry of Bulacan, two white flags can be seen hoisted within the radius of Manila. We have not yet received official communiques but only the news transmitted by telegraph officials in the campaign stations near the front lines and the news brought by persons coming from those places.
February 26
The information I have stated in the previous paragraph proved to be false. Up to now, nothing has been regained except part of San Pedro Makati, the Water Reservoir being in Santolan. A fraction of our forces North of Manila succeeded in effect to push through to Manila, reaching Trozo; but they could not hold the place and they had to fall back towards Tinajeros.
We have rumors here that in the Bisayas the Americans have also succeeded in occupying the forts of Iloilo, Molo, and Jaro, after these were burned down. We also hear news to the effect that the foreigners are filing many claims, because the fort was bombarded before the expiration of the period announced for the purpose.
The news is also going around that the Cantonal Government of Negros wanted to enter into an agreement with the Americans, some members of said Government having come to Manila in American transports to confer with General Otis. We do not know the conditions of the settlement because the people of Negros have not communicated with us until now.

February 28, 1899

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

There exist no doubt whatsoever that the tragic end of Luna was premeditated, and if anything can justify this ignominous act, it is that the members of the Cabinet —educated men, cultured and intelligent, headed by Paterno and Buencamino and generals very loyal to Aguinaldo — considered and made Aguinaldo believe that Luna was a pernicious man who was a hindrance to unity in our Government. Mabini himself, long before the date of the death of Luna, wrote Aguinaldo the following letters in which he showed his prejudice against Luna:
“Malolos, February 28, 1899
“Mr. President:
“I have received reports that Luna is going to resign as Director and General-in-Chief of Operations in Manila because no punishment had been meted out to the captains of the companies who did not obey his instructions in the last attack on Manila. We are already seeing the disastrous effects of all weakness. This is noted not only by the army but also by the people. And for the very reason that there is the belief that we do not punish the guilty, some soldiers might say that here it is nothing to disobey a General, whereas in other countries disobedience is punished by shooting. If you are going to punish the companies who disobey in the future, the people will say that you punish them because the soldiers are not from Kawit. At this rate, our soldiers will never know what is discipline***.”[50]

March 2, 1899

In The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, Brian McAllister Linn writes:

“The Americans were unable to capitalize on this turmoil because they were in the process of replacing one army with a new one. When it became clear that there would be war with Aguinaldo’s forces, the U.S. government had to bring back the troops from the original Manila expedition and recruit new forces designed especially for service in the Philippines. Under the provisions of the Army Bill of 2 March 1899, the regular establishment of the U.S. Army was placed at 65,000 men and its cavalry and infantry regiments were recruited to their full wartime strength. Officered and manned by veterans of the Cuban, Puerto Rican, or Philippine campaigns, these regulars were tough and capable soldiers. In addition, Congress authorized a 35,000-man volunteer force enlisted for two years and designated exclusively for service in the Philippines. Organized into twenty-five regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, the U.S. Volunteers were commanded by regular and state officers who had distinguished themselves in the Spanish-American War. Both regulars and volunteers were subjects to rigorous examination standards and thorough training. The soldiers arrived in the archipelago skilled in the skirmishing tactics, march discipline, and marksmanship necessary to fighting a guerrilla war.”[51]

March 3, 1899

In The Truth About Aguinaldo and Other Heroes, Alfredo Saulo writes:

Luna issued a proclamation ordering that all persons who directly or indirectly refused to aid the execution of his military plans were to be immediately shot without trial.[53]

March 6, 1899

In The Truth About Aguinaldo and Other Heroes, Alfredo Saulo writes:

Mabini reports to Aguinaldo of “abuses of Luna,” in the case of Chinese resident of Bocaue, Bulacan, shot without trial: “To be shot without a summary trial is a punishment which can be inflicted on soldiers but a chief cannot enforce it in a civilized community, except among savages… If an educated man can hardly understand his duties, how will the uneducated one understand his?”[53]

This is what Mabini actually wrote:

LETTER TO PRESIDENT AGUINALDO
March 6, 1899
Mr. President:
Many complaints have been directed to us here against the abuses committed by General Luna. People say that he published an edict a few days ago threatening to shoot without process of law those who would violate his orders. In Bocaue, he ordered a Chinese shot without due process of law; and published his edict even in the province of Pampanga.
Soldiers usually shoot people summarily, it is true. But only in barbaric countries, not in civilized ones, do military chiefs order such a thing by means of an edict. Besides, Luna has jurisdiction only in Polo, where his headquarters stands, and in the towns comprising the Manila zone.
I find it strange that Luna does not understand this. He cannot be giving orders in Bulacan and Pampanga except through the military chiefs of these provinces.
While he is acting as Chief of Operations, he stops being the Director of War, and even if he does not he can only have powers within the office and, at most, only when he takes the place of the Secretary of War in the absence of the latter.
If an educated person cannot understand what powers he has, how much less an ignorant one?
Please make him understand these things so that we shall have no conflicts.
Command me.
MABINI
P.S.
If you can put another in his place, it would be much better.[54]

Note: see Si Apolinario Mabini laban kay Hen. Antonio Luna / sinulat ni José P. Santos ; may paunang salita ni Gregoria de Jesus.

In The Development of Philippine Politics, Maximo Kalaw writes:

Mabini himself often complained to President Aguinaldo about the arbitrary acts committed by General Luna. One of these charges was to the effect that General Luna published a decree warning people that those who should disobey his orders should be shot to death without even summary trial. In this connection Mabini in his letter dated March G, 1899, said that to be shot to death without summary trial is a punishment which can be inflicted on soldiers; but a chief cannot enforce it in .a civilized community, except among savages. Besides, he has only jurisdiction over Polo, where the General Headquarters is, and over the towns of the zones of Manila.
“I am very surprised that these things are not well understood by General Luna,” proceeded Mabini. “He has no executive power over Bulacan and Pampanga; he must have issued his orders through the military chiefs thereof.” [61]

March 7, 1899

Mabini, in a telegram to Aguinaldo: Luna “not qualified to command an army,much less to conduct an office, because he is a despot.”

LETTER TO PRESIDENT AGUINALDO[55]
March 7, 1899
Mr. President:
I suppose Mr. Velez showed you last night the letter of Arquiza from Laguna. I also received the letter of a lawyer from Pateros, who now lives in Santa Cruz, which says the same thing. It seems that the provincial chief cannot decide anything in view of the fact that Mr. Benitez, as a representative, is untouchable.
My office companion received also a letter from Don Vicente Reyes, who, although he says nothing on the particular subject, relates that, according to persons who had news from reliable sources, the Americans are going to bombard Dagupan and land there. Because of this, the launches that were ordered from Hongkong are coming over and. proceeding to Laguna. After Dagupan is taken, the American forces in Manila and those in Pangasinan will have us cornered. The launches will bombard the coastal towns of Laguna.
This is the news going around over there. Even if the names of the persons who heard it from reliable sources are not mentioned, we can readily see that there is truth in it from the other letters received from the same place.
I believe we should not consent to the landing of the Americans in Santo Tomas, La Union. The military chiefs of Pangasinan and La Union shall oppose this firmly. Should the Americans succeed in taking positions in that place, Dagupan will be attacked by their forces from land and sea.
I am sending you the telegram I received from Luna as well as the draft of my answer. It is up to you to decide on his irrevocable resignation. I sent to the Department of War a General Order to be given to you. In this order, the attributes and jurisdiction of a Commander-in-Chief of Operations in the neighborhood of Manila are stated.
Inasmuch as the resignation of Luna is irrevocable, you should appoint another and you should give the direction of the defense work in this part of Polo to Don Ambrosio, he being your Chief of Staff, so that there will be no friction and trouble afterwards.
I have written below the draft of the acceptance of Luna’s resignation, just in case you decide to accept said resignation and you have no answer in readiness. I leave everything in your hands; command your servant,
MABINI
P.S.
Concerning Mr. Benitez, I think we have to instruct the provincial chief to send him here accompanied by a trusted person. And would heaven that he would learn his lesson from this as the roads are very bad!
Same
[DRAFT OF ANSWER TO LUNA]
Having read your irrevocable resignation from your present position, I find myself constrained to accept it with deep regret, because I am conscious of your merits and the great services you have rendered to the country, services that I shall never forget. By virtue thereof, kindly relinquish the Command to General–. In thanking you in the name of the country for your services, I beg of you to count always on my sincere friendship.

March 19, 1899

The Queen regent of Spain, María Cristina, signed the Treaty of Paris, breaking the deadlock in the Spanish Cortes.

March 26, 1899

Battle of Polo lost (site of general headquarters of Luna).

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

This trip produced two incidents which were both disagreeable and for which many who were not well informed of the causes which produced them criticized the acts of Luna. The first was the arrest by his order of the station master in San Fernando and a high British official of the railroad company for having refused to facilitate a special train which he had asked for the young women of the Red Cross. Luna was always irked by any air of superiority which foreigners used to put on in dealing with us, and he took advantage of this opportunity to show them that he was not ready to tolerate such things. The Englishman arrived in Polo very haughty, refusing to enter the car in which he was to be taken in compliance with his arrest. He showed to everybody his passport signed by Lord Salisbury, but when Luna manifested through one of his aides that if he did not obey he would run the risk of being shot, he toned down in his attitude and submitted to the arrest.
Another incident connected with the trip to Polo of the Red Cross was the brutal treatment which Luna meted out to certain young men of San Fernando who pretended to accompany the young women during the trip. Luna looked with angry eyes at all the young men who did not feel enough virility and patriotism to serve in the ranks of the army at a time when the country needed in the contest all her sons able to take up arms..[56]

Luna in Bagbag, Kalumpit and Sto. Tomas

The march of the campaign was becoming more disastrous for our arms. Luna was burning with impatience to take active part again in the war and was only waiting for an opportunity to offer his services to the Government, but he wanted to do it under circumstances in which he could dictate his terms. This opportunity presented itself after the fall of Polo and Marilaw to the invaders. The defeats which we suffered convinced those in Malolos that Luna was the only general who could organize effective and prolonged resistance, since the state of things in which we found ourselves could not allow us any hope to stop the advance of the enemy.
[…]
He possessed an iron will-power and a character untamed by adversity. And he never retreated in the face of any obstacle whenever it comes to carrying out any enterprise.[56]

March 29, 1899

Battle of Guiguinto lost, resulting in fall of Bocaue and Bigaa

March 31, 1899

Barasoian, capital of the Republic, falls.

In his article, “The way Antonio Luna died,” Ambeth Ocampo writes:

“Luna, en route from San Fernando to Calumpit, writes Last Will and Testament: “1. I leave whatever I have to my mother. 2. If they will kill me, wrap me in a Filipino flag with all the clothing with which I was dressed when killed, and bury me in the ground. 3. I wish to state freely that I would die willingly for my country, for our independence, without thereby looking for death.”[57]

March 31 to May 1899

In The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, Brian McAllister Linn writes:

“In the operations following the outbreak of war the U.S. Army quickly established its military superiority over the Filipino nationalist forces. The Americans inflicted terrible casualties on Aguinaldo’s soldiers, easily storming entrenchments that were “beautifully made and wretchedly defended.” They shattered the revolutionary forces in battle and captured the Republican capital of Malolos on 31 March, driving into the central Luzon provinces in April and May, and sweeping into the southern Tagalog provinces in June. Yet these victories, though carried out with efficiency and exacting heavy casualties on the revolutionaries, proved ineffectual. Numbering only some 26,000 troops, of which less than half could be spared for active operations in Luzon, Otis could not occupy the territory his forces moved through so easily. Time and time again, his soldiers trudged through the rice paddies and hills, fought a few skirmishes with Aguinaldo’s forces, occupied a provincial capital or key city, and then withdrew to Manila. The arrival of the monsoon in late May found the Army exhausted, suffering from a 60-percent sickness rate in some units, and with little to show for its brilliant record. Otis was forced to wait for the arrival of a new army in the fall before resuming the offensive.”[58]

In The Development of Philippine Politics, Maximo Kalaw writes:

After the taking of Malolos by the Americans, Luna rallied his forces in Calumpit and established severe disciplinary measures. He dismissed officers who disregarded his authority and disarmed men who disobeyed his orders. He knew how to infuse the proper morale into the army, and the American forces were surprised at the discipline displayed by his soldiers. But he was of a very despotic temperament and some of his acts were so arbitrary that they angered even such men as Mabini who, in the beginning, was a firm supporter of his disciplinary acts. [61]

April 6, 1899

Judge Advocate Pedro M. Liongson, in a letter to the Secretary of War, sends a list of officers and men that Luna ordered arrested and punished for alleged violations of military discipline.

April 7, 1899

In The Truth About Aguinaldo and Other Heroes, Alfredo Saulo writes:

Two weeks before the Mascardo-Luna confrontation in Betis, Pampanga, the younger officer had informed General Baldomero Aguinaldo, the secretary of war, that he wanted to resign in order to avoid serving under Luna whom he feared might harass and humiliate him before the woman he loved. Secretary Aguinaldo rejected Mascardo’s resignation.
…Mascardo also informed Secretary of War Baldomero Aguinaldo that Luna “had formed a party which, if not checked, would bring serious misfortunes upon the country.”[59]

Here is Mabini’s letter:

LETTER TO PRESIDENT AGUINALDO[1][60]
San Isidro, April 7, 1899
Mr. President:
I have been here at San Isidro, according to your instruction, for the last three days. When I arrived, Don Baldomero, Don Gracio, and Don Severino were already here, but Don Arcadio arrived only this morning from Tarlac. We are all assembled here at San Isidro, and I am exerting all efforts to reduce the salary expenses of the Government.
With regards to the defense of this province, I conferred with Don Baldomero and Sr. Padilla, and I discovered that there is no force here except that which is slightly bigger than one company. If you do not need the force from Nueva Ecija, send it back here or send arms confiscated from deserters so that they may be added to the force we have here. The rainy season is fast approaching and we need to defend the river which when swollen could be navigated by launches. Also we need to put defenses at San Miguel and Cabiao. Sr. Padilla says that although he will use the armed forces he cannot expect victory if there Will be no guns to support the attack.
Don Baldomero wants to leave the secretaryship of war to Don Ambrosio and join you there. If you do not deem such a move wise, better write to him or to me and I will show him your letter.
The bearer, Basilio Teodoro, is requesting that you find out the reason why his brother was arrested there under orders given by General Luna; it might be that the charges made against him are false. If the charges are true, he should be punished; but if those charges are false, made as usual by those who envy him, he must be cleared.
I hear that one of your companions is ailing, but the other members of your family are well with the help of God.
I am at your command.
MABINI
[1] The Schurman Commission arrived in March. Malolos was taken by the invading troops on the 31st . The Philippine Government was moved to San Isidro in April. The war dragged. From San Isidro, Mabini answered the Proclamation of the Schurman Commission with a manifesto which was published in Spanish and Tagalog. He also answered through the press the questions that an American newspaperman asked Aguinaldo. It is a pity that of the various letters that Mabini wrote to the Hongkong Committee only one [dated April 24, 1899] was found. – T.M.K.

In The Development of Philippine Politics, Maximo Kalaw writes:

The impression also gained currency that he wanted to supplant the President of the republic himself. Thus Aguinaldo’s staff officer, in a postscript to a letter said: “Although it will give you pain, nevertheless I advise you as I wish to be faithful that there is a report to the effect that our chief of operations is forming a party, the aim and purpose of which are none other than to make him president. Be very cautious as the disgrace would be great. Two or three persons have confirmed this report and the whole of Calumpit is aware of the same”.([1])[61]
[1] Taylor, Vol. II, 41 AJ.

April 8, 1899

Mabini writes again to Aguinaldo:

LETTER TO PRESIDENT AGUINALDO[60]
April 8, 1899
Mr. President:
I am informing you that Don Baldomero is willing to be relieved from the Department of War to avoid trouble with General Luna, which is likely to happen in the face of the accusations coming to him. On the basis of what I see in Don Baldomero, it is necessary to make Don Mariano Trias take his place as he asks, because even without actual troubles, Don Baldomero and Luna may get so much entangled in personal animosities that they will eventually become obstacles themselves in the exercise of their respective duties and to the ideal we are after.
As regards myself and the other Secretaries, even if we are aware that General Luna does not give the Government an account of what he does, we just close our eyes. Would to heaven that he can really raise high the national honor as it was your desire when you appointed him to his present position. Under other circumstances, these things would have given the Secretaries cause for resignation, but we are trying to hold on to avoid greater sufferings for our country.
What is taking place is sad because if we succeed, all the honor will be Luna’s – and I am very willing that he should have it; but if we fail, if his plans should end in failure, the responsibility will be ours because we allowed him to go on. If our Government were a dictatorship, and not a constitutional one, this one would still do, because you will, then, be the only person responsible. But I believe we should not now change our form of Government so as not to give the world powers reason to believe the Americans when these tell them that with the capture of Malolos our Government fell.
We are not asking him any more to give the Government an account of his plans and policy of war; but we want, yes, that he notify us of the measures that he should take with regard to the townspeople, the foreigners, and other matters that fall under the classification of war policy. I believe on this point, as well as in the organization of our forces, and in the recruiting of soldiers, the Government should intervene, since it is the one called upon to supply arms and provisions. It is the Government and not the Chief of Operations that is responsible for the war policy; that is why the Chief of Operations should obey the instructions that he gets.
We received a communication from Iloilo, coming from General Martin Delgado and from your Commissioner Francisco Soriano. Soriano says that the soldiers of D— did nothing but loot and rob the people of money when the Americans attacked the fort of Iloilo. There were soldiers whose guns were broken because they used them in carrying money to C—. It is said that these soldiers not only refused to fight the Americans, but also refused to surrender their guns to those who were willing and ready to fight. They also do not like that C— should help the people of Iloilo, who are the ones feeding the soldiers, including those of D—, who repaired to that place.
General Martin Delgado says that the Americans attacked the fort of Iloilo on February 11, and because of the retreat of the forces of D— and of A—, the invaders captured the city and also Jaro and Molo on the following day. The enemy suffered around two hundred casualties, and we about thirty. The enemy’s general headquarters is in Santa Barbara and its forces total up to 3,000, half of which are musketeers, and the rest are armed in various ways. Of the musketeers, five hundred remained in Capiz, Concepcion and Antique. General Delgado continues to recruit men and he asks for more guns; and in case we have nothing more to give, D— should be told to give what he has. D— and A— say that they acknowledge Delgado as Chief as they realize that the enemy had taken Iloilo, Jaro, and Molo because they failed to follow his instructions and kept falling back.
A priest, M. Pascual Reyes, also arrived here from Cebu. He says that in L—, General L— is committing many abuses, and that Colonel M— is only his instrument. There are also troubles in Cebu, because Military Chief Magilom (Maxilom) is not in good terms with the people.
I was told that you received a proclamation from the Americans. I beg of you, if possible, to send me a copy of it so that I can answer it, should there be a need to do so.
Command your old servant
MABINI

April 9, 1899

Mabini sends telegram to Aguinaldo, on a Frenchman named Don Marrais “murdered supposedly by order of Luna.”

April 11, 1899

The Treaty of Paris was proclaimed.

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

The enlightened class who came to Malolos in order to fill honorific positions which could serve to shield them against the reprisal of the people for their previous misconduct (of betraying the first phase of the revolution), flew away like birds with great fright upon hearing the first gun report, hiding their important persons in some corner, meantime that they could not find protection of the American army. Only a few followed the Government in its oddyssey and, certainly, less enlisted in the army.[62]

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

“The great majority of the rich and educated elements who had been attracted to the cause of the Revolution during its successes were in no manner capable of following up in times of adversities. Neither were they imbued with self-abnegation and patriotism to stake their material interests and conveniences and, much less their lives, on the hazards of an arduous and unequal struggle. Undoubtedly, upon the outbreak of the war they were sincere in 19 manifesting that all the Filipinos should fight to the end, but subsequent events demonstrated that their convictions were not deep-rooted. For hardly had they encountered the opportunity, they formed without honorable exception the nucleus of the pro-annexation Federal Party which worked so hard to disarm by all means imaginable men whom they themselves had encouraged to fight the war.”[62]

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

Luna, in the midst of this debacle, contained in himself, restraining his impetuous and violent temper in seeing himself impotent to remedy such disorder and indiscipline. Nevertheless, at time his temper overrode his will-power and made him maltreat by word and by deed some chiefs and officers who had distinguished themselves most by their cowardice. This caused complaints against Luna to rain in Malolos which, unfortunately, were listened to, thereby producing more laxity in the already little discipline in the army and strained relations between Luna and the Office of the Captain General![64]

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

“Our army had a regional organization. Each province organized brigades and regiments under the command of generals and chiefs who were native sons of the province. This regional organization greatly impaired the unity and solidarity of the army, because most of the generals – at least those under Luna – did not want to recognize any other authority except theirs and that of the Captain General (Aguinaldo). They did not want to submit to the Chief of Operations (Luna) and the Government did not feel sufficiently strong to impose discipline upon these recalcitrant generals. Some believed that the mere fact that they had organized their brigades and armed them with guns taken from the Spaniards was a sufficient reason for them to treat such brigades as their own private armies.”[64]

April 14, 1899

Luna disarms the Kawit forces for the 2^nd time, in Calumpit; Judge Advocate Pedro M. Liongson in a letter states 138 soldiers and one officer, Lt. Anacleto Mendoza, listed as having been disarmed by Luna for insubordination.

April 18, 1899

In the “Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands”, Felipe Buencamino said:

Buencamino: “…there was a conflict between General Mascardo and General Luna in the province of Pampanga. General Mascardo was one of the most intimate friends of General Aguinaldo, and had been the companion of Aguinaldo since the insurrection of 1899. General Luna desired to subject General Mascardo to his order, and General Mascardo objected. Thus, on this morning, April 18,1899, General Luna took 800 soldiers from the trenches of Bagbag, who were facing the trenches of General MacArthur at Malolos, a distance of about 8 miles, and they went in the opposite direction to search for General Mascardo and capture him. General Mascardo also prepared himself with 500 men to fight the soldiers of General Luna. At 10 o’clock in the morning that same day General MacArthur attacked General Luna’s trenches, and took the same day the town of Quingua, which was defended by General Aguinaldo. General Aguinaldo called on General Luna to attack the flank of General MacArthur, but General Luna was not at his post; he was 25 miles beyond, looking for General Mascardo. At 3 o’clock in the afternoon the troops were all ready to have a combat when they received advices stating that * General MacArthur had defeated General Aguinaldo at Quingua. This was the cause for the suspension of internal dissensions among us, but the motives were still held in reserve.[66]

In The Development of Philippine Politics, Maximo Kalaw writes:

One of the incidents which showed the sanguinary temper of Luna concerned him and General Mascardo. General Mascardo was the politico-military chief of Pampanga and Bataan and hence under the jurisdiction of General Luna. General Luna gave an order to General Mascardo which the latter did not at once obey because he had not been officially notified of the appointment of Luna. General Luna then asked for the dismissal of Mascardo from the government. Aguinaldo appointed Felipe Buencamino to settle the dispute, and the latter decided that Mascardo was at fault and should be placed under arrest for one day. This solution was agreeable to Aguinaldo and apparently also to Luna. But the following day, Luna was planning to challenge Mascardo to a duel, and later on intended to arrest him with 800 men. A civil war thus almost started.([1])
[1] Memoirs of Buencamino under heading ‘‘Incidents Luna-Mascardo”. Another act of General Luna which has been severely criticised was his secret order of February 7, 1899, for the massacre of Americans and foreigners in Manila. “Brethren,” he said, “The Americans have insulted us and we must revenge ourselves upon them by annihilating than… The servants of the houses occupied by Americans and Spaniards shall burn the buildings In which their masters live in such a manner that the conflagration shall he simultaneous In all parts of the city… The lives of the Filipinos only shall be respected, and they shall not be molested with the exception of those who have been pointed out as traitors”. Fortunately his order was not carried out. For the complete order see Senate Document 381, pt. 2, 57 Cong. 1st sess. p, 1912.
See also Taylor, Vol. IV. Exhibit 816, 96 FZ.[65]

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

Among the generals who were under the immediate orders of Luna was General Mascardo whom he entrusted with the mission of guarding the coast of Manila Bay on the Pampanga side in order to impede as much as possible an enemy landing, or, at least, to delay it so that we would not find ourselves outflanked in Bagbag and Kalumpit. This general, on various occasions, absented himself from his post without permission, in disregard of the instructions of the General-in-Chief, believing undoubtedly that with the protection that he enjoyed from the Captain General, Luna would not attempt to impose upon him a punishment. In this case, however, he was mistaken because the Luna of Kalumpit was not the Luna of Kalookan. The admonitions of Luna were answered with insolence and Mascardo’s threats to rebel in case Luna should impose upon him any punishment reached the ears of Luna. Things took such a serious turn that Luna decided to make said general toe the line, resorting to force if necessary. For this purpose he took with himself some companies of the garrison not on duty and with them he proceeded to the place where the general in question was. Everybody feared a bloody conflict, so much so that the inhabitants of the towns near the place where General Mascardo was stationed went out en masse to beg Luna to desist from his plans. Luna, however, answered that discipline was a question of life or death for our troops and that, unless Mascardo recognized his authority and submitted to his orders, he would carry things to the last extreme. Fortunately, however, the incident was settled in a satisfactory manner because General Mascardo had enough prudence to recognize that he was in error and he abided publicly by the orders of Luna, admitting his fault.[67]

In John Schumacher’s, review of Vivencio Jose’s The Rise and Fall of Antonio Luna, he writes:

Though admitting that Luna was impulsive and inclined to rash and harsh action, he [V. Jose] generally defends him as impelled by the necessity of creating a unified and disciplined army in the face of Aguinaldo’s toleration of insubordination and his personalistic conduct of military and governmental affairs. The contention that Aguinaldo’s Cavitismo and favoritism was a major factor in undermining Luna’s leadership and continuting to the military defeats by the Americans seems to this reviewer amply demonstrated. On the other hand, Jose’s efforts to justify Luna’s action in abandoning the battlefield with a large force of men just as the Filipino troops were under severe pressure from the Americans at Bagbag, in order to punish the indiscipline of General Mascardo, seem forced. In spite of the assertion that it was necessary as a matter of principle (p. 305) it seems clear from Luna’s own words cited by the author (p. 301) that personal resentment played a major part in his action. That his impulsive action was largely responsible for the subsequent Filipino defeat also seems clear. The recognition that Aguinaldo’s failure to support Luna and that the latter’s eventual murder destroyed the chance of the Republic to withstand the Americans need not demand the total justification of Luna at every point. His fierce nationalism, his determination and superior military skill are as clear as the tragic blow his murder dealt to the Filipino cause. Similarly in the case of the assassination of Luna, the book demonstrates the responsibility of Buencamino and the culpable complicity of Aguinaldo. The author maintains that Luna did not ambition the Presidency of the Republic, for he recognized in Aguinaldo the only one who had ‘the popular prestige and the personal power to hold the majority of the generals together.’ Moreover, had he had such ambitions, he would have been more diplomatic in dealing with those who ‘counted in the councils of the Republic’ (p. 364). The argument is suasive, and it is clear that Luna was not an intriguer. Nonetheless, it is hard to say whether, given his growing frustration with Aguinaldo, Luna might not have been driven to eliminate at least the many enemies of his who surrounded Aguinaldo, in order to save the Republic from defeat.[13]

But in his memoirs, Alejandrino asserts,

After a month, more or less, of respite which the enemy conceded to us, Luna was able to reunite some 7,000 battle-seasoned and disciplined men who put up energetic and tenacious resistance against the attack of the Americans. The Battle of Bagbag was one of the most hard-fought of those which took place during the entire campaign in the north. Our soldiers disputed inch by inch the territory and they retreated only after they had barely left enough cartridges to cover a retreat. Luna was always in the firing line during all the actions and was always one of the last to retreat.
I insist once more that the grave accusation launched against him by his enemies that the Battle of Bagbag was lost because he had left with a part of his forces to discipline Mascardo and to satisfy his personal pride is absolutely false, because he directed personally the defense of Bagbag. The most palpable and incontrovertible evidence of this fact is that the then Colonel Benito Natividad was wounded during the retreat in front of the station of Kalumpit by the side of Luna. There also died in this battle Lt. Jose Villanueva who was carrying the rifle of Luna which the latter had the custom of using during critical moments.[67]

Dr. Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera recounted:

Si hen. Luna– ang wika sa akin ng matalinong doktor– ay talagang matapang. Ito’y hindi na pagtatalunan. Nguni’t sa kasawiang palad, ang katapangan niya ay hindi nauukol sa isang pinunong hukbo. Totoo siyang magagalitin at hindi marunong tumanggap ng anumang biro. Pati sa babae ay nakikipagkagalit, gaya ng magalit siya kay Pepita Levya. Ang mga kapatid man niya ay hindi pinag-papakundanganan, maliban sa pintor na siya niyang kinaaalang-alanganan. Sinasabing sa mga manunulat sa LA INDEPENDENCIA ay marami rin siyang nakasamaan ng loob. Sa Espanya ay gayon din at minsan ay hinamon pa niya ng barilan si Rizal at kaya lamang hindi natuloy ay nakarating sa pintor na siyang namagitan at pumayapa. Dito man noong nakaraang himagsikan ay marami rin siyang nakagalit na mga pinunong hukbo at pinunong pamahalaan. Kung hindi sa pagkakaalit nila ni heneral Mascardo ay hindi sana natalo agad ang mga pilipino sa mga amerikano sa labanan ng Bagbag. Kung nagagalit si heneral Luna ay walang tanging nakasisira sa kanyang loob at nakapagpapahupa ng kanyang galit kundi ang kanyang ina na labis niyang minamahal at pinagpipitaganan. [63]

In The Development of Philippine Politics, Maximo Kalaw writes:

Again in another letter, April 18th he told President Aguinaldo that Baldomero Aguinaldo should be allowed to resign from the office of the Secretary of War in order to avoid trouble with General Luna, which was likely to, occur on account of the number of complaints he was receiving.
“This state of affairs is very serious,” said Mabini. “If an incident turns out well, the credit goes to him alone; while we wish him all that is due him, the blame falls upon us because we permit the same. If our government were dictatorial in form instead of constitutional, it might be all right, but I believe it is not advisable to change the form of government because this would furnish ground for the other powers to believe what the Americans say to the effect that when they took Malolos our government was already dissolved.”([1]) [65]

April 23, 1899

Calumpit lost, Luna wounded.

In Mabini’s letters, he wrote:

After the Calumpit bridge had fallen to the American forces, due mainly to the scarcity of ammunition, Luna came to see at San Isidro and entreated me to help him convince Mr. Aguinaldo that the time had come to adopt guerrilla warfare. I promised to do what he wanted, while making it clear to him I doubted I would get anywhere because my advice was hardly heeded in military matters insamuch as, not being a military man but a man of letters, my military knowledgeability must be scant, if not non-existent. I could not keep my promise because after our meeting I did not get to see Mr. Aguinaldo until after some time…[69]

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

In Kalumpit where Luna established his headquarters, he began to organize the scattered elements of the different brigades which were then found without chiefs. He ordered me to finish the construction of the trenches of the line north of Bagbag River. When I received this order, I did not have available men under me except a few officers, and this I manifested to Luna, adding that in order to comply with his instructions it would be necessary for me to have at least two thousand men with pick-axes, hoes, hatchets and shovels — implements which we lacked. Luna, without seeming to worry at all over what I said, told me that within three or four days I would have not only 2,000 but 4,000 men with their tools. Being used to the slowness of Malolos, I listened with skepticism to his promises, but when the day set by him arrived and I saw getting off the train the men with their tools who had come from different provinces, my skepticism changed into admiration and I understood that things were going to change aspect from then on. Luna inaugurated that series of orders for the noncompliance of which he prescribed only one punishment — that of death. These orders earned for him the nickname of “General Article One.”[70]

During this time the town of Macabebe was being alarmed by the rumors circulating around, the source of which I could not verify, that the soldiers intended to enter said town and thru blood and fire to raze it to the ground and disperse its inhabitants. Luna spoke to me about the case, condescending to consult my opinion about the matter without manifesting his own. I took advantage of the opportunity to tell him how impolitic such an act would be and, undoubtedly, he was of the same opinion, because he assured me that he would never consent to the execution of such a plan. Sometime afterwards a prominent man of Pampanga, Don Macario Arnedo, went to see Luna to plead for the Macabebes and Luna, in order to quiet down the inhabitants, decided to make a personal trip to Macabebe.[70]

In The Good Fight, Manuel L. Quezon writes:

At Calumpit, one of the most bloody battles fought during the war of resistance against the United States, he [Luna] was wounded, but did not enter a hospital. [68]

April 24- May 5, 1899

From Manuel L. Quezon’s autobiography The Good Fight:

General Benito Natividad, who was seriously wounded in the battle of Calumpit, was brought to Cabanatuan in a hammock carried by his men. General Natividad was one of the right-hand men of General Luna, and by orders previously given by this general he was to be taken to Luna’s headquarters in Bayambang. Colonel Sitiar of Aguinaldo’s staff instructed me to escort General Natividad to Bayambang. After safely placing my patient in the hands of his friend and chief, I departed the following day for Cabanatuan. Upon reporting that my mission had been performed, I found that I had been promoted to the rank of captain.[68]

April 26, 1899

Luna promoted to Lieutenant General after Battle of Santo Tomas, Pampanga, in which he had been wounded.

April 29, 1899

Mabini writes to the Schurman Commission. Teodoro M. Kalaw in a footnote to this letter, provides the context for it: “[1] After four days of hard fighting, General Luna, who was defending with his forces the strategic points of the Bagbag and Calumpit rivers, had to abandon them and fall back to Santo Tomas, Pampanga. From this place he sent his Staff Colonel, Manuel Arguelles, to the enemy camp to ask for a suspension of hostilities under the pretext of calling a session of Congress in San Fernando on May 1st. General Otis refused, alleging that he had only the power to make peace upon the unconditional surrender of the Filipinos. Mabini, as President of the Council of Government, followed up Luna’s request, sending Arguelles anew with concrete instructions. Otis remained adamant. The war continued. – T.M.K”

LETTER TO THE SCHURMAN COMMISSION[1]
San Isidro, April 29, 1899
Honorable Sir:
The Filipino people, through their Government, wish to make known to the Commission that they have not lost their faith in the friendship, justice and magnanimity of the North American nation.
The Filipino people feel weak before the onslaught of the American troops, whose valor they admire; and in view of the superiority of the American forces in organization, discipline, war materials and other resources, the former do not consider it a humiliation to solicit peace, invoking the generous feelings of the Government of the North American people, worthily represented by the Commission, and the sacred interests of humanity.
But the Philippine Government, fully convinced that it did not provoke the war and that it had only taken the use of arms in defense of its native soil, asks for a suspension of hostilities and a general armistice in the whole Archipelago for the short period of three months, in order to sound the opinion of the people regarding the most advantageous form of government for them, the proposal that shall be offered to the North American Government, and the appointment of a commission with full powers to act in the name of the Filipino people.
The happiness of this unfortunate country and the triumph of the party now in power in the United States depend on the prompt restoration of this peace.
We admit our weakness, but we still have other recourses and, above all, a firm resolution to prolong the war for an indefinite period of time, if the aim to dominate us by force persists.
In expressing these statements before the Commission, I believe I am interpreting the feelings of my President and his Government and those of the Filipino people.
I greet the Commission with the greatest respect.
Your obedient servant,
APOLINARIO MABINI
INSTRUCTIONS TO COL. ARGUELLES
The members of the Philippine Government have commissioned Colonel Manuel Arguelles to present and to expound to the North American Commission in the Philippines the following points:
First — The Philippine Government finds itself compelled to negotiate an armistice and a suspension of hostilities as indispensable means to arrive at peace: in the first place, to justify itself before the eyes of its people for having made use of all the means within its power to avoid the ruin of the country; and, in the second place, to offer the Commission a means to end the war in a way which is more honorable to the North American Army and more glorious to the Government of the United States.
Secondly — The Philippine Government does not solicit the armistice in order to gain time to reinforce itself or to await help from Japan or from any other nation, inasmuch as, up to the present time, no government has acknowledged its belligerency. Neither is it decided to hurt its relations with the powerful American nation, because it knows that in so doing it would gain nothing. The Philippine Government, ardently desiring the happiness of its people, although it seeks its independence, would not insist on fighting for its ideal if the Filipino people, through their accredited representatives, would ask for peace and would accept autonomy.
Thirdly — The interest of humanity is at present in harmony with that of the American Government, and both ask for a brief period of time, so that, however short this may be, the Filipino people can reflect on their sad situation and learn of the basis of the autonomy that may be offered them.
Fourthly — If, however, this last recourse would be denied to it, no one can censure the Philippine Government for the tenacity which it can give proofs of. The honor of the Army and the happiness of the people shall determine the line of conduct that it should follow; that is, the prolongation of the war until all means at its command shall have been exhausted. This prolongation of the war would be fatal for both countries.
Let the Commission consider, while there is still time to do so, that, should the war become a national war, it would be very hard to confine it within bounds. Should this happen, peace would mean the annihilation of the Filipino people or of the imperialist party of America.
San Isidro, May 1, 1899.
APOLINARIO MABINI.[72]

May 1899

In The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, Brian McAllister Linn writes:

The Americans invaded Nueva Ecija in May 1899 as part of their early campaigns against the main Republican army under Emilio Aguinaldo. Although Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton occupied the temporary capital of San Isidro on 17 May, he failed to capture the Republican government, which retreated up the river to Cabanatuan. Lawton had little trouble with the Filipino forces, whom he brushed aside with little resistance. The climate was a far more serious opponent. Undermanned and near collapse from overwork and disease, Lawton’s forces withdrew and the province reverted to Republican control. The main result of this expedition was to increase the tension between Aguinaldo and his leading general, Antonio Luna, culminating in Luna’s murder a month later and the equally fatal destruction of internal discipline among the Filipino troops.[73]

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

On two or three occasions the President reviewed the troops organized and commanded by Luna. On one of these occasions he indicated a desire that Luna send one or two batallions to him in Nueva Ecija, but Luna made him see the necessity of having disciplined troops at the front. Although this reason seemed to have convinced the President, I believe nevertheless that Aguinaldo harbored some resentment over it, which was later on taken advantage of by the enemies of Luna to eliminate him.[74]

May 4, 1899

Santo Tomas, Pampanga, lost.

May 5, 1899

Paterno replaces Mabini as Prime Minister (President of the Cabinet). Buencamino becomes Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

San Fernando, Pampanga, lost.

In The Good Fight, Manuel L. Quezon writes:

Soon after Aguinaldo had gone to Cabanatuan, the Filipino Congress held a session there. It was generally believed that at this session the Congress had decided to appoint a committee that would go to Manila and negotiate peace terms with the Philippine Commission sent by President McKinley on the basis of Philippine autonomy under an American protectorate. But General Luna, having heard of the action taken by the Congress, came rushing to Cabanatuan and arrested the members of the Congress whom he found there, including those who had been appointed members of the committee. That was the end of the Malolos Congress as well as any attempt to negotiate peace with the American Government. It was also rumored that General Luna, after insulting some of the members of Aguinaldo’s cabinet who had approved of the action of the Congress, demanded from Aguinaldo their dismissal. Whether the rumor was true or not, the fact remains that after Luna’s trip to Cabanatuan, to which place the Congress had returned, the members of the cabinet presented their resignations and they were accepted. On the other hand, Aguinaldo prevailed upon Luna to release the members of the Congress whom he had arrested. [68]

In The Roots of the Filipino Nation, O.D. Corpuz writes:

The “disasters” that Buencamino had ascribed to Luna were in fact hard fought contests.The battle of Bulacan that began with the actions at the Bagbag and Galumpit rivers pitted Luna against General Arthur MacArthur. Under the latter were two generals of his command (Hale and Wheaton); a third (Lawton) drove north through eastern Bulacan to give flank support. The fight lasted from 24 April to 5 May, Luna reporting that he had run out of ammunition. The enemy drive resumed in mid-May, forcing Aguinaldo to retire to Cabanatuan and Lima to Bayambang. After Luna’s death Aguinaldo moved his capital to Tarlac.[71]

May 9, 1899

Government moves to Cabanatuan.

In The Good Fight, Manuel L. Quezon writes:

For several months I was stationed in Cabanatuan. When later Aguinaldo, pressed by the American advance, transferred the seat of his government form Malolos to Cabanatuan, I was detailed to form a part of his staff. The General in command of all the forces operating in Luzon was Antonio Luna, a highly educated man who had spent many years as a student in Spain and in France. No braver soldier was ever born in any clime or any land. Whenever a key position was at stake, he always took personal command of the Filipino forces and was the last to retreat.[68]

In The Development of Philippine Politics, Maximo Kalaw writes:

On May 9th, the Revolutionary Government changed its seat to Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and on the same day Luna was appointed assistant secretary of war. A few days afterwards Luna knew that, after all, the peace commission had left for Manila. This angered him. He went to Cabanatuan and insulted one of the cabinet members calling him autonomist and traitor. Later on he arrested the president and members of the cabinet and handed them over to Aguinaldo advising their deportation. Some of them immediately endeavored to convince Aguinaldo that Luna was going to the extent of plotting against the President of the Republic himself. At first Aguinaldo would not believe that Luna would have such high designs. Later on he must have been convinced that Luna really had evil plans in mind. An evidence of Aguinaldo’s conviction is that he wrote confidential letters, in Tagalog, and in his own handwriting, addressed to his faithful companions of the insurrection of 1896, telling them that he was in imminent peril and that he relied in the faithfulness of his old comrade who would surely not abandon him.([1])
[1] One of these letters, said Concepcion, was received in his presence, on May 31, by General Makabulos who showed it to him. (Concepcion, Apuntes etc. Entries for June 24, to 30th) [65]

May 17, 1899

In The Truth About Aguinaldo and Other Heroes, Alfredo Saulo writes:

Luna, through adjutant, Col. Francisco Roman, “seized drafts worth 15,000 pesos from the government treasury in Tarlac, Tarlac, and sent them to Manila for collection.”[76]

May 18, 1899

In The Development of Philippine Politics, Maximo Kalaw writes:

That General Luna, on the other hand, was endeavoring to secure popular support for the arrests he had made of Paterno and Buencamino, was shown from the cablegrams he received, one from the Provincial Presidente of Cagayan dated May 18, 1899, and the other from the Provincial Councilor and Representative of Abra dated May 19, 1899, both expressing congratulations upon his action.([1])
[1] The telegrams referred to are taken from Taylor’s Vol. IV, Exhibit 879-881 as follows:
Exhibit 879
(Original in Spanish. Record of telegrams P. I. R. 917-9)
Tuguegarao. Provincial Presidente Cagayan to Secretary of War: I received your telegram with cries of, “Death to Paterno and Buencamino”: and in reply I take pleasure in statins that the entire province refuses to accept autonomy, which is nothing more than a trick to disarm us and then do what they will with us. I trust in the sound wisdom and patriotism of the Filipino people and its government. To accept autonomy now and lower our flag after having spilled blood,—ourselves and others—would be to occupy a false position before all the nations of the world.
Tuguegarao, May 18, 1899.
Exhibit 881
(Original in Spanish. Telegram P. I. R. 917-8)
Vigan, May 19, 1899.
Provincial Councilor and Representative of Abra to General Luna: Have learned traitors Paterno, Buencamino, Velarde and Arguelles imprisoned warmly congratulate you while at the same time we unconditionally adhere to policy and decisions of Government and its Honorable President. Whole province united, sentiments identical to those of that province brave army and pueblo we all repeat cries of Viva Independencia, death to the traitors. Viva the Philippine Republic and its president.
Benguet, May 18, 1899. [65]

May 20, 1899

In La Independencia, Luna said:

“The Filipino people want independence and I sustain the cause of my country until the end in compliance with the oath I made to the flag. Without exaggeration or exaltation, I sincerely confess to you that it is always better to fall on the battlefield than to accept any foreign rule…
…The Americans fought with abnegation to defend theirs; they themselves understand why we resist…”[77]

In The Development of Philippine Politics, Maximo Kalaw writes:

In La Independencia of May 20, 1899, an interview with Luna was published in which he said that the autonomy plan was opposed by all the people that he had met. His statement reads in part:
“All of the Generals with whom I have had communication, viz: Tinio, Macubulos, Concepcion, Mascardo, Pilar and Torres are all of the same opinion. Those of the south are still more decided. The military, together with the civil party, will not deliver their arms or accept autonomy. I have profound convictions of what I say, since in a kind of plebiscite I have asked the people whether they wanted autonomy. Do you know what they answered me? ‘Long live Independence.’ ‘May autonomy die!’ Those were the answers I received in eight of the central provinces I addressed. On repeated occasions I asked the entire population of towns who were fleeing from the enemy, ‘Are you discouraged? Do you want peace? Do you wish to return to your pueblos?’ And they, women, old men and children, would answer me: ‘We have started to fight for our independence, we will continue, we will lose all before we will live under the domination of those who humble and destroy us.”([1])
in reply I take pleasure in statins that the entire province refuses to accept autonomy, which is nothing more than a trick to disarm us and then do what they will with us. I trust in the sound wisdom and patriotism of the Filipino people and its government. To accept autonomy now and lower our flag after having spilled blood,—ourselves and others—would be to occupy a false position before all the nations of the world.
Tuguegarao, May 18, 1899.
Exhibit 881
(Original in Spanish. Telegram P. I. R. 917-8)
Vigan, May 19, 1899.
Provincial Councilor and Representative of Abra to General Luna: Have learned traitors Paterno, Buencamino, Velarde and Arguelles imprisoned warmly congratulate you while at the same time we unconditionally adhere to policy and decisions of Government and its Honorable President. Whole province united, sentiments identical to those of that province brave army and pueblo we all repeat cries of Viva Independencia, death to the traitors. Viva the Philippine Republic and its president.
Benguet, May 18, 1899.
[1] Taylor, Vol. IV, Exhibit 882 [65]

May 25, 1899

In Cabantuan, the alleged slapping incident between Luna and Buencamino.

In The Letters of Apolinario Mabini, Mabini writes:

Luna, who aspired to the Presidency of the Council of Government with the War portfolio, seeing that, despite the scandal, the present Cabinet [Pedro Paterno’s, after Mabini had been forced out] would not resign, indicted Colonel Arguelles, whom he wanted shot by musketry, for favoring autonomy, but the Council of War condemned him only to 12 years of imprisonment. Luna summoned the son of [Cabinet member Felipe] Buencamino, a Major, who disappeared a short time later, murdered, according to some, and killed in combat, according to the newspaper La Independencia. Lastly, Luna ordered Paterno and Buencamino arrested, but in this he failed.[78]

The order of arrest:

SECRETARIA DE GUERRA DEL GOBIERNO FILIPINO
(Membrete impreso)
Quedan autorizados respectivamente los Senores Quintin Bravo y Ceferino Santos, Capitan y 1er. Teniente respectivamente para que puedan recoger la persona del Senor Felipe Buencamino donde le encuentren y conducirlo a esta plaza. Bayambang 25 Mayo 1899.
El Srio. de Guerra
(Fdo.) A. LUNA
Narito ang salin sa Tagalog:
KALIHIMAN NG DIGMA NG PAMAHALAANG PILIPINO
(Membreteng limbag)
Isa’t isang binbigyan ng kapahintulutan sina Ginoong Quintin Bravo at Ceferino Santos, Kapitan at unang Tenyente, upang mangyaring kunin ang katahuan ni Ginoong Felipe Buencamino saan man siya nila matagpuan at ihatid sa Himpilang ito. Bayambang 25 ng Mayo ng 1899.
Ang Kahilim-Digma
(Lgda. A. LUNA)[63]

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

In the headquarters which was established in a house near the railway station, Luna indignantly spoke to me of the pro-autonomy attitude of some high officials of the Government, lamenting that Aguinaldo was surrounded by men who, according to him, were traitors to the country. As a matter of fact he said to me: “Here we have a colonel whose conduct arouses my suspicion.” Knowing whom he was referring to, I asked him why he selected him as the emissary to ask for an armistice.[79]

In The Memoirs of Victor Buencamino:

Then came the celebrated “slapping incident” at Cabanatuan where the Aguinaldo government had fled in the face of an intensified American military pressure.
General Antonio Luna, one of the top military men of the period who was removed for his temper, was said to have come to Cabanatuan to confront General Aguinaldo about some issue involving command authority.
The accounts record that Luna and Father had a heated exchange of words and that Luna slapped my father who was defending Aguinaldo.
I never had a chance to get my father’s version of this incident as I did not take interest in it until after Father’s death. But one day in 1961, during a call on the aging General Aguinaldo, I asked him to tell me all that he knew about this incident. Also present during my talk with general were his secretary, Mr. Emilio Virata; my son Victor, Jr.; a young Frenchman in the consular service, Mr. Alain Miailhe; and a lawyer, Mr. Alfonso Felix, who was president of the Historical Conservation Society.
General Aguinaldo’s version was that there was a rather heated exchange of words between General Luna and my father. It seems that General Luna has accused my half-brother, Joaquin Buencamino, of cowardice and my father retorted it was Luna who was guilty of cowardice for he had abandoned a certain defensive fort in the heat of battle.
Anyway, Aguinaldo added, Luna stood up to hit my father, but at this instant Aguinaldo interceded, reminding Luna he was in the presence of the president of the Philippines, and the incident ended there.
It is also recorded that Father was among the early converts in the American pacification drive and in fact took an active part in it. Then along with Don Pedro A. Paterno and several other prominent Filipinos, Father organized the Association de Paz which was later named the Partido Federal. It was as spokesman of this party that he went to the United States in 1903.
BUT THOUGH HE NEVER himself aspired for any position afterwards, Father continued to espouse nationalist causes. He was a close personal friend of Bishop Gregorio Aglipay.[75]

May 28, 1899

Paterno writes to Luna, saying he (Paterno) “desired to resign his position [as Prime Minister] since he accepted it against his will.”

May 31, 1899

Mabini writes to Galicano Apacible:

LETTER TO APACIBLE AND SANTOS
Nueva Ecija, May 31, 1899
MESSRS. APACIBLE AND SANTOS
My dear Friends:
I have just received your letter dated the 4th, instant, together with those addressed to the President, the letter of Sol[1] together with a copy for Naning, the copy of the telegrams, and a letter of Gregorio Agoncillo. I have not received the pamphlets and the copies of the prospectus on the antiannexationist League; neither the memorandum on the lawsuit and transaction with the Bank, nor the fees of the lawyers.
As for me, I am agreeable to the transaction, because there is the saying that a bad transaction is preferable to a winning lawsuit. In this way we avoid disputes, misunderstandings and delays.
I turned over to Mr. Buencamino, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the letters that you addressed to me with the copy of the telegrams, sending the other documents to the President, so that they can take into account what you say in them.
I am surprised that you complain about lack of instructions, since in my last letters to you I have given you plenty. I cannot cite the dates now, because the antecedents and the copy book are now in the possession of Mr. Buencamino.
From the 9th, instant, I turned over the Government to the new Cabinet formed by P. A. Paterno, President; Alas, Secretary of the Interior; Trias, War and Navy; Hugo Ilagan, temporary, Treasury; Aguedo Velarde, Public Instruction; Maximo Paterno, Communications and Public Works; and Leon Maria Guerrero, Agriculture, Industry and Commerce.[2] I am sending Dr. Calvo the numbers of the official newspaper containing articles about that talk of the change of the Cabinet, with the request that he give them them to you so that you will know the details. In my last letter, I already mentioned to you that there would soon be a change, and now the change has come.
Since Calumpit was captured by the Americans, General Luna, knowing that I wanted a temporary suspension of hostilities in order to come to an understanding, had sent persons to parley with General Otis. These representatives had come back saying that the American General was ready to come to an understanding, and so we sent Commissioners with instructions to negotiate with the American Commission. Our Commissioners came back to say that the Americans cannot recognize our Government, but would only deal with General Aguinaldo and the other generals; and that they were ready for peace if the former and the latter would surrender unconditionally to them. As I refused to agree to this absurd demand, the members of the present Cabinet, almost all of them members of Congress, asked for a change of Cabinet, under the pretext that the previous one could not secure an understanding because of its uncompromising attitude from the beginning.
Immediately after the formation of the new Cabinet, the Government tried to send Commissioners to Manila with instructions to propose the acceptance of an autonomy like that of Canada. But the Government had to desist from this intention in view of the opposition of the Army and of the people. General Luna came to call the members of the new Cabinet traitors with a certain degree of reason because, with the Constitution still in force, any program of autonomy that the Government may adopt is illegal.
Nevertheless, the President, in his capacity as General, has sent Commissioners with instructions to ask for a suspension of hostilities for the length of time that he may consider necessary to consult the people and the Army, alleging that, in his desire to come to an understanding with the American Government, he has sought the advice of a more moderate and conciliatory new Cabinet. I do not know the result of the talks of this Commission because it has not yet returned from Manila.
The last official news are flattering. It is said that the Americans have evacuated San Isidro and San Fernando, going back to Baliwag and Calumpit. I believe this news to be true inasmuch as the President is still in San Isidro. I do not know the causes of this retreat.
I am taking advantage of these days of rest to look for relief for my ailment. I do not know whether I can find any; but, anyway, you have as ever, an affectionate friend and faithful servant,
MABINI
[1] Sun Yat-Sen.
[2] The name of Felipe Buencamino as Secretary of Foreign Affairs does not appear in the original letter, probably an inadvertent omission. – T.M.K.[80]

Venario Concepcion wrote:

To what extent the loss of Luna weakened – as it undoubtedly did weaken – the military power of the Revolutionary Government is for writers on military topics to discuss The following comments of General Concepcion, a supposedly pro-Luna man, as to the real merit of General Luna as a military commander, are however of interest:
“According to what chiefs and officers closest to General Luna have told me, there had been occasions in which the forces under his command went to the extent of hating him, since in battles, without attending to reasons, circumstances or conveniences, he was taking them to real suicide; in a word he gets mad when he hears the enemy’s fire… People versed in the military art concede to General Luna great merits as chief of a column, whose radius of action he can dominate with his eye, but not as director of great operations, because his foolhardiness (ceguedad) might be the cause of useless loss of live and perhaps of lamentable defeats.
“To my mind it is not foolhardiness (ceguedad) which dominate Luna but the desire to give example of true heroism to his soldiers and his conviction that he lacked men who could follow him with intelligence and resolution. V. Concepcion, Apuntes, Vol. II, Entry for May 31, 1899. [91]

Maximo M. Kalaw’s The Development of Philippine Politics turn cites “the diaries entitled Apuntes y Diario de Operaciones sobre la guerra Hispano-Filipino-Americana.” In a footnote on p. 255 of his book, Kalaw says, “These Apuntes are still in MS. form but copies of them have been made and the writer is keeping one of them.” The manuscript, in turn, is listed in the catalog of the library of Kalaw which was prepared before World War II by E. Arsenio Manuel and mentioned in his article, “Teodoro M. Kalaw’s Collection of Revolutionary Notes,” which appeared in Vol. 48, No. 3 (2000) of Philippine Studies. The following appears as Venancio Concepcion’s diary entry for May 31, 1899:

According to what chiefs and officers closest to General Luna have told me, there had been occasions in which the forces under his command went to the extent of hating him, since in battles, without attending to reasons, circumstances or conveniences, he was taking them to real suicide; in a word he gets mad when he hears the enemy’s fire… People versed in the military art concede to General Luna great merits as chief of a column, whose radius of action he can dominate with his eye, but not as director of great operations, because his foolhardiness.

June 1899

Luna orders arrest of Lt. Col. Vitan, Major Leisan, Capts. Ricafort, Martinez Ibañez, and Quimson for insubordination.

June 1, 1899

In the “Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands”, Felipe Buencamino said:

Then General Aguinaldo decided on the suppression of General Luna, and he collected 4,000 men and went to look for General Luna, leaving the town where the captain-general was temporarily on June 1.[81]

June 2, 1899

Spanish forces at Baler, Philippines, surrender.

Luna receives two telegrams. He said:

Tell our fellowmen that Independence cannot be obtained from rosebeds with comfort and without the corresponding risk. Independence is attained after a period of fighting, of sufferings, sacrifices, afflictions and bloodletting.
Buencamino writes to Aguinaldo denying his son, Major Joaquin Buencamino, had gone over to the Americans –pointing out his son had been killed in the Battle of San Fernando.[82]

In The Development of Philippine Politics, Maximo Kalaw writes:

General Concepcion’s version of the death of Luna after gathering information from other officials is as follows: On the 2nd or 3rd of June Luna received a telegram from Aguinaldo asking him to form a new cabinet and asking him to see the President at Cabanatuan. Luna found out upon reaching Cabanatuan that the officer whom he had disarmed was in charge of the bodyguard of the president. Upon going up to the presidency he also found out that Aguinaldo had left for San Isidro. He was naturally disappointed at the apparent failure of the President to keep his appointment. Suddenly a revolver shot was heard from below. Luna walked downstairs to see what was the matter, but before he left the last steps he was stabbed in the back, then he and his aide Colonel Roman were fired upon and boloed, till they died.([1]) [91]
[1] Version heard by General Concepcion at the time and noted in his Apuntes for June 24 to 30, 1899.

June 3, 1899

In The Truth About Aguinaldo and Other Heroes, Alfredo Saulo writes:

Luna publishes announcement of a prospective cabinet lineup in La Independencia, with himself as prime minister and for the war portfolio, Pedro Paterno, Lt. Col. Alberto Barreto, or Leon Ma. Guerrero as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; Lt. Col. Joaquin Luna or Severino de las Alas as Secretary of the Interior; Telesforo Chiudan, Mariano Limjap or Mariano Nable for Secretary of Finance; Gen. Jose Alejandrino or Regino Garcia as Secretary of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce; Leon Ma. Guerrero, Teodoro Sandiko, or Gen. Francisco as Secretary of Public Instruction; Gracio Gonzaga, Severino de las Alas, or Teodoro Sandiko as Secretary of Communications.[83]

In La Revolucion Filipina, Mabini writes:

I cannot believe that Luna was plotting to wrest from Mr. Aguinaldo the high office he held although Luna certainly aspired to be prime minister instead of Mr. Paterno, with whom Luna disagreed because the former’s autonomy program was a violation of the fundamental law of the State and as such was a punishable crime. This is shown by a report in the newspaper La Independencia, inspired by Luna and published a few days before his death, which stated that the Paterno-Buencamino cabinet would be replaced by another in which Luna would be prime minister as well as war minister.[84]

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

Luna wanted to proceed strongly against some of these persons for a general punishment. He said that it was necessary to shoot an autonomist, a coward, a recalcitrant, and a thief, and he wanted that the victims should be those occupying very high positions in order that the punishment be exemplary. But he never wanted to replace Aguinaldo, and even in intimate conversations he told me that nobody had the countrywide prestige earned by Aguinaldo and that no one else could control the majority of our generals. Even when he considered that the President, because of his weakness and partiality towards others was an obstacle to the disciplining of the army and the unity of our pro-independence policy, was an evil, he was, nevertheless, a necessary evil.[85]

June 4, 1899

Luna sends telegram.

In 2018, a telegram comes up for auction. Ambeth Ocampo writes,

An English translation of the coded telegram is printed in the auction catalog as: “Paging for an important meeting, therefore you are ordered to come here immediately. Waiting for a reply to my previous telegram about urgent matters to discuss. It is really an emergency.”
No authority is presented for the translation of the message as well as what appeared to be Luna’s reply at the bottom of the message: “Felipe Buencamino not yet detained based on my accusation.”

Jim Richardson, historian of the revolutionary period, spoiled everyone’s fun by posting photos of the pertinent page from the telegraph operator’s message log book, taken from a microfilm of the Philippine Insurgent Records.
The same message sent to Luna on June 5 is found both on the telegram and the logbook, proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that the telegram is authentic.
But seeing things, sans auction hype, reveals it is not as deadly as it is supposed to be.
Partly in code, the transcribed message is as follows:
“Folabo (Felipe) puoncimane (Buencamino) iun (aun) thiundotonade (detenido) sin ordenar fegmicaen (formacion) ciusi (causa) Esperando contestacion a mi telegrama anterior en que le pedia piso (base) incupsicaen (acusacion). Suplico urgencia.”
The decoded words in parenthesis match Luna’s scrawl at the bottom of the message perfectly except for one letter crossed out in “acusacion.”
Luna did not write a reply to the telegram. He decoded the message himself. A translation from the original Spanish reads:
“Felipe Buencamino is detained without ordering the formation of the case. I am waiting your reply to my previous telegram where I request the basis for your accusation.”)

In The Good Fight, Manuel L. Quezon writes:

Not long afterward Aguinaldo once again transferred the seat of his government from Cabanatuan to Angeles. We made the trip on horseback from Cabanatuan to San Isidro, where we found a force composed of at least three thousand men under the command of General Gregorio del Pilar. General Aguinaldo, after reviewing his guard of honor, ordered all the officers who were then in San Isidro to come up to his residence, and there, without any explanation for this unexpected as well as unusual procedure, he made us swear that we would fight by his side against all comers. Very early the next morning, we proceeded in the direction of Bayambang where we arrived late at night. On this trip for the first time I saw General Aguinaldo dressed in his military uniform with his insignia as full general. I asked him if he was celebrating some happy event, and he just smiled and said nothing.[68]

June 5, 1899

Luna is killed.

In the Letters of Apolinario Mabini:

Finally, on June 5th, Luna went to Cabanatuan at a time when the President was away, and he died there with Colonel Paco Roman, murdered by the Presidential guard. I still do not know the causes of this tragic end; but I suppose that, somehow, the hatred that the companies of Kawit felt towards him contributed to it. The deceased had these companies disarmed twice, once in Tuliahan and again in Calumpit, for infractions of discipline, according to the deceased, and out of hatred towards the Caviteños, according to the punished.
I do not know how much truth there is in this. But impartial persons see in Luna dangerous tendencies, because, while he wanted to impose obedience on everyone by force, he did not like to obey anyone; and he did whatever he fancied without consulting anybody. Anyway, I deplore his sad end; it would have been less painful had he died in the battlefield and not at the hands of his own countrymen.[86]

Also from Mabini:

I have already informed you in my previous letters of the truth of the murder of Luna and Paco Roman. According to a circular of the Department of the Interior, Luna insulted the guards, kicking and slapping them and hitting them with the butt of his gun, for which reason the soldiers killed him. As I was in Balungaw on the date of the murder and from there I came to Rosales where I still am now, I cannot tell you anything definite. What there was to it was that Luna, as Undersecretary of War and ad interim Secretary in the absence of Don Mariano Trias, using as a pretext the tendency shown earlier by the present Cabinet to look for a settlement with the Americans on the basis of autonomy like that of Canada, moved the Department to Bayambang and there he ran matters all by himself completely disregarding ‘Puno’ [Aguinaldo] and his colleagues in the Government. He acted thus because he wanted the Paterno Cabinet to resign, so that he could take charge of forming another Cabinet retaining for himself the Presidency with the Department of War. He announced thus in his newspaper when he was called by the President to Cabanatuan. You add to all these data the scandal against Buencamino and Paterno and the death of the son of the former, and you have enough to break your head if you try to imagine what took place.[88]

In La Revolucion Filipina, Mabini later writes:

When… Luna received Mr. Aguinaldo’s telegram calling him to Cabanatuan, Luna thought perhaps that the subject of their meeting would be the new cabinet…[89]

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

The first link in the chain of events which culminated in the death of General Luna was forged in Kalookan during the first battles in which he insulted and threatened to shoot a colonel and a lieutenant colonel from Nueva Ecija who had retreated from the line during the fighting abandoning their men. The second link was the disarming of a company of Kabite soldiers who formed part of the Presidential Guard at Kalumpit. The third is when by means of force he compelled General Mascardo to recognize his authority as General-in-Chief, thereby creating a deep enmity between them. The fourth was the violent scene involving Buencamino, Paterno and Luna in the Presidential Office in Kabanatuan. The fifth is when an influential General came to know that he was being threatened by Luna for his continuous acts of insubordination. The sixth was the reasoned refusal of Luna to send some battalions of the soldiers he had organized in Kalumpit to Nueva Ecija as General Aguinaldo wanted. But the order of arrest against Paterno and Buencamino, the alleged assassination of Joaquin Buencamino, and the trial of Arguelles were the seventh and last link which completed the iron chain that ended the heroic life of the regretted Lieutenant General of the Army of the Republic.
[…]
Joaquin Luna, brother of the General, who was in La Union, was informed by some friends of the suspicions engendered by the tenor of the telegrams of Aguinaldo to Tinio that something very serious was being plotted against Luna, and he went to Bayambang to caution him against the danger. Luna answered, however, that he knew that Aguinaldo appreciated him just as he appreciated also Aguinaldo and that there was nothing to fear about. Hardly had Joaquin Luna arrived in Dagupan on his way back to La Union when he received the sad report of the death of his brother. [85]

In The Crisis of the Republic, Teodoro Agoncillo writes:

The thirst for vengeance by those who were affected by Luna’s discipline and militarism did not end with his murder. Manuel Bernal was arrested in Dagupan, Pangasinan by troops under General Gregorio del Pilar. He was stripped of his uniform and insignias and tortured until he fell unconscious. A few days later, he was shot by a certain Major Gatmaitan at the barrio of Bunuan. Captain Jose Bernal was shot in Angeles, Pampanga by a group of soldiers under Col. Servillano Aquino on June 16, 1899.[90]

In the “Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands”, Felipe Buencamino said:

Mr. BUECAMINO: Before midnight it was rumored in Bayambang that Luna had been murdered in Cabanatuan by the personal guards of Aguinaldo who were left in that town to protect his mother and wife. While this terrible news was being whispered all around, we received orders to board the train which was to take Aguinaldo with the forces of General Gregorio del Pilar to Angeles. Angeles was the headquarters of General Concepcion, another of General Luna’s trusted men, who was in command of the forces which were facing the Americans in San Fernando. General Concepcion was evidently unaware of our arrival, for he showed his surprise when he was faced by the Commander-in-Chief of the Filipino forces. The following day an official announcement was made of the killing of General Luna and that of his senior aide-de- camp, Colonel Paco Roman. His two junior aides were put in prison.
The brigade defending the line facing San Fernando was the crack brigade of the old Philippine Army. It had been organized by General Luna himself and was composed of veteran soldiers of the defunct Spanish Army and commanded by officers who had also served and fought many battles under the Spanish flag. Quietly but hurriedly, General Aguinaldo recalled these officers, sent them to other brigades, and replaced them with his old trusted officers of the Revolution.
We did not remain long in Angeles. From there we went farther north to the town of Tarlac where Aguinaldo, in personal command of the Philippine Army since Luna’s death, remained for several months.
Mr. BUENCAMINO. General Luna was living in Bayambang, about 75 miles from Cabanatuan, so that it took Aguinaldo four days to arrive at the town of Bayambang. But what I can not explain is the coincidence that upon the same day that Aguinaldo was arriving at the residence of General Luna. General Luna on the same day and at the same hour was also arriving at General Aguinaldo’s house.
The CHAIRMAN. How far were they apart?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Seventy-five miles. General Luna was killed in the lower part of General Aguinaldo’s house by General Aguinaldo’s guards.
Mr. CHAIRMAN. Who of General Luna’s staff were present with him?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Francisco Roman and his aid-de-camp,
Mr. CHAIRMAN. General Luna was killed?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes.
Mr. CHAIRMAN. What other persons of Aguinaldo’s family were there?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. His mother, his sister, his wife, and his children.
Mr. CHAIRMAN. Where were they?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. In the upper part of the building in which General Luna was killed.
Mr. CHAIRMAN. General Luna was killed just outside of General Aguinaldo’s house by General Aguinaldo’s personal guards?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir.[95]

In another part of the “Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands”, Felipe Buencamino said:

Mr. JONES. Who were the slayers of General Luna?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. I desire to be excused from answering this question, because I would be obliged to refer to Mr. Aguinaldo, and Mr. Aguinaldo is at the present time an enemy of mine, politically speaking, and a prisoner, and my duty is not to say anything about him. It is also my duty to answer, Mr. Congressman, but if you will permit me, if you will excuse me from answering the question, I will appreciate it very much.
Mr. JONES. I understood the witness to say that Aguinaldo had gone to the place of residence of General Luna, in search of him, and that
The CHAIRMAN. He did not say in search of him.
Mr. JONES. He did not use the word ‘“search,” but looking for him. He had gone-well, I will say in search of him.
Mr. BUENCAMINO. With 4,000 men.
Mr. JONES. With 4,000 men, and that Aguinaldo had gone to the place where General Luna resided with 4,000 men.
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir.
Mr. JONES. And that in some mysterious way-he used that word General Luna had departed for Aguinaldo’s headquarters.
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes.
Mr. JONES. General Luna was in search of Aguinaldo, was he not?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir; but without any forces.
Mr. JONES. Without any forces?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Except 50 mounted men, his natural escort.
Mr. JONES. Fifty mounted men?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. His usual escort.
Mr. JONES. And he was killed whilst Aguinaldo was at his place of residence looking for him, accompanied by 4,000 men.
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir.
Mr. JONES. I understood, too, that some differences had grown up between Aguinaldo and Luna on account of the cruelties practiced by General Luna.
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir.
Mr. JONES. Were you the private secretary of Aguinaldo at the time?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. I was then secretary of state.. I had nothing to do with the army.
Mr. JONES. You were then secretary of state and had nothing to do with the army. Was that prior to the time when Mabini was president?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. I relieved Mabini, who fell on the 16th. I was secretary of state after Mabini.
Mr. JONES. Was there much feeling on the part of the Filipino people against General Luna on account of his cruelties?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir; he had a good many admirers also, especially among the young military men, because he was a very brave man and a gentleman.
Mr. JONES. General Aguinaldo himself was dissatisfied with the course of General Luna, and opposed to the atrocities and cruelties which he practices, was he not?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir; but he also admired his valor and his courage and his military qualities.
Mr. JONES. I understand you to say that Aguinaldo admired the military qualities and courage of General Luna, and that the differences between them grew out of the fact that Aguinaldo did not approve and indorse his cruel course in the conduct of the war?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. That is one of the causes, and the other was the ambition of General Luna to supplant Aguinaldo.
Mr. JONES. I understand you to say that there was a feeling of relief on the part of the Filipino people, although they did not approve of the killing of Luna, on account of his cruel conduct, and there was a feeling of relief throughout the country at his death?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. No; that the Filipino people did not approve of the means which had been employed for the killing of Luna. Luna was found with 36 bolo wounds, and more than 40 bullet wounds.
Mr. JONES. But my question was, they did experience a feeling of relief, although they did not approve of the manner of his taking off.
Mr. BUENCAMINO. They breathed freely, because they considered their lives in danger before his death.
Mr. JONES. There were Filipinos who believed their lives were in danger as long as he lived?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes.[92]

In the “Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands”, Felipe Buencamino said:

Mr. WILLIAMS of Illinois. I would like to ask a question or two, not having any direct reference to what has been under discussion today. You testified that Aguinaldo with a force of 400 men went in search of General Luna and called at his place of residence, and that while Aguinaldo was there General Luna, with only 50 mounted men as Fan escort, called at the residence of Aguinaldo and was received with such a welcome that his body was found with 36 bolo and pierced by more than 40 bullets. I would like to ask if you know the Occasion of or reason for General Luna’s visit to General Aguinaldo’s residence at that time?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. As I said before, it is a mystery. I do not know. It is not known why this visit was made.
Mr. OLMASTED. Do you know whether he was invited or directed to call there?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. That is a. question of dispute. Luna’s partisans say, that Luna received a telegram from Aguinaldo, and Aguinaldo’s partisans say that he sent no such telegram, because Aguinaldo was in search of Luna. I have personally attempted to find in our telegrams the ribbons of that day and of the previous day, but it has been impossible to find anything of them. General Bell, who covered all the parts where, Luna and Aguinaldo were in the north, also desired to study that question, and he took all the telegrams and ribbons that he could find abandoned by the Filipinos in their flight. He says that he did not find anything which would throw any light on the subject, in order to discover how that coincidence took place, of Aguinaldo being at Luna’s house, while Luna was being killed in the lower part of Aguinaldo’s house 75 miles from each other.
Mr. OLMSTED. Is it not apparent from the fact that he was accompanied only by his staff that General Luna’s visit to Aguinaldo’s house was not hostile?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir; it appears to be.
Mr. OLMSTED. Has any explanation been given of the fact that he did meet his death in Aguinaldo’s house?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Nothing at all.
Mr. OLMSTED. Has any attempt been made to learn of the reason of his being put to death?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Nothing to my knowledge. I do not know if Aguinaldo made any investigation, but at that time there was such secrecy that none of us could speak a word about it, fearing that we would suffer the same fate, and for that reason the Philippine insurrection morally died; there was no more confidence in anybody.[93]

In The Development of Philippine Politics, Maximo Kalaw writes:

It became apparent that the new venture of the Paterno cabinet in favor of peace was to be fruitless, because of the opposition of General Otis to a suspension of hostilities and the hostile attitude of the army and people. At the same time a most interesting drama was being enacted in the internal politics of the revolutionary government. It culminated in the death of General Luna, not at the hands of the American soldier but at the hands of General Aguinaldo’s own bodyguard. Here was another issue between two Filipino leaders which was decided at the point of the bayonet and which necessarily affected the internal politics of the country. Inasmuch as many rumors and accusations have been current about Aguinaldo’s part in the death of Luna, it will be necessary for us to treat the matter at some length, using all the available documents.[91]

In The Development of Philippine Politics, Maximo Kalaw writes:

On June 5, 1899, at 2:30 P. M. General Concepcion whose headquarters was at Angeles, Pampanga, received a telegram from President Aguinaldo advising him that the President had taken charge of the direction of the operations in Central Luzon, that he was provisionally establishing his offices and headquarters at Bamban and that he was coming at 4:00 P. M. that same day. This meant that Luna had been relieved of the command. Aguinaldo arrived at the appointed hour and immediately began investigations as to whether there were any plots against him, for General Concepcion and his troops were supposed to be pro-Luna. He asked General Concepcion why he did not send his reports about his brigade to the President, to which General Concepcion replied that he had sent all reports to the Secretary of War, who in turn was supposed to transmit them to the government.
Aguinaldo — Do you recognize me as general-in-chief of all the operations?
Concepcion — Undoubtedly, My General.
Aguinaldo — Do you know if any conspiracy is being prepared here?
Concepcion — No, General.
Aguinaldo — Do you have confidence in the chiefs and officials of your brigade?
Concepcion — Absolutely, general.
Aguinaldo — Very well; give orders for the presentation to the office of the Captain General which I shall establish this same night in this town of all the chiefs of your brigades, at the most urgent possible time, this same evening.
This was done and the officers who presented themselves to Aguinaldo were placed under arrest and not allowed to communicate with outsiders pending investigations as to the alleged plot. [91]

Also in Kalaw, Venancio Concepcion’s diary entry for June 5, 1899:

As soon as everybody was in front of my headquarters, General Del Pilar separated from us and ordered his men to surround my headquarters. He posted four sentry guards each in front of all the offices. He changed my guards with members of the Presidential Guard and then presented himself to Aguinaldo inviting him to go upstairs with him. Once upstairs, Aguinaldo and Del Pilar held a secret conference. I was later subjected by Aguinaldo to an interrogation about an alleged conspiracy which he said had been planned against him.

June 6, 1899

Capital of the Republic is at Bamban, Tarlac.

In the “Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands”, Felipe Buencamino said:

Mr. CHAIRMAN. What effect on the insurrection did the assassination of General Luna have?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. From a sentimental point of view, I can not say that many persons were pleased with it. but it can be said that they breathed freely, because the very morning of the death of General Luna, at 5 o’clock, he had ordered two executions, and consequently everybody considered their lives and persons in danger. So while I will not say that many rejoiced at the death of General Luna, they breathed easier.[94]

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

Aguinaldo, as usual, excused himself in good words and we talked of other things, but General Concepcion was relieved by Lacuna of the command of the lines in Bamban. All the chiefs of the regiments organized by Luna were equally relieved and detained with General Concepcion. In this manner they destroyed the work created thru so much effort by the best general ever produced by the war against the Americans, not only according to my opinion but also according to the opinion of many, including the Americans themselves.[95]

In The Development of Philippine Politics, Maximo Kalaw writes of the purge that followed:

The following morning, June 6th, General Concepcion received a telegram from the President of the Council of Government advising him of the death of General Luna at Cabanatuan the day before, on June 5th. “Immediately,” said Concepcion, “I went to see General Aguinaldo and told him of the lamentable happening showing the telegram I received and he showed great surprise not being able to say a word for five minutes, and then said at last: “Please return to your headquarters; in the meanwhile reserve to yourself such a grave incident and order the presentation to the captain-generalship of all the forces armed with mausers!” Two companies armed with mausers were discharged in spite of their good records for they were suspected of being friendly to General Luna. Some of the officers continued under arrest, and investigations continued to determine whether there was a plot to oust the President and place Luna in his stead. Most important of all, General Concepcion was himself relieved of the command of his brigade, and General L. San Miguel was put in his place. General Concepcion was detailed to work in the office of the Captain General.([1]) In his observation for June 24 to 30 General Concepcion said: “In view of the famous intrigues which resulted in the sensible death of our lamented General Antonio Luna and Colonel Roman, General Aguinaldo who lived under that false impression decided to have me always within his eyesight, and it is this fact which determined my present appointment and also the appointments of General Hizon and Colonel Leyva as first and second chiefs, respectively, of his military room; so that those who were cognizant of the great diplomacy of Aguinaldo called us the three punished ones.” [91]
[1] Concepcion Apuntes etc. Entries for June 5, 6, 7, 8, 1899.

June 8, 1899

The case versus Luna put forward by the government is contained in the following documents:

The official notification of the death of Luna made by the Revolutionary Government to the provincial chiefs was as follows:
CIRCULAR TO THE PROVINCIAL CHIEFS OF THIS ARCHIPELAGO REGARDING THE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF GENERAL ANTONIO LUNA AND HIS AIDE, COLONEL FRANCISCO ROMAN.
1899
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO PROVINCIAL CHIEFS,
Cabanatuan, June 8, 1899.
I regret to communicate to you that in consequence of a military collision in this town on the 5th instant, General Luna and Colonel Roman died, which event the Military court is investigating.
(Signed) SEVERINO DE LAS ALAS
Secretary.
Letter head;
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC
Supplementary to my telegram of the 8th instant, making known the death of General Antonio Luna and of his aide. Colonel Francisco Roman, I must add that the causes of the deaths of these gentlemen were the insulting and assaulting of the sentinel and guard of the house of the Honorable President of the Republic, and slurs directed against the person of the latter, who was at the time absent in the field.
Therefore, the sentinel and the guards being insulted by the said General and also kicked and cuffed by him and even having revolvers discharged against them, not only by the General but also by his aide Colonel Francisco Roman, and being still much more wrought up over the gross insults and threats of death which both made against the Honorable President, who, thank God, was absent in the field, the sentinel and other guards made use of their arms to repel the unjust aggression of General Luna and his aid, both of whom were instantly killed.
Immediately thereupon the Military Court took the proper steps and is now conducting the preliminary proceedings, and the Government decided to have the burial take place with all military honors. Such is the history of the lamentable event of the death of General Luna and of his aid, an occurrence which God has apparently permitted, in order to prevent greater evils.
God has so disposed surely for the good of the present and the future of the Philippines. Such is the public opinion on the subject, because said General showed by his acts that he desired the Supreme Power of the nation, because being only the Assistant Secretary of War, without the authority of the President of the Republic or of the Government, he issued orders in person in such delicate matters as the decree of expulsion of foreigners residing outside the radius of operations, and the law upon conscription which, without having any legal value, it is true, caused and still cause serious inconvenience to the families of all the inhabitants of the Archipelago, and many other things which it is unnecessary to mention.
Such acts show the deliberate purpose of usurping the power of our honorable President, a purpose lately confirmed by the arbitrary orders to arrest the President of the Council and some Secretaries of Government; said General did this by himself without consulting the will of anyone else and without orders from anybody.
I communicate this to you in detail, in order that you and those under your government may have an exact statement of this unexpected and providential event, and that absolute secrecy may be maintained as to foreign countries in tills connection. It is desirable that you take care that in the territory under your jurisdiction there be no parties which may prejudice our enviable unity which is the cause and origin of our strong resistance against the invading enemy.
You will acknowledge due receipt hereof.
God preserve you many years.
CABANATUAN, June 13, 1899.
The Secretary.([1])
[1] Taylor, Vol IV, Exhibit 893. 50-8. Taylor also appends the following: (Original in Spanish. Rough draft in handwriting of F. Buencamino. P. I. R. 60-4).
Supplementary to my telegram of this date announcing the death of General Antonio Luna and that of his adjutant Colonel Francisco Roman, I must add that the cause for the deaths of said gentlemen are (1) Insult to and assault upon the sentinel and guard at the house of the Honorable President of the Republic and (2) Insult to and threat of death also against our said Honorable President.
General Luna and his Adjutant, Francisco Roman had, for a long time, been committing abuses of power of so grave a nature that it is evident to the intelligent that they had a deliberate intention of forming a party to oppose our Honorable President.
He several times issued proclamation of a general character to the entire Archipelago, in his own name only and without the knowledge or authority of our Honorable President or of the Government, which constitutes a real usurpation of power and functions, as you will see.
He has many times ordered the shooting of countrymen and soldiers, without making any report to the Captain General of the Army, who is our Honorable President, more than a hundred persons being his victims, by which acts of cruelty he has sown terror in all towns.
He has also taken troops from Calumpit in order to make civil war against General Mascardo, presenting an opportunity to our North American enemy to take that title of defense of the first order.
Lately he has given himself out as the Secretary of War, when he was only the Assistant Secretary and then established the Department in Bayamban and organized the office without in any manner asking leave of our government or Honorable president and enacting measures by himself in matters pertaining to the Department of the Treasury and of the Interior, as the last law on conscriptions, which has been causing so much inconvenience in the homes of the families in all the towns of this Archipelago.
These acts show in an evident manner a deliberate intention to usurp power, as against our Honorable President, an intention which has lately been confirmed by the arbitrary orders to arrest the president of the Council and some Secretaries of Government, for the purpose of putting others in their places, as is shown by his act of writing to various persons offering them cabinet portfolios, and by publishing in the newspaper called “La Independencia”, of which he is a part owner and editor, that he was called to power to take the place of the present Government.
The Honorable President has left nothing undone to reward the merits and services of General Luna. At the beginning be gave him the rank of Brigadier General when he appointed him Director of War; a month and a half later he promoted him to General of Division, and recently after the battle of Santo Tomas on the 26th of April last, he promoted him to Lieutenant General, in addition to always having granted his wishes and slightest suggestions that did not cause any prejudice to third persons as, for example, the appointment of his brother Don Joaquin as lieutenant Colonel of Military Administration.
What more could any one desire who was not General Luna? Lees than one year from the time he was a simple citizen, he was promoted by our Honorable President to Lieutenant General in the national army.
But without doubt ambition was stronger in said General than gratitude; hence, when he saw himself brought to such a height, he attempted to climb higher until he should be above the one selected by God to redeem us from slavery under foreigners, even though to attain his ambitious purpose it was necessary for him to employ terrorization and the usurpation of powers, as he was doing the day of his death.
Hence, when the sentinel and the guards were insulted by said General and also kicked and cuffed by him and even having had revolvers discharged against them, not only by the General but also by his Adjutant Colonel Francisco Roman, being still more wrought upon by the gross insults and threats of death, which both directed against the honorable President, who, thank God, was absent in the field, the sentinel and other guards made use of their arms to repel the unjust aggression of General Luna and his adjutant, both of them being instantly killed.
Immediately thereupon the Military Court took the proper steps and is now conducting the preliminary investigation, the Government ordering that the bodies of the victims should be buried with all military honors.
Colonel Francisco Roman disabled by blows with a stick and otherwise, a policeman of this town of Cabanatuan, and in the same manner one of the town of Aliaga, in addition to having committed many other abuses elsewhere.
Such is the history of the lamentable event of the death of General Luna and of his adjutant, an occurrence which God has evidently permitted. In order to prevent greater evils, which would have occurred if said two persons had still been living.
God has so disposed surely for the present and future good of the Philippines. This is the opinion of the Government and these details are communicated to you in order that you and those you govern may have an exact idea of this unexpected and providential event, and that absolute secrecy may be observed as to foreign countries in this matter. It Is desirable that you take care that in the territory under your jurisdiction there be no parties which may prejudice our enviable unity, which in the basis and origin of our strong resistance to the invading enemy.
(No signature)
(NOTE BY COMPILER:—This is translated from the original draft of a circular which was to be sent out in explanation of the death of Luna. In the circular as issued much of this matter was omitted.)[91]

June 7, 1899

Venancio Concepcion’s diary as quoted by Kalaw:

On the following day, I inquired whether or not the officers of my brigade had been presented to the President, and Del Pilar, with signs of satisfaction, led me to one of the rooms and said to me: “There they are –they are being held incommunicado as a result of an investigation which I am conducting on orders of the Captain General.”

June 8 or 13, 1899

Felipe Buencamino, circular to provincial leaders:

What more could any one desire who was not General Luna? Less than one year from the time he was a simple private citizen, he was successively promoted by our Honorable President to lieutenant general in the national army.

June 13, 1899

In his article, “Who really ordered Luna’s murder?,” Ambeth Ocampo quotes the following:

The Evening News, WA, USA: Manila, June 13. [7.35 p.m.]—General Luna, lieutenant commander of the Filipino army, has been assassinated by order of Aguinaldo. He was stabbed to death by a guard selected by Aguinaldo to kill him. Reports were received here this morning giving the news that Luna had been assassinated, but the information was at first discredited. Investigation proved, however, that Luna had been killed and General Otis has authentic information regarding the death of the insurgent general.
Details regarding the tragedy show that last Tuesday the general and his adjutant, Colonel Ramon [Roman], visited Aguinaldo’s headquarters at Cabanatuan, their purpose being to procure Aguinaldo’s authority to imprison all Filipinos suspected of being friendly to the United States. General Luna asked the captain of the guard in the lower hall of Aguinaldo’s quarters, if Aguinaldo was at home, to which question the captain replied in an insolent manner, ‘I don’t know.’
Luna berated the officer vigorously for his insolence, whereupon the captain put his hand upon his revolver. Luna instantly drew his revolver and fired at the captain, who was only a second behind the general in drawing his weapon. The captain returned the fire. Both missed and Colonel [Roman] interfered, whereupon a sergeant of the guard stabbed Luna with a bayonet. The entire guard then attacked both Luna and [Roman] with bayonets and bolos, soon killing them. The wounds of both men were numerous.
The guard whose insolence to Luna was the main cause of the assassination was, it is said, arrested, tried by court-martial and promptly acquitted. Further advices say that Ney [?], by order of Aguinaldo, purposely insulted Luna and forced a quarrel. One report says Luna was shot before Ney stabbed him.
The foregoing information was sent by the Filipino leader, Pedro Paterno, to his brother in Manila by special courier and is confirmed from other sources. The assassination of Luna recalls the similar fate of Andres Bon[i]facio in the Cavite province in the beginning of the revolution. Both were rivals of Aguinaldo for the leadership of the Filipinos.
Luna was exceedingly unpopular among the Filipino troops on account of his stubborn, dictatorial manners, and very little regret is expressed at his death. Luna and Aguinaldo were unable to agree as to the manner of conducting the campaign, and it is said the rebel chief was afraid he would be assassinated by Luna’s orders. The death of General Luna is looked upon by the majority of the Filipinos as an undisguised blessing.
Adjutant General Corbin refused this morning to discuss the reported assassination of General Luna. He would not deny that General Otis had informed the department of Luna’s death, but refused to affirm. It is believed that the death of Luna will mark the beginning of a break in the insurgent ranks. Notwithstanding his lack of accord with Aguinaldo, Luna undoubtedly had many followers among the rebels and they will, it is believed, resent his murder.[96]

In the “Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands”, Felipe Buencamino said:

The CHAIRMAN. That was the date set by General Luna for the seizure of Aguinaldo and the control of the government?
Mr. BUENCAMINO. Yes, sir; that day was also his feast day, the day which is celebrated in the Philippines instead of the birthday.[97]

From Mabini’s letters:

“Even Paterno himself had to change his policy when he saw that his life would be in danger had he persisted with his autonomy patterned to that of Canada.
With reference to this, important things have taken place from the time the big-stomached Cabinet, as Don Gracio calls it, has come into power. Paterno, on taking his oath of office, announced his intention to seek understanding with the Americans on the basis of the autonomy like that of Canada’s and, to that effect, he appointed a Commission of nine individuals headed by Buencamino, the grand leader of the new arrangement. Luna, impetuous as usual, accused Buencamino of being a traitor and, according to some, he even slapped him creating a capital scandal in the office of the President, which was in Cabanatuan. In consequence thereof, the Commission was suspended, and another was appointed in its place, composed of Don Gracio Gonzaga, General Gregorio H. del Pilar and Barretto, who all went to Manila, with instructions to work for the suspension of hostilities in order to consult the people
Luna, who aspired to the Presidency of the Council of Government with the War portfolio, seeing that, despite the scandal, the present Cabinet would not resign, indicted Colonel Arguelles, whom he wanted shot by musketry, for favoring autonomy, but the Council of War condemned him only to 12 years of imprisonment. Luna summoned the son of Buencamino, a Major, who disappeared a short time later, murdered, according to some, and killed in combat, according to the newspaper La Independencia. Lastly, Luna ordered Paterno and Buencamino arrested, but in this he failed.
Finally, on June 5th, Luna went to Cabanatuan at a time when the President was away, and he died there with Colonel Paco Roman, murdered by the Presidential guard. I still do not know the causes of this tragic end; but I suppose that, somehow, the hatred that the companies of Kawit felt towards him contributed to it. The deceased had these companies disarmed twice, once in Tuliahan and again in Calumpit, for infractions of discipline, according to the deceased, and out of hatred towards the Cavitenos, according to the punished.
I do not know how much truth there is in this. But impartial persons see in Luna dangerous tendencies, because, while he wanted to impose obedience on everyone by force, he did not like to obey anyone; and he did whatever he fancied without consulting anybody. Anyway, I deplore his sad end; it would have been less painful had he died in the battlefield and not at the hands of his own countrymen.
I am now somewhat removed from public affairs as I left Cabanatuan on the 11th of May and I arrived here in Balungaw on the 31st of the same month to make thermal baths. I spent the whole month of June here without finding any improvement in my health. The water is very hot and very salty, just like that of the sea. I am only a step away from Rosales and very near Bayambang. Nevertheless, in order to help the cause, I publish articles in La Independencia, using as a basis the clippings that friends send me. Do not fail, therefore, to send me translations or clippings that you may consider favorable to our cause and should be known to the people.
I cannot send you the issues that contain my short articles, because I do not have them, as my stay here is not permanent but only temporary. I received news that the Government moved from Cabanatuan to Tarlac, but I do not know if this is true, although I am certain that the President has been there from the time of the Luna events.
Please extend my cordial regards to our colleague Kanoy and other countrymen of that colony, and command your affectionate and respectful
MABINI
The Commission headed by Don Gracio obtained nothing. Otis stands pat; he does not agree to a suspension of hostilities without our previous surrender. In view of this, Paterno issued a proclamation notifying the people of the continuation of the war.
Your father and Barcelona are in Paniqui. It is said that Don Marcelino had a serious illness, but he is now well. The Moreno family and others are back in Manila.
Same”[98]

June 20, 1899

In The Price of Freedom, Jose Alejandrino writes:

These were the opinions of Mabini when Luna was making superhuman efforts to remedy the existing chaos in our army due to the indiscipline which Mabini himself recognized in the first of his foregoing letters. Regarding the death of Luna, his opinion is expressed in the following letter[99]:
“Balungao, June 20, 1899
“Mr. Isidro de Santos
“My dear friend:
“I don’t know whether it is true, but impartial persons recognize in Luna some very dangerous tendencies because, while he wanted to impose by means of force the obedience of everybody, he did not want to obey anybody, and he did what pleased him without consulting anybody. At any rate, I deplore his very sad end, and it would have been less painful if he had succumbed in the field of battle and not in the hands of his own brothers. ***”
[…]
Mabini in a letter to Dr. Isidro de Santos of June 20, 1899 cited as causes of the death of Luna the supposed assassination of Major Joaquin Buencamino and the trial of Colonel Manuel Arguelles which I now propose to clarify.
[…]Seeing that Luna did not speak a word to me, I left him in order to ask the other officers about what happened. Colonel Liongson related to me that upon giving the report of the result of the trial, Luna blew up and Liongson did not know where to hide himself in his fear that he would eat him up alive. Other officers told me that Luna asked for a revolver and that all believed he would personally shoot Arguelles, but Luna limited himself to handing the pistol to him, telling him that if he had any sense of honor he should commit suicide. Arguelles naturally refused, and he was solemnly degraded and sent — I do not know where — to serve his sentence. I did not have to work for his pardon because, a few days afterwards, Luna was called to Kabanatuan where he met his tragic end, one of the consequences of which was the release of Arguelles.

June 24-30, 1899

In Kalaw’s book, the following is mentioned as the diary entries of Gen. Venancio Concepcion for June 24-30, 1899:

In view of the famous intrigues which resulted in the sensible death of our lamented General Antonio Luna and Colonel Roman, General Aguinaldo who lived under that false impression decided to have me always within his eyesight, and it is this fact which determined my present appointment and also the appointments of General Hizon and Colonel Leyva as first and second chiefs, respectively, of his military room; so that those who were cognizant of the great diplomacy of Aguinaldo called us the three punished ones.

[Kalaw: General Concepcion’s version of the death of Luna after gathering information from other officials is as follows:]

On the 2nd or 3rd of June Luna received a telegram from Aguinaldo asking him to form a new cabinet and asking him to see the President at Cabanatuan. Luna found out upon reaching Cabanatuan that the officer whom he had disarmed was in charge of the bodyguard of the president. Upon going up to the presidency he also found out that Aguinaldo had left for San Isidro. He was naturally disappointed at the apparent failure of the President to keep his appointment. Suddenly a revolver shot was heard from below. Luna walked downstairs to see what was the matter, but before he left the last steps he was stabbed in the back, then he and his aide Colonel Roman were fired upon and boloed, till they died.

July 1899

In The Roots of the Filipino Nation, O.D. Corpuz writes:

Aside from the men of the educated and professional class (both locally or foreign educated) there were two other important groups. One was composed of elected delegates. They were members of the provincial principalia or provincial military leadership. By July 1899 (after the proclamation of the Republic), there were around forty of them. The other group was composed of generals and other military commanders, including old Katipuneros, lately emerged leaders, and even a defector – Sityar, the Guardia Civil commander in Pasig. Aside from Antonio Luna, Alejandrino, Canon, and Sandico, there were Aguinaldo’s old comrades in arms: Teodoro Gonzalez, Ambrosio Flores, Pantaleon Garcia, Luciano San Miguel, Antonio Montenegro, Francisco Macabulos, Daniel Tirona, Arsenio Cruz Herrera, Pio del Pilar, Maximino Hizon, Pedro Lipana, Vito Belarmino, and Tomas Mascardo.[87]

July 5, 1899

Mabini writes to Palma:

LETTER TO RAFAEL PALMA[100]
Rosales, July 5, 1899
Mr. Rafael Palma
My dear Sir:
Day before yesterday, a short while before leaving Balungaw for this place, I received your pleasant letter of the 24th of June, last.
I am grateful for the good opinion that the paper has of my short works as well as for the favor that you do me in publishing them. I am also grateful, and very deeply so, for your offer to send me a copy every day from that date, although so far I have not yet received any number.
Enclosed is another short article, just in case you may consider it suitable for publication. As it is the only means that I have now of helping in the common work, I shall always toil in this way as long as I can; but one cannot expect brilliant articles from a man deficient in learning and strength.
I take advantage of this opportunity to offer myself as your attentive and loyal servant.
MABINI

July 22, 1899

Mabini to De Santos:

LETTER TO ISIDORO DE SANTOS[1][101]
Rosales, July 22, 1899
ISIDORO DE SANTOS
Hongkong
My dear Friend:
On the 19th, instant, I received your pleasant letter of June 17th with another from our friend Apacible and translations of foreign news which at once to “Puno”[2], who is in the capital of Tarlac with the whole Government. I have just received a letter from “Puno” in which he tells me that he expects to stay in peace for some time in that capital as the Americans, who are occupying San Fernando, Candaba and Baliwag, do not give any indications of moving upwards. However, I have also received news that American forces are being concentrated in San Fernando.
“Puno” tells me, besides, that the Americans who attacked Cavite had to fall back again towards Manila, leaving the towns they had taken and retaining only Imus and Bacoor where our own forces were attacking them. La Independencia has just published the news that the American forces had to return to Manila, leaving Cavite completely.
It seems that the Americans want really to take the narrow path they are talking about, because they suffered heavy casualties in the battle with our men between Morong and Binangonan. Let us see if they can do this, especially now that heavy rains have started to fall.
I have already informed you in my previous letters of the truth of the murder of Luna and Paco Roman. According to a circular of the Department of the Interior, Luna insulted the guards, kicking and slapping them and hitting them with the butt of his gun, for which reason the soldiers killed him. As I was in Balungaw on the date of the murder and from there I came to Rosales where I still am now, I cannot tell you anything definite. What there was to it was that Luna, as Undersecretary of War and ad interim Secretary in the absence of Don Mariano Trias, using as a pretext the tendency shown earlier by the present Cabinet to look for a settlement with the Americans on the basis of autonomy like that of Canada, moved the Department to Bayambang and, there he ran matters all by himself completely disregarding “Puno” and his colleagues in the Government. He acted thus because he wanted the Paterno Cabinet to resign, so that he could take charge of forming another Cabinet retaining for himself the Presidency with the Department of War. He announced thus in his newspaper when he was called by the President to Cabanatuan. You add to all these data the scandal against Buencamino and Paterno and the death of the son of the former, and you have enough to break your head if you try to imagine what took place. You do not need to recommend your father to me, because “Puno” regards him highly, and even if it were not so, you know full well that I like him as much as I do like you, and I would do what little I can in his favor.
Actually, I see that the American people are beginning to side with us and, as long as they do not change their way of thinking, they can largely contribute to our triumph. I have seen that they do not know the truth in the events that have taken place, that is why I have tried to coordinate my ideas and write them down on the enclosed sheet, without deviating in the least from the truth. If you and the others there believe that its publication is still timely, have it translated and published in the newspapers of America and of the neighboring places. See to it that the translation is faithful in order to avoid any change of concepts that may not be so convenient. I leave to you the choice of the best means for its publication because I believe that it cannot fail to cause an impression on the American people. I have not yet published it here for fear that the Yankees would adopt measures to prevent its publication in America. When I learn that you have already published it over there, I shall also release it here.
I think I have nothing more to tell you now. Should you find a good opportunity to send me a purely English dictionary, among the best of those being used by the Englishmen, I would be very grateful. The English-Spanish dictionaries contain very few terms and they neither give a good explanation of the real meaning nor the proper use of each term.
You know that you always have in me a friend that truly likes you.
MABINI
P.S.
Please send me foreign newspapers so that I will be thoroughly informed of what is going on there. Although I am out of the Government, I help with my modest short works that I publish in La Independencia. I do not send you copies of the paper because I suppose you receive them from the Administration itself.
Same
[1] From Balungaw, Mabini went to Kabarua, a barrio of Villasis, accompanied by Aguinaldo; then to the town proper of Villasis on the invitation of F. Isidoro C. Perez, and back to Rosales on the insistence of Zenon Corrales, Municipal President. The Government of the Republic had moved to Tarlac, the place becoming the provisional capital of the Republic, where the new Revolutionary Congress convened on July 14th, electing Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista as its President.
During his stay in Rosales up to the November, when due to the dispersion of the Philippine Government with the capture of Tarlac and Bayambang he had to hide from the invading army, he continued more intensely write newspaper articles. – T.M.K.
[2] General Emilio Aguinaldo.

July 25, 1899

Mabini to some friends:

LETTER TO KANOY AND IKKIS[1][102]
Rosales, July 25, 1899
MESSRS. KANOY AND IKKIS[2]
Hongkong
My dear Friends:
I acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 25th and 26th of June which I got only two days ago, not knowing what could have caused the delay. I sent “Puno” the translations of the foreign news, with the copy of the treaty between Spain and Germany, and your letters to him. I wrote Mr. Buencamino, telling him that you are complaining of his silence and that of the President of the Council of Government, and requesting him to inform you of the decision of the Government about Ilustre’s request for 800 gold pesos for his return expenses, an amount which, to me, seems somewhat excessive, unless he has to meet some obligations. I told him also that you already know about the change of the Cabinet, that is why I am of the opinion that you should also write to him about the general progress of the affairs over there, so that the members of the Cabinet will not think that you are not with them. The welfare of the country and our goals demand that you do this.
The autonomists of Manila are very much discredited in the eyes of the country, and in those of the Americans themselves who believed that the former could be of great service to them with the revolutionists. Even the present Cabinet has to change its opinion and program very soon and to continue our previous policy, because it has seen that if it would not lend itself to this change, it could not remain long in power, as “Puno”, backed by the Army and by the people, is decided to fight for independence. “Puno” wanted a suspension of hostilities only for a short time to afford the troops a much-needed rest and to gather pills.[3] Otis refused out of distrust, but “Puno” has partly obtained his wish, because the rains are forcing the enemy almost to inaction and the soldiers are disheartened. “Puno” tells me that the Government is ready to receive the Serge[4] any time, but it is necessary that it be soon.
The news about dissensions and formation of factions is not true. There are only the autonomists and the partisans of the war. The first are very few and they are within Manila and, even among these few, it seems to me that many show that they are so only for the sake of convenience. Among us, although I deplore and condemn the violent death of Luna, his demise has warded off a threatening tempest. Luna aimed high, convinced maybe that he was more cultured than “Puno” and, if he had not done anything as yet, it was because he had not yet acquired the necessary prestige to challenge “Puno” openly. That is why he aspired to the Presidency of the Council with the portfolio of war. “Puno’s” weakness before Luna has contributed much to rouse Luna’s ambitions. Because “Puno” allowed him to do what he wanted, Luna thought that he could manipulate “Puno” like a puppet. But, knowing “Puno” as I do, it is safe to suppose that had Luna obtained what he wanted, a cleavage would have taken place that may have destroyed us all. Despite everything, however, I frankly admit that, until now, I am yet in the dark as to the real motives behind Luna’s death, which I still cannot determine whether it was casual or premeditated.
I do not know if it is true that Paterno has asked to be allowed to return to Manila. It may be true, but the request may have been made before his coming into power, and after robbers have entered his house in Mejico, robbing him of plenty of money and jewelry. The news about General G. del Pilar is not true either; so much so, that “Puno” had appointed him one of the commissioners who went to Manila to ask for a suspension of hostilities, after Arguelles had failed and following the scandal stirred up by Luna against Buencamino and Paterno right after the formation of the present Cabinet.
“Puno” has just written to me about the appointment of Antonio Regidor as envoy to America. He tells me that Regidor’s power is limited to asking for the recognition of our independence. Would to heaven that he be more luck than “Kita.” As long as he would not allow himself to be flatter by the Americans, like the political acrobats of Manila, he can be of some service to us. The trouble with Regidor is that because he does not know our people well he may be guided by the information that he may receive from those of Manila. It will be up to you to put us on guard if needs be. On the other hand, the Americans know by now that the truly influential”
[1] Although retired from power, Mabini continued writing to the Committee in Hongkong and to his friends to inform them of the progress of the national politics with its varied incidents. It is a pity that the whole correspondence of this period has not been saved. – T.M.K.
[2] Dr. Isidoro de Santos
[3] Munitions
[4] Arms

In The Development of Philippine Politics, Maximo Kalaw writes:

This attitude of Mabini on the death of Luna is very significant, because in his Philippine Revolution written two or three years afterwards, he severely criticizes Aguinaldo for the death of Luna. Yet a few weeks after Luna’s death, Mabini wrote to Galicano Apacible who was then in Hongkong, as follows:
“Between us, while I regret and disapprove the violent death of Luna, his disappearance banished a danger which was menacing. Luna aspired a great deal, convinced perhaps that he was better educated than Puno (Aguinaldo); and if he had not done anything, it was because he had not yet acquired the necessary prestige to put himself face to face with Puno. It was for this reason that he aspired to the presidency of the Council as Secretary of War. The confidence that Puno had in him has contributed a great deal to feed his ambition; for inasmuch as Puno (Aguinaldo) gave him a free hand, he thought that he could manage the president as an automaton. But as I know Puno (Aguinaldo) it would not be a risky thing to suppose that if Luna had secured what he wanted there would have occurred a division which would have annihilated us.”([1]) [105]

In The Development of Philippine Politics, Maximo Kalaw writes:

In a letter written by F. Buencamino to Felipe Agoncillo dated at Tarlac, July 25. 1899 F. Buencamino said:
“In our camp there is great harmony and enthusiasm in the defense of our cause; respect, obedience and unity with Don Emilio Aguinaldo are the notable characteristics of the conduct of all; there has been one exception – Don Antonio Luna, but God ordained that in the clash with the body guard at Cabanatuan at a time when the President was absent from that point, this dissenter who wanted to do away with Don Emilio and raise himself to his place as dictator, lost his life.
“The proofs of this unmeasured anti-political ambition are dear and are preserved in possession of Don Emilio and although we all lament the circumstances, because we should have been better pleased had it not happened, we are reconciled to what has occurred because we have returned to that tranquility and unity so much needed to maintain our cause against the common enemy.” Taylor, Vol. IV, Exhibit 731. [105]

September 10,1899

In The Roots of the Filipino Nation, O.D. Corpuz writes:

The Filipino strategy would also change. Luna was the only general who could plan to fight battles with armies. Without him, the Paterno cabinet hoped to gain through negotiations what could not be won in battle. General Pio del Pilar had a different idea. On the 10th September he formally recommended guerrilla warfare. He had not played a major role in the more or less conventional battles along the railroad. He was in command in Morong and in the rough broken country of northeast Bulacan, including the area of historic Biak-na-Bato. This was east of the railroad, a region ideal for guerrilla warfare. On the 19th his recommendation was approved for the east line, where he was directed to harass the enemy constantly through “surprises and ambuscades.” [104]

October 13, 1899

October 19, 1899

In The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, Brian McAllister Linn writes:

American forces returned to Nueva Ecija in the fall of 1899 as part of Otis’s final campaign against the Republican Army in the north. Once again under Lawton, they blocked the mountain passes in the east and north of the province to prevent Aguinaldo’s army from retreating into northern Luzon. Pushing aside Padilla’s weak defenses, the soldiers occupied San Isidro on 19 October, but alternating low and high water, mud, and unseasonable rains stalled the advance shortly afterward. In a daring gamble, Lawton cut Brig. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young’s cavalry free of the supply train and sent them north to head off the fleeing president and link up with Wheaton’s forces who had landed at San Fabian. Young’s horsemen swept over Nueva Ecija’s demoralized Republicans and scattered them while Lawton’s infantry followed behind to occupy the towns. Aguinaldo retreated to the north, barely slipping between the converging American forces, but his army collapsed and broke up, the survivors fleeing to the hills or hiding their weapons and becoming “amigos.”
In their sweep through Nueva Ecija, Lawton’s forces encountered little organized resistance and were somewhat surprised at the friendliness of the population.[106]

November 1899

In The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, Brian McAllister Linn writes:

With the arrival of these new forces in November 1899, the Americans went on the offensive in a three-pronged drive directed at the Republican Army in the north. While Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur pinned down the Filipinos on the central Luzon plain, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton swept to the northeast and occupied the mountain passes, preventing any retreat to the east. The Filipinos fell back to the north, only to have their retreat cut off by Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton’s amphibious landing at Lingayen Gulf. Caught between the converging American forces, with their lines of retreat blocked, the Republican Army broke up. The revolutionaries lost their supplies…[106]

In The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, Brian McAllister Linn writes of Gen. Pantaleon Garcia:

But despite his intellectual abilities he was a poor combat commander who, by the fall of 1899,was suffering from physical exhaustion, lingering illness, and demoralization over the complete defeat of his conventional forces. After taking over the Center of Luzon, he spent much of his time in hiding, exerting little control over his subordinates and conducting few operations. His capture on 6 May 1900, at Jaen, Nueva Ecija, was not a “deathblow to the insurgent cause” as MacArthur claimed, but instead provided an opportunity for more aggressive leadership to emerge.
Garcia’s weak leadership at the top was compounded by poor guerrilla leadership within Nueva Ecija. The provincial commander, Col. Pablo Padilla, was unable or unwilling to control the misbehavior of his forces. Although a former governor of the province and a prominent figure in the war against the Spanish, he was badly beaten by the Americans during their invasion in late 1899. Moreover, he failed to take advantage of the Army’s disorganization during the winter of 1899-1900 and instead suspended hostilities until February, allowing the Americans to consolidate their position. American Army officers despised him; one called him “a cruel and cowardly scoundrel” and suspected he had murdered several pro-American Filipinos. In the north of Nueva Ecija, Col. Teodoro Sandico, another ilustrado and veteran of the 1896 revolt, was little better. Described by Funston as a military nonentity, Sandico admitted that he was a colonel without troops. He spent much of his time in quarrels with other commanders and complained bitterly to Aguinaldo that nobody accepted his authority.
From its inception, the guerrilla movement in the Fourth District was hampered by the failure of its leaders to establish a civil organization in the towns and barrios that could support military operations. The explanation may lie in the speed of the American advance in the fall of 1899, the lack of political and administrative skills among provincial guerrilla chiefs, or the internal divisions within Nueva Ecijan society. Garcia and Padilla issued proclamations forbidding Filipinos to accept civil office under the Americans, but they could not enforce these decrees. Captured correspondence indicates that, unlike their counterparts elsewhere, they neglected the creation of loyal militias, shadow governments, Katipunan societies, storehouses, and village supply organizations which made up the usual Philippine guerrilla infrastructure. As a result, they had a hard time organizing such an infrastructure after the Americans had occupied the key towns. Although some guerrilla chiefs did establish ties with local principalia or insured collaboration through intimidation, this effort was not carried on in a systematic way throughout the province. Where an individual military leader could form such connections, he was able to secure food and shelter. Far too often, however, the revolutionaries consisted of small bands of partisans, isolated from popular support, and moving from place to place without a consistent source of supplies.[106]

December 1899

In The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, Brian McAllister Linn writes:

In December 1899, the new district commander rode through the province with a two-man escort and commented that the area was so peaceful that he could not tell there was a war going on. The lack of resistance allowed the Army to reorganize its chaotic administration and supply system which was now “fearfully strung out.” [107]

[1] Corpuz, O.D., The Roots of the Filipino Nation Philippine Centennial (1898-1998) Centennial Edition Volume II, 1989, pp.111, 152, 161, 163, 172, 179, and 181

[2] – Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, pp. 99-103

[3] –Anderson, Benedict, Under Three Flags, 2005, pp. 126-128

[4] Antonio Luna– Letter to Jose Rizal, January 1892, Madrid, Epistolario Rizalino, Vol. III, in Jose, Vivencio, The Rise and Fall of Antonio Luna, 1972. pp. 291-294

[5] Jose Rizal, The Philippines a Century Hence

[6] St. Claire, Francis, The Katipunan or The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune, 1902, pp. 78 and 88

[7] Corpuz, O.D., The Roots of the Filipino Nation Philippine Centennial (1898-1998) Centennial Edition Volume II, 1989, p.203-205

[8] Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, p. 104

[9] –Mabini, Apolinario, Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 1965, p.27

[10] –Mabini, Apolinario, Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 1965, p.118

[11] –Ricklefs, M.C., Lockhart, Bruce, Lau, Albert, et.al, A New History Of Southeast Asia, 2010, p. 226

[12] –Owen, Norman, The Emergence Of Modern Southeast Asia- A New History, 2014, p.156

[13] –Schumacher, John, review of Vivencio Jose’s “The Rise and Fall of Antonio Luna”, 1972

[14] Corpuz, O.D., The Roots of the Filipino Nation Philippine Centennial (1898-1998) Centennial Edition Volume II, 1989, p. 225

[15] –St. Claire, Francis, The Katipunan or The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune, 1902, p. 78

[16] –Ricklefs, M.C., Lockhart, Bruce, Lau, Albert, A New History Of Southeast Asia, 2010, p. 226

[17] Schumacher, John N., Socioeconomic Class in the Revolution, 1998, pp. 192, 197-198

[18] Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, p.104

[19] St. Claire, Francis, The Katipunan or The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune, 1902, p. 80

[20] Corpuz, O.D., The Roots of the Filipino Nation Philippine Centennial (1898-1998) Centennial Edition Volume II, 1989, p.205

[21] –Reyes, Raquel, Love, Passion and Patriotism: Sexuality and the Philippine Propaganda 1882-1892, 2008, p.118

[22] –Buencamino, Felipe, Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands, 1902, p.55

[23] The Philippine review (Revista filipina) [Vol. 3, no. 1], 2005, p.34

[24] –Buencamino, Felipe, Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands, 1902, p.56

[25] –Buencamino, Felipe, Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands, 1902, p. 71

[26] –Buencamino, Felipe, Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands, 1902, p. 56

[27] – Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, pp. 105, and 104

[28] – Corpuz, O.D., The Roots of the Filipino Nation Philippine Centennial (1898-1998) Centennial Edition Volume II, 1989, p 305.

[29] – McAllister Linn, Brian, The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 2000, p.13

[30] –Kalaw, Maximo, The development of Philippine politics, 1986, pp.194-195

[31] –Buencamino, Felipe, Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands, 1902, pp. 4, 67-68

[32] – Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949

[33] –De los Santos, Epifanio, The Revolutionists: Aguinaldo, Bonifacio, Jacinto, 1973, pp. 41, 26-27

[34] –Luna, Antonio, “Lo que decimos,” La Independencia, December 10, 1898

[35] –Corpuz, O.D., The Roots of the Filipino Nation Philippine Centennial (1898-1998) Centennial Edition Volume II, 1989, pp. 305, 295

[36] – Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, p.115

[37] Mabini, Apolinario, La Revolucion Filipina, 1969, pp. 59-60

[38] Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, pp.125-126

[39] –Buencamino, Felipe, Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands, 1902, p. 64

[40] –Buencamino, Felipe, Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands, 1902, p. 68

[41] –Buencamino, Felipe, Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands, 1902, pp. 70-71

[42] – Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, pp. 110, 113-114, 118

[43] –Saulo, Alfredo B., citing Taylor, The Truth About Aguinaldo and Other Heroes, 1987, p.22

[44] – Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, pp.117-119

[45] – Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, p.126, p.120

[46] – Corpuz, O.D., The Roots of the Filipino Nation Philippine Centennial (1898-1998) Centennial Edition Volume II, 1989, p.409

[47] Saulo, Alfredo B., citing Taylor, The Truth About Aguinaldo and Other Heroes, 1987, pp. 23-24

[48] Philippine Information Society, Facts about the Filipinos. [Vol. 1, no. 7], 2005, p.11

[49] McAllister Linn, Brian, The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 2000, pp. 12-14

[50] Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, pp.151-152

[51] McAllister Linn, Brian, The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 2000, p.14

[52] Corpuz, O.D., The Roots of the Filipino Nation Philippine Centennial (1898-1998) Centennial Edition Volume II, 1989, pp 410, 406

[53] Saulo, Alfredo B., The Truth About Aguinaldo and Other Heroes, 1987, p.22

[54] Mabini, Apolinario, Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 1965, p.132

[55] Mabini, Apolinario, Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 1965, pp. 136-137

[56] Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, pp. 127-130

[57] Ocampo, Ambeth, The way Antonio Luna died, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 11, 2015

[58] McAllister Linn, Brian, The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 2000, p.12

[59] Saulo, Alfredo B., The Truth About Aguinaldo and Other Heroes, 1987, p.19

[60] Mabini, Apolinario, Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 1965, pp.154-155

[61] Kalaw, Maximo, The development of Philippine politics, 1986, pp. 195-196

[62] Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, pp. 110, 113

[63] Santos, Jose P. ,Si Apolinario Mabini laban kay Hen. Antonio Luna, 2005, pp. 27-28

[64] Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, pp. 117-118

[65] Kalaw, Maximo, The development of Philippine politics, 1986, p.195-197, 206-207

[66] Buencamino, Felipe, Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands, 1902, pp. 4-5

[67] Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, pp.135-136, 139

[68]Quezon, Manuel L., The Good Fight

[69] Mabini, Apolinario, La Revolucion Filipina, 1969, p.60

[70] Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, pp.130-131, 134

[71] Corpuz, O.D., The Roots of the Filipino Nation Philippine Centennial (1898-1998) Centennial Edition Volume II, 1989, p. 417

[72] Mabini, Apolinario, Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 1965, pp.172-174

[73] McAllister Linn, Brian, The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 2000, p.69

[74] Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, pp.136

[75] Memoirs of Victor Buencamino, 1977, pp.46-47

[76] Saulo, Alfredo B., citing Taylor, The Truth About Aguinaldo and Other Heroes, 1987, pp. 24-25

[77] Luna, Antonio, La Indepedencia, May 20, 1899

[78] Mabini, Apolinario, Letter to Isidoro de Santos in Hong Kong, July 2, 1899, Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 1965, pp. 190

[79] Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, p.140

[80] Mabini, Apolinario, Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 1965, pp. 182-183

[81] Buencamino, Felipe, Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands, 1902, p.5

[82] Luna, Antonio, letter to Ms. Conchita Castillo, June 2, 1899

[83] Saulo, Alfredo B., citing Kalaw, The Truth About Aguinaldo and Other Heroes, 1987, p.24

[84] Mabini, Apolinario, La Revolucion Filipina, 1969, p. 62

[85] Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, pp.142, 149-150, and p.156

[86] Mabini, Apolinario, letter to Isidoro de Santos in Hong Kong on July 2, 1899, Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 1965, pp. 190

[87] Corpuz, O.D., The Roots of the Filipino Nation Philippine Centennial (1898-1998) Centennial Edition Volume II, 1989, p 317-318

[88] Mabini, Apolinario, letter to Isidoro de Santos in Hong Kong on July 22, 1899, Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 1965, pp. 195-196

[89] Mabini, Apolinario, La Revolucion Filipina, 1901

[90] Agoncillo, Malolos; The Crisis of the Republic (Quezon City: U.P. Press, 1960), pp. 537-538

[91] Kalaw, Maximo, The development of Philippine politics, 1986, pp.195-197, 207-213, 216

[92] Buencamino, Felipe, Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands, 1902, pp. 26-28

[93] Buencamino, Felipe, Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands, 1902, pp. 101-102

[94] Buencamino, Felipe, Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands, 1902, p. 5-6

[95] Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, p. 160

[96] Ocampo, Ambeth, Who really ordered Luna’s murder? Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 5, 2015

[97] Buencamino, Felipe, Statement before the Committee on Insular Affairs on Conditions in the Philippine Islands, 1902, p.5

[98] Mabini, Apolinario, Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 1965, pp. 190-191

[99] Alejandrino, Jose M. ,The Price of Freedom (La Senda Del Sacrificio): Episodes and Anecdotes of Our Struggles for Freedom. Translated Into English, 1949, p.155-156, p. 143 and pp.148-149

[100] Mabini, Apolinario, Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 1965, p. 194

[101] Mabini, Apolinario, Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 1965, pp. 195-197

[102] Mabini, Apolinario, Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 1965, pp. 200-201

[103] De los Santos, Epifanio, The Revolutionists: Aguinaldo, Bonifacio, Jacinto, 1973, pp. 44-47

[104] Corpuz, O.D., The Roots of the Filipino Nation Philippine Centennial (1898-1998) Centennial Edition Volume II, 1989, p. 435

[105] Kalaw, Maximo, The development of Philippine politics, 1986, pp.213-214

[106] Brian McAllister Linn, The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 2000, p.69

[107] Brian McAllister Linn, The US Army & Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 2000, p.69